Drop patches merged in 2.6.38.2
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
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From: Stuart Hayes <stuart_hayes@yahoo.com>
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Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 12:42:05 +0000 (+0100)
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Subject: dcdbas: force SMI to happen when expected
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X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=dd65c736d1b5312c80c88a64bf521db4959eded5
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dcdbas: force SMI to happen when expected
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The dcdbas driver can do an I/O write to cause a SMI to occur. The SMI handler
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looks at certain registers and memory locations, so the SMI needs to happen
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immediately. On some systems I/O writes are posted, though, causing the SMI to
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happen well after the "outb" occurred, which causes random failures. Following
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the "outb" with an "inb" forces the write to go through even if it is posted.
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Signed-off-by: Stuart Hayes <stuart_hayes@yahoo.com>
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Acked-by: Doug Warzecha <douglas_warzecha@dell.com>
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Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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---
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diff --git a/drivers/firmware/dcdbas.c b/drivers/firmware/dcdbas.c
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index 69ad529..ea5ac2d 100644
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--- a/drivers/firmware/dcdbas.c
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+++ b/drivers/firmware/dcdbas.c
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@@ -268,8 +268,10 @@ int dcdbas_smi_request(struct smi_cmd *smi_cmd)
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}
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/* generate SMI */
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+ /* inb to force posted write through and make SMI happen now */
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asm volatile (
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- "outb %b0,%w1"
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+ "outb %b0,%w1\n"
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+ "inb %w1"
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: /* no output args */
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: "a" (smi_cmd->command_code),
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"d" (smi_cmd->command_address),
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@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
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From linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Thu Nov 18 21:03:11 2010
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From: Josef Bacik <josef@redhat.com>
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To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com,
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linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
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selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, bfields@fieldses.org
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Subject: [PATCH] fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias V2
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Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 20:52:55 -0500
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Message-Id: <1290131575-2489-1-git-send-email-josef@redhat.com>
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X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
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While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was
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getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me
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figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following
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denial
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type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772
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comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
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tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file
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Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create
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one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the
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security_d_instantiate.
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Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
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security_d_instantiate() by the parent's i_mutex, but obviously this isn't an
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option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in
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and finds our new dentry before we get to run security_d_instantiate(), we go
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ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok
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as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so calling
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security_d_instantiate() against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With
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this patch I'm no longer getting errant -EACCESS values.
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Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@redhat.com>
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---
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V1->V2:
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-added second security_d_instantiate() call
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fs/dcache.c | 3 +++
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1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
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index 5699d4c..85388fc 100644
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--- a/fs/dcache.c
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+++ b/fs/dcache.c
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@@ -1577,9 +1577,13 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
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spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
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+ security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
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+
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return tmp;
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out_iput:
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+ if (res && !IS_ERR(res))
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+ security_d_instantiate(res, inode);
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iput(inode);
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return res;
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}
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--
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To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
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the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
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More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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21
kernel.spec
21
kernel.spec
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@ -732,14 +732,6 @@ Patch12207: pci-pcie-links-may-not-get-configured-for-aspm-under-powersave-mode.
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Patch12303: dmar-disable-when-ricoh-multifunction.patch
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Patch12421: fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch
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# Fix possible memory corruption on Dell HW
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Patch12430: dcdbas-force-smi-to-happen-when-expected.patch
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# CVE-2011-1182
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Patch12431: prevent-rt_sigqueueinfo-and-rt_tgsigqueueinfo-from-spoofing-the-signal-code.patch
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%endif
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BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/kernel-%{KVERREL}-root
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@ -1366,15 +1358,6 @@ ApplyPatch acpi_reboot.patch
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# rhbz#605888
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ApplyPatch dmar-disable-when-ricoh-multifunction.patch
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# rhbz#662344,600690
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#ApplyPatch fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch
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# Fix possible memory corruption on Dell HW
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#ApplyPatch dcdbas-force-smi-to-happen-when-expected.patch
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# CVE-2011-1182
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#ApplyPatch prevent-rt_sigqueueinfo-and-rt_tgsigqueueinfo-from-spoofing-the-signal-code.patch
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# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
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%endif
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@ -1985,6 +1968,10 @@ fi
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%changelog
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* Sun Mar 27 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com> 2.6.38.2-8
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- Linux 2.6.38.2
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- Drop patches merged in 2.6.38.2:
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dcdbas-force-smi-to-happen-when-expected.patch
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fs-call-security_d_instantiate-in-d_obtain_alias.patch
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prevent-rt_sigqueueinfo-and-rt_tgsigqueueinfo-from-spoofing-the-signal-code.patch
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- Fix more PCIe ASPM bugs:
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kworker task over 65% after resume (#683156)
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ASPM powersave mode does not get enabled
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@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
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From: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
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Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2011 22:05:21 +0000 (-0700)
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Subject: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
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X-Git-Url: http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux%2Fkernel%2Fgit%2Ftorvalds%2Flinux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=da48524eb20662618854bb3df2db01fc65f3070c
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Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
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Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
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signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
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Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
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send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
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from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
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SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
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Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
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SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
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anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
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So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
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value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
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there that might depend on using other si_code values.
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Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
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Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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---
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diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
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index 4e3cff1..3175186 100644
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--- a/kernel/signal.c
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+++ b/kernel/signal.c
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@@ -2421,9 +2421,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
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return -EFAULT;
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/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
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- Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
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- if (info.si_code >= 0)
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+ * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
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+ */
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+ if (info.si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
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+ /* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
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+ WARN_ON_ONCE(info.si_code < 0);
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return -EPERM;
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+ }
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info.si_signo = sig;
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/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups. */
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@@ -2437,9 +2441,13 @@ long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig, siginfo_t *info)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
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- Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
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- if (info->si_code >= 0)
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+ * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
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+ */
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+ if (info->si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
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+ /* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
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+ WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0);
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return -EPERM;
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+ }
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info->si_signo = sig;
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return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);
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