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Fix unsafe pointer access in sendmsg/sendmmsg

This commit is contained in:
Chuck Ebbert 2011-08-30 09:18:58 -04:00
parent 9c11a5058e
commit d6189c7ffd
2 changed files with 70 additions and 1 deletions
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11
kernel.spec
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@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# When changing real_sublevel below, reset this by hand to 1
# (or to 0 and then use rpmdev-bumpspec).
#
%global baserelease 3
%global baserelease 4
%global fedora_build %{baserelease}
# real_sublevel is the 3.x kernel version we're starting with
@ -680,6 +680,9 @@ Patch21004: vfs-fix-automount-for-negative-autofs-dentries.patch
# rhbz#727927 rhbz#731278 rhbz#732934
Patch21005: cifs-fix-ERR_PTR-dereference-in-cifs_get_root.patch
# from 3.0.5 patch queue
Patch21006: sendmmsg-sendmsg-fix-unsafe-user-pointer-access.patch
%endif
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/kernel-%{KVERREL}-root
@ -1229,6 +1232,9 @@ ApplyPatch vfs-fix-automount-for-negative-autofs-dentries.patch
# cifs-possible-memory-corruption-on-mount.patch is already queued for 3.0.4
ApplyPatch cifs-fix-ERR_PTR-dereference-in-cifs_get_root.patch
# from 3.0.5 patch queue
ApplyPatch sendmmsg-sendmsg-fix-unsafe-user-pointer-access.patch
# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
%endif
@ -1849,6 +1855,9 @@ fi
# and build.
%changelog
* Tue Aug 30 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> 2.6.40.4-4
- Fix unsafe pointer access in sendmsg/sendmmsg
* Mon Aug 29 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> 2.6.40.4-3
- Linux 3.0.4

60
sendmmsg-sendmsg-fix-unsafe-user-pointer-access.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 19:45:03 -0700
Subject: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
commit bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c upstream.
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
net/socket.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1965,8 +1965,9 @@ static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
- if (used_address && used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
- !memcmp(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
+ if (used_address && msg_sys->msg_name &&
+ used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
+ !memcmp(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
@@ -1978,8 +1979,9 @@ static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
- memcpy(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
- used_address->name_len);
+ if (msg_sys->msg_name)
+ memcpy(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
+ used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl: