Linux v4.5.5

This commit is contained in:
Josh Boyer 2016-05-19 08:29:30 -04:00
parent 2b03673893
commit c2ddac6027
8 changed files with 4 additions and 406 deletions

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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From 8358b02bf67d3a5d8a825070e1aa73f25fb2e4c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 22:26:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] bpf: fix double-fdput in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()
When bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...) was invoked with a BPF program whose bytecode
references a non-map file descriptor as a map file descriptor, the error
handling code called fdput() twice instead of once (in __bpf_map_get() and
in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()). If the file descriptor table of the
current task is shared, this causes f_count to be decremented too much,
allowing the struct file to be freed while it is still in use
(use-after-free). This can be exploited to gain root privileges by an
unprivileged user.
This bug was introduced in
commit 0246e64d9a5f ("bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn"), but is only
exploitable since
commit 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") because
previously, CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required to reach the vulnerable code.
(posted publicly according to request by maintainer)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 618ef77c302a..db2574e7b8b0 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2030,7 +2030,6 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
- fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
--
2.5.5

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@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
From 86db8dac9286f8397434184a6b442b6419e54ec0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2016 18:56:20 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 3 ++-
kernel/bpf/inode.c | 7 ++++---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 +++++++----
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 83d1926c61e4..67bc2da5d233 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -165,12 +165,13 @@ void bpf_register_prog_type(struct bpf_prog_type_list *tl);
void bpf_register_map_type(struct bpf_map_type_list *tl);
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd);
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_inc(struct bpf_prog *prog);
void bpf_prog_put(struct bpf_prog *prog);
void bpf_prog_put_rcu(struct bpf_prog *prog);
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd);
struct bpf_map *__bpf_map_get(struct fd f);
-void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref);
+struct bpf_map *bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref);
void bpf_map_put_with_uref(struct bpf_map *map);
void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
index 5a8a797d50b7..d1a7646f79c5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ static void *bpf_any_get(void *raw, enum bpf_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case BPF_TYPE_PROG:
- atomic_inc(&((struct bpf_prog *)raw)->aux->refcnt);
+ raw = bpf_prog_inc(raw);
break;
case BPF_TYPE_MAP:
- bpf_map_inc(raw, true);
+ raw = bpf_map_inc(raw, true);
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
goto out;
raw = bpf_any_get(inode->i_private, *type);
- touch_atime(&path);
+ if (!IS_ERR(raw))
+ touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
return raw;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 3b39550d8485..4e32cc94edd9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -181,11 +181,18 @@ struct bpf_map *__bpf_map_get(struct fd f)
return f.file->private_data;
}
-void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
+/* prog's and map's refcnt limit */
+#define BPF_MAX_REFCNT 32768
+
+struct bpf_map *bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
- atomic_inc(&map->refcnt);
+ if (atomic_inc_return(&map->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
+ atomic_dec(&map->refcnt);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ }
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
+ return map;
}
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd)
@@ -197,7 +204,7 @@ struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return map;
- bpf_map_inc(map, true);
+ map = bpf_map_inc(map, true);
fdput(f);
return map;
@@ -580,6 +587,15 @@ static struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_get(struct fd f)
return f.file->private_data;
}
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_inc(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ if (atomic_inc_return(&prog->aux->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
+ atomic_dec(&prog->aux->refcnt);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ }
+ return prog;
+}
+
/* called by sockets/tracing/seccomp before attaching program to an event
* pairs with bpf_prog_put()
*/
@@ -592,7 +608,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return prog;
- atomic_inc(&prog->aux->refcnt);
+ prog = bpf_prog_inc(prog);
fdput(f);
return prog;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2e7f7ab739e4..060e4c4c37ea 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2023,15 +2023,18 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
return -E2BIG;
}
- /* remember this map */
- env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
-
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
- bpf_map_inc(map, false);
+ map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(map)) {
+ fdput(f);
+ return PTR_ERR(map);
+ }
+ env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
+
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
--
2.5.5

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@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From 99d825822eade8d827a1817357cbf3f889a552d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 16:25:35 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] get_rock_ridge_filename(): handle malformed NM entries
Payloads of NM entries are not supposed to contain NUL. When we run
into such, only the part prior to the first NUL goes into the
concatenation (i.e. the directory entry name being encoded by a bunch
of NM entries). We do stop when the amount collected so far + the
claimed amount in the current NM entry exceed 254. So far, so good,
but what we return as the total length is the sum of *claimed*
sizes, not the actual amount collected. And that can grow pretty
large - not unlimited, since you'd need to put CE entries in
between to be able to get more than the maximum that could be
contained in one isofs directory entry / continuation chunk and
we are stop once we'd encountered 32 CEs, but you can get about 8Kb
easily. And that's what will be passed to readdir callback as the
name length. 8Kb __copy_to_user() from a buffer allocated by
__get_free_page()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 0.98pl6+ (yes, really)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
fs/isofs/rock.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c
index 5384ceb35b1c..98b3eb7d8eaf 100644
--- a/fs/isofs/rock.c
+++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ int get_rock_ridge_filename(struct iso_directory_record *de,
int retnamlen = 0;
int truncate = 0;
int ret = 0;
+ char *p;
+ int len;
if (!ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock)
return 0;
@@ -267,12 +269,17 @@ repeat:
rr->u.NM.flags);
break;
}
- if ((strlen(retname) + rr->len - 5) >= 254) {
+ len = rr->len - 5;
+ if (retnamlen + len >= 254) {
truncate = 1;
break;
}
- strncat(retname, rr->u.NM.name, rr->len - 5);
- retnamlen += rr->len - 5;
+ p = memchr(rr->u.NM.name, '\0', len);
+ if (unlikely(p))
+ len = p - rr->u.NM.name;
+ memcpy(retname + retnamlen, rr->u.NM.name, len);
+ retnamlen += len;
+ retname[retnamlen] = '\0';
break;
case SIG('R', 'E'):
kfree(rs.buffer);
--
2.5.5

