Copy security fixes from F13

[SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads (CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495) agp: fix arbitrary kernel memory writes (CVE-2011-1745) agp: fix OOM and buffer overflow (CVE-2011-1746)
2011-05-03 05:31:03 -04:00 · 2011-05-03 05:31:03 -04:00 · b8c6e51855
parent 9e4696b4a4
commit b8c6e51855
4 changed files with 216 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/agp-fix-arbitrary-kernel-memory-writes.patch
+++ b/agp-fix-arbitrary-kernel-memory-writes.patch
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
+Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 16:55:16 +0000 (+0400)
+Subject: agp: fix arbitrary kernel memory writes
+X-Git-Tag: v2.6.39-rc5~29^2
+X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=194b3da873fd334ef183806db751473512af29ce
+
+agp: fix arbitrary kernel memory writes
+
+pg_start is copied from userspace on AGPIOC_BIND and AGPIOC_UNBIND ioctl
+cmds of agp_ioctl() and passed to agpioc_bind_wrap().  As said in the
+comment, (pg_start + mem->page_count) may wrap in case of AGPIOC_BIND,
+and it is not checked at all in case of AGPIOC_UNBIND.  As a result, user
+with sufficient privileges (usually "video" group) may generate either
+local DoS or privilege escalation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
+---
+
+diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/generic.c b/drivers/char/agp/generic.c
+index 850a643..b072648 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/agp/generic.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/generic.c
+@@ -1095,8 +1095,8 @@ int agp_generic_insert_memory(struct agp_memory * mem, off_t pg_start, int type)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* AK: could wrap */
+-	if ((pg_start + mem->page_count) > num_entries)
+	if (((pg_start + mem->page_count) > num_entries) ||
+	    ((pg_start + mem->page_count) < pg_start))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	j = pg_start;
+@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ int agp_generic_remove_memory(struct agp_memory *mem, off_t pg_start, int type)
+ {
+ 	size_t i;
+ 	struct agp_bridge_data *bridge;
+-	int mask_type;
+	int mask_type, num_entries;
+ 
+ 	bridge = mem->bridge;
+ 	if (!bridge)
+@@ -1142,6 +1142,11 @@ int agp_generic_remove_memory(struct agp_memory *mem, off_t pg_start, int type)
+ 	if (type != mem->type)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+	num_entries = agp_num_entries();
+	if (((pg_start + mem->page_count) > num_entries) ||
+	    ((pg_start + mem->page_count) < pg_start))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+ 	mask_type = bridge->driver->agp_type_to_mask_type(bridge, type);
+ 	if (mask_type != 0) {
+ 		/* The generic routines know nothing of memory types */
--- a/agp-fix-oom-and-buffer-overflow.patch
+++ b/agp-fix-oom-and-buffer-overflow.patch
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
+Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 16:55:19 +0000 (+0400)
+Subject: agp: fix OOM and buffer overflow
+X-Git-Tag: v2.6.39-rc5~29^2~1
+X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=b522f02184b413955f3bc952e3776ce41edc6355
+
+agp: fix OOM and buffer overflow
+
+page_count is copied from userspace.  agp_allocate_memory() tries to
+check whether this number is too big, but doesn't take into account the
+wrap case.  Also agp_create_user_memory() doesn't check whether
+alloc_size is calculated from num_agp_pages variable without overflow.
+This may lead to allocation of too small buffer with following buffer
+overflow.
+
+Another problem in agp code is not addressed in the patch - kernel memory
+exhaustion (AGPIOC_RESERVE and AGPIOC_ALLOCATE ioctls).  It is not checked
+whether requested pid is a pid of the caller (no check in agpioc_reserve_wrap()).
+Each allocation is limited to 16KB, though, there is no per-process limit.
+This might lead to OOM situation, which is not even solved in case of the
+caller death by OOM killer - the memory is allocated for another (faked) process.
+
+Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
+---
+
+diff --git a/drivers/char/agp/generic.c b/drivers/char/agp/generic.c
+index 012cba0..850a643 100644
+--- a/drivers/char/agp/generic.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/generic.c
+@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ static struct agp_memory *agp_create_user_memory(unsigned long num_agp_pages)
+ 	struct agp_memory *new;
+ 	unsigned long alloc_size = num_agp_pages*sizeof(struct page *);
+ 
+	if (INT_MAX/sizeof(struct page *) < num_agp_pages)
+		return NULL;
+
+ 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct agp_memory), GFP_KERNEL);
+ 	if (new == NULL)
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -234,11 +237,14 @@ struct agp_memory *agp_allocate_memory(struct agp_bridge_data *bridge,
+ 	int scratch_pages;
+ 	struct agp_memory *new;
+ 	size_t i;
+	int cur_memory;
+ 
+ 	if (!bridge)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((atomic_read(&bridge->current_memory_agp) + page_count) > bridge->max_memory_agp)
+	cur_memory = atomic_read(&bridge->current_memory_agp);
+	if ((cur_memory + page_count > bridge->max_memory_agp) ||
+	    (cur_memory + page_count < page_count))
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (type >= AGP_USER_TYPES) {
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@ -832,6 +832,13 @@ Patch13711: md-fix-regression-resulting-in-delays-in-clearing-bits-in-a-bitmap.p

