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[SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads

This commit is contained in:
Chuck Ebbert 2011-05-02 10:32:03 -04:00
parent 29f13318a3
commit af9cec82a3
2 changed files with 94 additions and 1 deletions
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10
kernel.spec
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@ -855,6 +855,8 @@ Patch13956: bluetooth-bnep-fix-buffer-overflow.patch
Patch13957: agp-fix-arbitrary-kernel-memory-writes.patch
# cve-2011-1746
Patch13958: agp-fix-oom-and-buffer-overflow.patch
# CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495
Patch13960: scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch
%endif
@ -1620,6 +1622,8 @@ ApplyPatch bluetooth-bnep-fix-buffer-overflow.patch
ApplyPatch agp-fix-arbitrary-kernel-memory-writes.patch
# cve-2011-1746
ApplyPatch agp-fix-oom-and-buffer-overflow.patch
# CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495
ApplyPatch scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch
# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
@ -2241,7 +2245,11 @@ fi
%kernel_variant_files %{with_pae_debug} PAEdebug
%changelog
* Fri Apr 29 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> 2.6.34.9-69
* Mon May 02 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> 2.6.34.9-69
- [SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
(CVE-2011-1494, CVE-2011-1495)
* Fri Apr 29 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
- Bluetooth: bnep: fix buffer overflow (CVE-2011-1079)
- agp: fix arbitrary kernel memory writes (CVE-2011-1745)
- agp: fix OOM and buffer overflow (CVE-2011-1746)

85
scsi-mpt2sas-prevent-heap-overflows-and-unchecked-reads.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 16:45:59 +0000 (-0400)
Subject: [SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=a1f74ae82d133ebb2aabb19d181944b4e83e9960
[trivial backport to 2.6.34]
[SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
At two points in handling device ioctls via /dev/mpt2ctl, user-supplied
length values are used to copy data from userspace into heap buffers
without bounds checking, allowing controllable heap corruption and
subsequently privilege escalation.
Additionally, user-supplied values are used to determine the size of a
copy_to_user() as well as the offset into the buffer to be read, with no
bounds checking, allowing users to read arbitrary kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Moore <eric.moore@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
---
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
index 1c6d2b4..d72f1f2 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_ctl.c
@@ -688,6 +688,13 @@ _ctl_do_mpt_command(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc,
data_out_sz = karg.data_out_size;
data_in_sz = karg.data_in_size;
+ /* Check for overflow and wraparound */
+ if (karg.data_sge_offset * 4 > ioc->request_sz ||
+ karg.data_sge_offset > (UINT_MAX / 4)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* copy in request message frame from user */
if (copy_from_user(mpi_request, mf, karg.data_sge_offset*4)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
@@ -1963,7 +1970,7 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
Mpi2DiagBufferPostReply_t *mpi_reply;
int rc, i;
u8 buffer_type;
- unsigned long timeleft;
+ unsigned long timeleft, request_size, copy_size;
u16 smid;
u16 ioc_status;
u8 issue_reset = 0;
@@ -1999,6 +2006,8 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ request_size = ioc->diag_buffer_sz[buffer_type];
+
if ((karg.starting_offset % 4) || (karg.bytes_to_read % 4)) {
printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: either the starting_offset "
"or bytes_to_read are not 4 byte aligned\n", ioc->name,
@@ -2006,13 +2015,23 @@ _ctl_diag_read_buffer(void __user *arg, enum block_state state)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (karg.starting_offset > request_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
diag_data = (void *)(request_data + karg.starting_offset);
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MPT2SAS_DEBUG_FMT "%s: diag_buffer(%p), "
"offset(%d), sz(%d)\n", ioc->name, __func__,
diag_data, karg.starting_offset, karg.bytes_to_read));
+ /* Truncate data on requests that are too large */
+ if ((diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read < diag_data) ||
+ (diag_data + karg.bytes_to_read > request_data + request_size))
+ copy_size = request_size - karg.starting_offset;
+ else
+ copy_size = karg.bytes_to_read;
+
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)uarg->diagnostic_data,
- diag_data, karg.bytes_to_read)) {
+ diag_data, copy_size)) {
printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: Unable to write "
"mpt_diag_read_buffer_t data @ %p\n", ioc->name,
__func__, diag_data);