From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 18:01:11 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called, in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups. The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call that function in the setgroups permission check. This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups without privilege using user namespaces. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 5 +++++ kernel/groups.c | 4 +++- kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index e95372654f09..8d493083486a 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ extern const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations; extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *); extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *); extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *); +extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns); #else static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) @@ -87,6 +88,10 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) { } +static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + return true; +} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */ diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c index 02d8a251c476..664411f171b5 100644 --- a/kernel/groups.c +++ b/kernel/groups.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */ @@ -217,7 +218,8 @@ bool may_setgroups(void) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); - return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID); + return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID) && + userns_may_setgroups(user_ns); } /* diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index b99c862a2e3f..27c8dab48c07 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -843,6 +843,20 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, return false; } +bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + bool allowed; + + mutex_lock(&id_map_mutex); + /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in + * the user namespace has been established. + */ + allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0; + mutex_unlock(&id_map_mutex); + + return allowed; +} + static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) { struct user_namespace *user_ns; -- 2.1.0