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Linux v4.14.3

This commit is contained in:
Justin M. Forbes 2017-11-30 07:44:30 -06:00
parent bff21f88c7
commit b6e85294ed
4 changed files with 117 additions and 301 deletions
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108
0001-mm-thp-Do-not-make-page-table-dirty-unconditionally-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
From a8f97366452ed491d13cf1e44241bc0b5740b1f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 06:21:25 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] mm, thp: Do not make page table dirty unconditionally in
touch_p[mu]d()
Currently, we unconditionally make page table dirty in touch_pmd().
It may result in false-positive can_follow_write_pmd().
We may avoid the situation, if we would only make the page table entry
dirty if caller asks for write access -- FOLL_WRITE.
The patch also changes touch_pud() in the same way.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/huge_memory.c | 36 +++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 86fe697e8bfb..0e7ded98d114 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -842,20 +842,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmf_insert_pfn_pud);
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD */
static void touch_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- pmd_t *pmd)
+ pmd_t *pmd, int flags)
{
pmd_t _pmd;
- /*
- * We should set the dirty bit only for FOLL_WRITE but for now
- * the dirty bit in the pmd is meaningless. And if the dirty
- * bit will become meaningful and we'll only set it with
- * FOLL_WRITE, an atomic set_bit will be required on the pmd to
- * set the young bit, instead of the current set_pmd_at.
- */
- _pmd = pmd_mkyoung(pmd_mkdirty(*pmd));
+ _pmd = pmd_mkyoung(*pmd);
+ if (flags & FOLL_WRITE)
+ _pmd = pmd_mkdirty(_pmd);
if (pmdp_set_access_flags(vma, addr & HPAGE_PMD_MASK,
- pmd, _pmd, 1))
+ pmd, _pmd, flags & FOLL_WRITE))
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, addr, pmd);
}
@@ -884,7 +879,7 @@ struct page *follow_devmap_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
return NULL;
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH)
- touch_pmd(vma, addr, pmd);
+ touch_pmd(vma, addr, pmd, flags);
/*
* device mapped pages can only be returned if the
@@ -995,20 +990,15 @@ int copy_huge_pmd(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD
static void touch_pud(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
- pud_t *pud)
+ pud_t *pud, int flags)
{
pud_t _pud;
- /*
- * We should set the dirty bit only for FOLL_WRITE but for now
- * the dirty bit in the pud is meaningless. And if the dirty
- * bit will become meaningful and we'll only set it with
- * FOLL_WRITE, an atomic set_bit will be required on the pud to
- * set the young bit, instead of the current set_pud_at.
- */
- _pud = pud_mkyoung(pud_mkdirty(*pud));
+ _pud = pud_mkyoung(*pud);
+ if (flags & FOLL_WRITE)
+ _pud = pud_mkdirty(_pud);
if (pudp_set_access_flags(vma, addr & HPAGE_PUD_MASK,
- pud, _pud, 1))
+ pud, _pud, flags & FOLL_WRITE))
update_mmu_cache_pud(vma, addr, pud);
}
@@ -1031,7 +1021,7 @@ struct page *follow_devmap_pud(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
return NULL;
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH)
- touch_pud(vma, addr, pud);
+ touch_pud(vma, addr, pud, flags);
/*
* device mapped pages can only be returned if the
@@ -1424,7 +1414,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
page = pmd_page(*pmd);
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page) && !is_zone_device_page(page), page);
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH)
- touch_pmd(vma, addr, pmd);
+ touch_pmd(vma, addr, pmd, flags);
if ((flags & FOLL_MLOCK) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)) {
/*
* We don't mlock() pte-mapped THPs. This way we can avoid
--
2.14.3

