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CVE-2014-0181 insufficient netlink permission checks (rhbz 1094270 1094265)

This commit is contained in:
Josh Boyer 2014-05-06 14:12:07 -04:00
parent 122e19846f
commit 70b6f2e94b
7 changed files with 911 additions and 1 deletions
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68
1-5-netlink-Rename-netlink_capable-netlink_allowed.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
Bugzilla: 1094270
Upstream-status: 3.15 and queued for stable
From a7e6a36c02e8a4c6547bfc2b789bfbfcc95072f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 14:25:48 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed
netlink_capable is a static internal function in af_netlink.c and we
have better uses for the name netlink_capable.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 04748ab649c2..28d66fbc7cef 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ retry:
return err;
}
-static inline int netlink_capable(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
+static inline int netlink_allowed(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
{
return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) ||
ns_capable(sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
@@ -1428,7 +1428,7 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
/* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */
if (nladdr->nl_groups) {
- if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
+ if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
@@ -1490,7 +1490,7 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
return -EINVAL;
if ((nladdr->nl_groups || nladdr->nl_pid) &&
- !netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
+ !netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
return -EPERM;
if (!nlk->portid)
@@ -2096,7 +2096,7 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: {
- if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
+ if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
dst_group = ffs(addr->nl_groups);
err = -EPERM;
if ((dst_group || dst_portid) &&
- !netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
+ !netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
goto out;
} else {
dst_portid = nlk->dst_portid;
--
1.9.0

104
2-5-net-Move-the-permission-check-in-sock_diag_put_filterinfo-to-packet_diag_dump.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
Bugzilla: 1094270
Upstream-status: 3.15 and queued for stable
From 568ddf41e32a9b4337d87fdb507e729029a69e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 14:26:25 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] net: Move the permission check in
sock_diag_put_filterinfo to packet_diag_dump
The permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo is wrong, and it is so removed
from it's sources it is not clear why it is wrong. Move the computation
into packet_diag_dump and pass a bool of the result into sock_diag_filterinfo.
This does not yet correct the capability check but instead simply moves it to make
it clear what is going on.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
include/linux/sock_diag.h | 2 +-
net/core/sock_diag.c | 4 ++--
net/packet/diag.c | 7 ++++++-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sock_diag.h b/include/linux/sock_diag.h
index 302ab805b0bb..46cca4c06848 100644
--- a/include/linux/sock_diag.h
+++ b/include/linux/sock_diag.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int sock_diag_check_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie);
void sock_diag_save_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie);
int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attr);
-int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
+int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(bool may_report_filterinfo, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype);
#endif
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c
index 6a7fae228634..c38e7a2b5a8e 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_diag_put_meminfo);
-int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
+int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(bool may_report_filterinfo, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
{
struct nlattr *attr;
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
- if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!may_report_filterinfo) {
nla_reserve(skb, attrtype, 0);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/packet/diag.c b/net/packet/diag.c
index 435ff99ba8c7..b34d0de24091 100644
--- a/net/packet/diag.c
+++ b/net/packet/diag.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static int pdiag_put_fanout(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *nlskb)
static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct packet_diag_req *req,
+ bool may_report_filterinfo,
struct user_namespace *user_ns,
u32 portid, u32 seq, u32 flags, int sk_ino)
{
@@ -172,7 +173,8 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
goto out_nlmsg_trim;
if ((req->pdiag_show & PACKET_SHOW_FILTER) &&
- sock_diag_put_filterinfo(sk, skb, PACKET_DIAG_FILTER))
+ sock_diag_put_filterinfo(may_report_filterinfo, sk, skb,
+ PACKET_DIAG_FILTER))
goto out_nlmsg_trim;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
@@ -188,9 +190,11 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
struct packet_diag_req *req;
struct net *net;
struct sock *sk;
+ bool may_report_filterinfo;
net = sock_net(skb->sk);
req = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
+ may_report_filterinfo = ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &net->packet.sklist) {
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
goto next;
if (sk_diag_fill(sk, skb, req,
+ may_report_filterinfo,
sk_user_ns(NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).sk),
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI,
--
1.9.0