 Patch13713: virtio_net-add-schedule-check-to-napi_enable-call.patch

+# cve-2011-1745
+Patch13957: agp-fix-arbitrary-kernel-memory-writes.patch
+# cve-2011-1746
+Patch13958: agp-fix-oom-and-buffer-overflow.patch
+# CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495
+Patch13960: scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch
+
 %endif

 BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/kernel-%{KVERREL}-root
@ -1563,6 +1570,13 @@ ApplyPatch md-fix-regression-resulting-in-delays-in-clearing-bits-in-a-bitmap.pa

 ApplyPatch virtio_net-add-schedule-check-to-napi_enable-call.patch

+# cve-2011-1745
+ApplyPatch agp-fix-arbitrary-kernel-memory-writes.patch
+# cve-2011-1746
+ApplyPatch agp-fix-oom-and-buffer-overflow.patch
+# CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495
+ApplyPatch scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch
+
 # END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS

 %endif
@ -2149,6 +2163,12 @@ fi
 # and build.

 %changelog
+* Tue May 03 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> 2.6.35.13-91
+- [SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
+  (CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495)
+- agp: fix arbitrary kernel memory writes (CVE-2011-1745)
+- agp: fix OOM and buffer overflow (CVE-2011-1746)
+
 * Thu Apr 29 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
 - Linux 2.6.35.13

--- a/scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch
+++ b/scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 16:45:59 +0000 (-0400)
+Subject: [SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
+X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=a1f74ae82d133ebb2aabb19d181944b4e83e9960
+
+[trivial backport to 2.6.34]
+
+[SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
+
+At two points in handling device ioctls via /dev/mpt2ctl, user-supplied
+length values are used to copy data from userspace into heap buffers
+without bounds checking, allowing controllable heap corruption and
+subsequently privilege escalation.
+
+Additionally, user-supplied values are used to determine the size of a
+copy_to_user() as well as the offset into the buffer to be read, with no
+bounds checking, allowing users to read arbitrary kernel memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
+Cc: stable@kernel.org
+Acked-by: Eric Moore <eric.moore@lsi.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
+---
+
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
+index 1c6d2b4..d72f1f2 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
+@@ -688,6 +688,13 @@ _ctl_do_mpt_command(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc,
+ 	data_out_sz = karg.data_out_size;
+ 	data_in_sz = karg.data_in_size;
+ 
+	/* Check for overflow and wraparound */
+	if (karg.data_sge_offset * 4 > ioc->request_sz ||
+	    karg.data_sge_offset > (UINT_MAX / 4)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ 	/* copy in request message frame from user */
+ 	if (copy_from_user(mpi_request, mf, karg.data_sge_offset*4)) {
+ 		printk(KERN_ERR "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
+@@ -1963,7 +1970,7 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
+ 	Mpi2DiagBufferPostReply_t *mpi_reply;
+ 	int rc, i;
+ 	u8 buffer_type;
+-	unsigned long timeleft;
+	unsigned long timeleft, request_size, copy_size;
+ 	u16 smid;
+ 	u16 ioc_status;
+ 	u8 issue_reset = 0;
+@@ -1999,6 +2006,8 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 	}
+ 
+	request_size = ioc->diag_buffer_sz[buffer_type];
+
+ 	if ((karg.starting_offset % 4) || (karg.bytes_to_read % 4)) {
+ 		printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: either the starting_offset "
+ 		    "or bytes_to_read are not 4 byte aligned\n", ioc->name,
+@@ -2006,13 +2015,23 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (karg.starting_offset > request_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+ 	diag_data = (void *)(request_data + karg.starting_offset);
+ 	dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MPT2SAS_DEBUG_FMT "%s: diag_buffer(%p), "
+ 	    "offset(%d), sz(%d)\n", ioc->name, __func__,
+ 	    diag_data, karg.starting_offset, karg.bytes_to_read));
+ 
+	/* Truncate data on requests that are too large */
+	if ((diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read < diag_data) ||
+	    (diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read > request_data + request_size))
+		copy_size = request_size - karg.starting_offset;
+	else
+		copy_size = karg.bytes_to_read;
+
+ 	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)uarg->diagnostic_data,
+-	    diag_data, karg.bytes_to_read)) {
+	    diag_data, copy_size)) {
+ 		printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: Unable to write "
+ 		    "mpt_diag_read_buffer_t data @ %p\n", ioc->name,
+ 		    __func__, diag_data);