296
1-2-kvm-vmx-Reinstate-support-for-CPUs-without-virtual-NMI.patch
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@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
From patchwork Mon Nov 6 12:31:12 2017
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [1/2] kvm: vmx: Reinstate support for CPUs without virtual NMI
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
X-Patchwork-Id: 10043403
Message-Id: <1509971473-74491-2-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 13:31:12 +0100
This is more or less a revert of commit 2c82878b0cb3 ("KVM: VMX: require
virtual NMI support", 2017-03-27); it turns out that Core 2 Duo machines
only had virtual NMIs in some SKUs.
The revert is not trivial because in the meanwhile there have been several
fixes to nested NMI injection. Therefore, the entire vNMI state is moved
to struct loaded_vmcs.
Another change compared to before the patch is a simplification here:
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked &&
!(is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(
get_vmcs12(vcpu))))) {
The final condition here is always true (because nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis
is always false) and is removed.
Fixes: 2c82878b0cb38fd516fd612c67852a6bbf282003
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1490803
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 106 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index e6c8ffa84968..d6b3b12ae1e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -202,6 +202,10 @@ struct loaded_vmcs {
bool nmi_known_unmasked;
unsigned long vmcs_host_cr3; /* May not match real cr3 */
unsigned long vmcs_host_cr4; /* May not match real cr4 */
+ /* Support for vnmi-less CPUs */
+ int soft_vnmi_blocked;
+ ktime_t entry_time;
+ s64 vnmi_blocked_time;
struct list_head loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link;
};
@@ -1291,6 +1295,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invpcid(void)
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_virtual_nmis(void)
+{
+ return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
+}
+
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit(void)
{
return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
@@ -1348,11 +1357,6 @@ static inline bool nested_cpu_has2(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, u32 bit)
(vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control & bit);
}
-static inline bool nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
-{
- return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
-}
-
static inline bool nested_cpu_has_preemption_timer(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control &
@@ -3712,9 +3716,9 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
&_vmexit_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
- min = PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING |
- PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
- opt = PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR | PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+ min = PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING;
+ opt = PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS | PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR |
+ PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
&_pin_based_exec_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
@@ -5669,7 +5673,8 @@ static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- if (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
+ if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() ||
+ vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
enable_irq_window(vcpu);
return;
}
@@ -5709,6 +5714,19 @@ static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis()) {
+ /*
+ * Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
+ * finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
+ * well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
+ * least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
+ * cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
+ * highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
+ */
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+ }
+
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
@@ -5727,6 +5745,8 @@ static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool masked;
+ if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
+ return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return false;
masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
@@ -5738,13 +5758,20 @@ static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
- if (masked)
- vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
- else
- vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+ if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis()) {
+ if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked != masked) {
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = masked;
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+ if (masked)
+ vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+ GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+ else
+ vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+ GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+ }
}
static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -5752,6 +5779,10 @@ static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return 0;
+ if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
+ to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
+ return 0;
+
return !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI
| GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
@@ -6479,6 +6510,7 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* AAK134, BY25.
*/
if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+ cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
@@ -6965,7 +6997,7 @@ static struct loaded_vmcs *nested_get_current_vmcs02(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
}
/* Create a new VMCS */
- item = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+ item = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vmcs02_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!item)
return NULL;
item->vmcs02.vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
@@ -7982,6 +8014,7 @@ static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
*/
if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+ cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
@@ -8826,6 +8859,25 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}
+ if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
+ if (vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+ } else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
+ /*
+ * This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
+ * NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
+ * disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
+ * futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
+ */
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
+ "state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
+ __func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers
&& kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason])
return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
@@ -9108,33 +9160,38 @@ static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
- if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
- return;
- /*
- * Can't use vmx->exit_intr_info since we're not sure what
- * the exit reason is.
- */
- exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
- unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
- vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- /*
- * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
- * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
- * a guest IRET fault.
- * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
- * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
- * If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
- * information field.
- * If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
- */
- if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
- vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
- vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
- else
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
- !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
- & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+ if (cpu_has_virtual_nmis()) {
+ if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Can't use vmx->exit_intr_info since we're not sure what
+ * the exit reason is.
+ */
+ exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+ unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
+ vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+ /*
+ * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+ * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
+ * a guest IRET fault.
+ * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
+ * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
+ * If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
+ * information field.
+ * If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
+ */
+ if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
+ vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
+ vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+ GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+ else
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
+ !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
+ & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+ } else if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time +=
+ ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
}
static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -9251,6 +9308,11 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long debugctlmsr, cr3, cr4;
+ /* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
+ if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() &&
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get();
+
/* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
if (vmx->emulation_required)

12
kernel.spec
View File

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
%if 0%{?released_kernel}
# Do we have a -stable update to apply?
%define stable_update 2
%define stable_update 3
# Set rpm version accordingly
%if 0%{?stable_update}
%define stablerev %{stable_update}
@ -650,12 +650,12 @@ Patch623: 0001-PATCH-staging-rtl8822be-fix-wrong-dma-unmap-len.patch
# rhbz 1509461
Patch625: v3-2-2-Input-synaptics---Lenovo-X1-Carbon-5-should-use-SMBUS-RMI.patch
# rhbz 1490803
Patch626: 1-2-kvm-vmx-Reinstate-support-for-CPUs-without-virtual-NMI.patch
# Fixes for QXL issues
Patch627: qxl-fixes.patch
# CVE-2017-1000405 rhbz 1516514 1519115
Patch628: 0001-mm-thp-Do-not-make-page-table-dirty-unconditionally-.patch
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
%endif
@ -2210,6 +2210,10 @@ fi
#
#
%changelog
* Thu Nov 30 2017 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.14.3-300
- Linux v4.14.3
- Fix CVE-2017-1000405 (rhbz 1516514 1519115)
* Fri Nov 24 2017 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 4.14.2-300
- Linux v4.14.2

2
sources
View File

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
SHA512 (linux-4.14.tar.xz) = 77e43a02d766c3d73b7e25c4aafb2e931d6b16e870510c22cef0cdb05c3acb7952b8908ebad12b10ef982c6efbe286364b1544586e715cf38390e483927904d8
SHA512 (perf-man-4.14.tar.gz) = 76a9d8adc284cdffd4b3fbb060e7f9a14109267707ce1d03f4c3239cd70d8d164f697da3a0f90a363fbcac42a61d3c378afbcc2a86f112c501b9cb5ce74ef9f8
SHA512 (patch-4.14.2.xz) = 04415954c3c4d3044a6a3da979e59fb18f0eda3fd872a8036ac8947fbbadcd6041384a900973b917353de6e5c1a589eff1db63c029edcb78f38b07868a929f9d
SHA512 (patch-4.14.3.xz) = 36a08a4c1c93c4fefb95273f3bfe4cac724d8e7c4f90d6e42a11c3afbbdd35b537f3380985a730c9aca491359f9bbdc4747ac444dd6b2625443c28df285cf74a