97
3-5-net-Add-variants-of-capable-for-use-on-on-sockets.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
Bugzilla: 1094270
Upstream-status: 3.15 and queued for stable
From ca469eb66a7b3e97a230c750de4d01b1dc53906a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 14:26:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets
sk_net_capable - The common case, operations that are safe in a network namespace.
sk_capable - Operations that are not known to be safe in a network namespace
sk_ns_capable - The general case for special cases.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
include/net/sock.h | 5 +++++
net/core/sock.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index b9586a137cad..57c31dd15e64 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -2278,6 +2278,11 @@ int sock_get_timestampns(struct sock *, struct timespec __user *);
int sock_recv_errqueue(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int level,
int type);
+bool sk_ns_capable(const struct sock *sk,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap);
+bool sk_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap);
+bool sk_net_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap);
+
/*
* Enable debug/info messages
*/
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index c0fc6bdad1e3..c8069561bdb7 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -145,6 +145,55 @@
static DEFINE_MUTEX(proto_list_mutex);
static LIST_HEAD(proto_list);
+/**
+ * sk_ns_capable - General socket capability test
+ * @sk: Socket to use a capability on or through
+ * @user_ns: The user namespace of the capability to use
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket had when the socket was
+ * created and the current process has the capability @cap in the user
+ * namespace @user_ns.
+ */
+bool sk_ns_capable(const struct sock *sk,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+ return file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, user_ns, cap) &&
+ ns_capable(user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * sk_capable - Socket global capability test
+ * @sk: Socket to use a capability on or through
+ * @cap: The global capbility to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket had when the socket was
+ * created and the current process has the capability @cap in all user
+ * namespaces.
+ */
+bool sk_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap)
+{
+ return sk_ns_capable(sk, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_capable);
+
+/**
+ * sk_net_capable - Network namespace socket capability test
+ * @sk: Socket to use a capability on or through
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket had when the socke was created
+ * and the current process has the capability @cap over the network namespace
+ * the socket is a member of.
+ */
+bool sk_net_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap)
+{
+ return sk_ns_capable(sk, sock_net(sk)->user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_net_capable);
+
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
int mem_cgroup_sockets_init(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
{
--
1.9.0

116
4-5-net-Add-variants-of-capable-for-use-on-netlink-messages.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
Bugzilla: 1094270
Upstream-status: 3.15 and queued for stable
From 71f40189cc9a0a28296d201652a5766d7c8aa66f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 14:28:03 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages
netlink_net_capable - The common case use, for operations that are safe on a network namespace
netlink_capable - For operations that are only known to be safe for the global root
netlink_ns_capable - The general case of capable used to handle special cases
__netlink_ns_capable - Same as netlink_ns_capable except taking a netlink_skb_parms instead of
the skbuff of a netlink message.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
include/linux/netlink.h | 7 ++++++
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/netlink.h b/include/linux/netlink.h
index aad8eeaf416d..f64b01787ddc 100644
--- a/include/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/linux/netlink.h
@@ -169,4 +169,11 @@ struct netlink_tap {
extern int netlink_add_tap(struct netlink_tap *nt);
extern int netlink_remove_tap(struct netlink_tap *nt);
+bool __netlink_ns_capable(const struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+bool netlink_ns_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+bool netlink_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+bool netlink_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+
#endif /* __LINUX_NETLINK_H */
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 28d66fbc7cef..6d69c27897f3 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1360,6 +1360,71 @@ retry:
return err;
}
+/**
+ * __netlink_ns_capable - General netlink message capability test
+ * @nsp: NETLINK_CB of the socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace.
+ * @user_ns: The user namespace of the capability to use
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap in the user namespace @user_ns.
+ */
+bool __netlink_ns_capable(const struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+ return sk_ns_capable(nsp->sk, user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__netlink_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * netlink_ns_capable - General netlink message capability test
+ * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
+ * @user_ns: The user namespace of the capability to use
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap in the user namespace @user_ns.
+ */
+bool netlink_ns_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+ return __netlink_ns_capable(&NETLINK_CB(skb), user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * netlink_capable - Netlink global message capability test
+ * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap in all user namespaces.
+ */
+bool netlink_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+{
+ return netlink_ns_capable(skb, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_capable);
+
+/**
+ * netlink_net_capable - Netlink network namespace message capability test
+ * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap over the network namespace of
+ * the socket we received the message from.
+ */
+bool netlink_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+{
+ return netlink_ns_capable(skb, sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_net_capable);
+
static inline int netlink_allowed(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
{
return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) ||
--
1.9.0