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@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
From 9f79323a0aebccb9915ab8f4b7dcf531578b9cf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 20:23:31 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] ipv4/fib: don't warn when primary address is missing if
in_dev is dead
After commit fbd40ea0180a ("ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work
during inetdev destroy.") when deleting an interface,
fib_del_ifaddr() can be executed without any primary address
present on the dead interface.
The above is safe, but triggers some "bug: prim == NULL" warnings.
This commit avoids warning if the in_dev is dead
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
---
net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
index 8a9246deccfe..63566ec54794 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
@@ -904,7 +904,11 @@ void fib_del_ifaddr(struct in_ifaddr *ifa, struct in_ifaddr *iprim)
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) {
prim = inet_ifa_byprefix(in_dev, any, ifa->ifa_mask);
if (!prim) {
- pr_warn("%s: bug: prim == NULL\n", __func__);
+ /* if the device has been deleted, we don't perform
+ * address promotion
+ */
+ if (!in_dev->dead)
+ pr_warn("%s: bug: prim == NULL\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (iprim && iprim != prim) {
--
2.5.5

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@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
%if 0%{?released_kernel}
# Do we have a -stable update to apply?
%define stable_update 4
%define stable_update 5
# Set rpm version accordingly
%if 0%{?stable_update}
%define stablerev %{stable_update}
@ -635,9 +635,6 @@ Patch701: antenna_select.patch
#rhbz 1302071
Patch702: x86-build-Build-compressed-x86-kernels-as-PIE.patch
# Follow on for CVE-2016-3156
Patch703: ipv4-fib-don-t-warn-when-primary-address-is-missing-.patch
# Stop splashing crap about broken firmware BGRT
Patch704: x86-efi-bgrt-Switch-all-pr_err-to-pr_debug-for-inval.patch
@ -647,14 +644,6 @@ Patch705: mm-thp-kvm-fix-memory-corruption-in-KVM-with-THP-ena.patch
#CVE-2016-4482 rhbz 1332931 1332932
Patch706: USB-usbfs-fix-potential-infoleak-in-devio.patch
#CVE-2016-4486 CVE-2016-4485 rhbz 1333316 1333309 1333321
Patch707: net-fix-infoleak-in-llc.patch
Patch708: net-fix-infoleak-in-rtnetlink.patch
#CVE-2016-4557 CVE-2016-4558 rhbz 1334307 1334303 1334311
Patch711: bpf-fix-double-fdput-in-replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr.patch
Patch712: bpf-fix-refcnt-overflow.patch
#rhbz 1328633
Patch713: sp5100_tco-properly-check-for-new-register-layouts.patch
@ -669,9 +658,6 @@ Patch717: KEYS-Fix-ASN.1-indefinite-length-object-parsing.patch
#CVE-2016-3713 rhbz 1332139 1336410
Patch718: KVM-MTRR-remove-MSR-0x2f8.patch
#CVE-2016-4913 rhbz 1337528 1337529
Patch719: get_rock_ridge_filename-handle-malformed-NM-entries.patch
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
%endif
@ -2193,7 +2179,8 @@ fi
#
#
%changelog
* Thu May 19 2016 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
* Thu May 19 2016 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> - 4.5.5-300
- Linux v4.5.5
- CVE-2016-4913 isofs: info leak with malformed NM entries (rhbz 1337528 1337529)
* Mon May 16 2016 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>

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@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From ec0de35ded8c4a8588290a1b442aa3aa4bdf4de1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kangjie Lu <kangjielu@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 16:35:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] net: fix infoleak in llc
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/llc/af_llc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c
index b3c52e3f689a..8ae3ed97d95c 100644
--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c
+++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c
@@ -626,6 +626,7 @@ static void llc_cmsg_rcv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct llc_pktinfo info;
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.lpi_ifindex = llc_sk(skb->sk)->dev->ifindex;
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &info.lpi_sap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, info.lpi_mac);
--
2.5.5

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@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
From 55a8a812d867ec9953bde7d86eef255a1abbf93e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kangjie Lu <kangjielu@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2016 16:46:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index a75f7e94b445..65763c29f845 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1180,14 +1180,16 @@ static noinline_for_stack int rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
static int rtnl_fill_link_ifmap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
- struct rtnl_link_ifmap map = {
- .mem_start = dev->mem_start,
- .mem_end = dev->mem_end,
- .base_addr = dev->base_addr,
- .irq = dev->irq,
- .dma = dev->dma,
- .port = dev->if_port,
- };
+ struct rtnl_link_ifmap map;
+
+ memset(&map, 0, sizeof(map));
+ map.mem_start = dev->mem_start;
+ map.mem_end = dev->mem_end;
+ map.base_addr = dev->base_addr;
+ map.irq = dev->irq;
+ map.dma = dev->dma;
+ map.port = dev->if_port;
+
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MAP, sizeof(map), &map))
return -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.5.5

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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
a60d48eee08ec0536d5efb17ca819aef linux-4.5.tar.xz
6f557fe90b800b615c85c2ca04da6154 perf-man-4.5.tar.gz
137460a1e32335e2eedc61fcfc2643fa patch-4.5.4.xz
fe89010925304f6f07713741f0c8e811 patch-4.5.5.xz