433
5-5-net-Use-netlink_ns_capable-to-verify-the-permisions-of-netlink-messages.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
Bugzilla: 1094270
Upstream-status: 3.15 and queued for stable
From 386e6689d3a9234ab00a80ab51906adedfa7fea7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 14:29:27 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of
netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
crypto/crypto_user.c | 2 +-
drivers/connector/cn_proc.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
net/can/gw.c | 4 ++--
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
net/dcb/dcbnl.c | 2 +-
net/decnet/dn_dev.c | 4 ++--
net/decnet/dn_fib.c | 4 ++--
net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 2 +-
net/netlink/genetlink.c | 2 +-
net/packet/diag.c | 2 +-
net/phonet/pn_netlink.c | 8 ++++----
net/sched/act_api.c | 2 +-
net/sched/cls_api.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_api.c | 6 +++---
net/tipc/netlink.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
19 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index 1512e41cd93d..43665d0d0905 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
diff --git a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
index 18c5b9b16645..3165811e2407 100644
--- a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
+++ b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void cn_proc_mcast_ctl(struct cn_msg *msg,
return;
/* Can only change if privileged. */
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!__netlink_ns_capable(nsp, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = EPERM;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
index fe30ea94ffe6..109802f776ed 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto next_msg;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto next_msg;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 95a20f3f52f1..f7e680d896ec 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -639,13 +639,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
diff --git a/net/can/gw.c b/net/can/gw.c
index ac31891967da..050a2110d43f 100644
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ static int cgw_create_job(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
u8 limhops = 0;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static int cgw_remove_job(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
u8 limhops = 0;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index 120eecc0f5a4..463dfe6496b4 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1386,7 +1386,8 @@ static int do_set_master(struct net_device *dev, int ifindex)
return 0;
}
-static int do_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
+static int do_setlink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
struct nlattr **tb, char *ifname, int modified)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
@@ -1398,7 +1399,7 @@ static int do_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
err = PTR_ERR(net);
goto errout;
}
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto errout;
}
@@ -1652,7 +1653,7 @@ static int rtnl_setlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
- err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, 0);
+ err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, ifname, 0);
errout:
return err;
}
@@ -1769,7 +1770,8 @@ err:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtnl_create_link);
-static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct net *net, int group,
+static int rtnl_group_changelink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct net *net, int group,
struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
struct nlattr **tb)
{
@@ -1778,7 +1780,7 @@ static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct net *net, int group,
for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
if (dev->group == group) {
- err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
+ err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
@@ -1920,12 +1922,12 @@ replay:
modified = 1;
}
- return do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
+ return do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
}
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE)) {
if (ifm->ifi_index == 0 && tb[IFLA_GROUP])
- return rtnl_group_changelink(net,
+ return rtnl_group_changelink(skb, net,
nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_GROUP]),
ifm, tb);
return -ENODEV;
@@ -2312,7 +2314,7 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
int err = -EINVAL;
__u8 *addr;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ndm), tb, NDA_MAX, NULL);
@@ -2764,7 +2766,7 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
sz_idx = type>>2;
kind = type&3;
- if (kind != 2 && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (kind != 2 && !netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
index 553644402670..f8b98d89c285 100644
--- a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
+++ b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
@@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ static int dcb_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct nlmsghdr *reply_nlh = NULL;
const struct reply_func *fn;
- if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*dcb), tb, DCB_ATTR_MAX,
diff --git a/net/decnet/dn_dev.c b/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
index a603823a3e27..3b726f31c64c 100644
--- a/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int dn_nl_deladdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct dn_ifaddr __rcu **ifap;
int err = -EINVAL;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static int dn_nl_newaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct dn_ifaddr *ifa;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
diff --git a/net/decnet/dn_fib.c b/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
index 57dc159245ec..d332aefb0846 100644
--- a/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int dn_fib_rtm_delroute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct nlattr *attrs[RTA_MAX+1];
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int dn_fib_rtm_newroute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct nlattr *attrs[RTA_MAX+1];
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index e83015cecfa7..e4d9560a910b 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index 046aa13b4fea..c6881781d70a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static void nfnetlink_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
netlink_ack(skb, nlh, -EPERM);
return;
}
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index b1dcdb932a86..a3ba3ca0ff92 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/packet/diag.c b/net/packet/diag.c
index b34d0de24091..92f2c7107eec 100644
--- a/net/packet/diag.c
+++ b/net/packet/diag.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
net = sock_net(skb->sk);
req = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
- may_report_filterinfo = ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+ may_report_filterinfo = netlink_net_capable(cb->skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &net->packet.sklist) {
diff --git a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
index dc15f4300808..b64151ade6b3 100644
--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
int err;
u8 pnaddr;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ASSERT_RTNL();
@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ static int route_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
int err;
u8 dst;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ASSERT_RTNL();
diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c
index 72bdc7166345..3b2265523552 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_action(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
u32 portid = skb ? NETLINK_CB(skb).portid : 0;
int ret = 0, ovr = 0;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETACTION) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETACTION) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(struct tcamsg), tca, TCA_ACT_MAX, NULL);
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c
index 29a30a14c315..bdbdb1a7920a 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tfilter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
int err;
int tp_created = 0;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
replay:
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index a07d55e75698..98532cfa7823 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static int tc_get_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
struct Qdisc *p = NULL;
int err;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETQDISC) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETQDISC) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
struct Qdisc *q, *p;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
replay:
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
u32 qid;
int err;
- if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTCLASS) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTCLASS) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink.c b/net/tipc/netlink.c
index 3aaf73de9e2d..ad844d365340 100644
--- a/net/tipc/netlink.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int handle_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
int hdr_space = nlmsg_total_size(GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
u16 cmd;
- if ((req_userhdr->cmd & 0xC000) && (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
+ if ((req_userhdr->cmd & 0xC000) && (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
cmd = TIPC_CMD_NOT_NET_ADMIN;
else
cmd = req_userhdr->cmd;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 2f7ddc3a59b4..b10d04fa3933 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
- if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
--
1.9.0

22
kernel.spec
View File

@ -779,6 +779,14 @@ Patch25079: 0003-samsung-laptop-Add-broken-acpi-video-quirk-for-NC210.patch
#rhbz 1067181
Patch25080: 0004-acpi-blacklist-Add-dmi_enable_osi_linux-quirk-for-As.patch
#CVE-2014-0181 rhbz 1094270 1094265
Patch25081: net-Fix-ns_capable-check-in-sock_diag_put_filterinfo.patch
Patch25082: 1-5-netlink-Rename-netlink_capable-netlink_allowed.patch
Patch25083: 2-5-net-Move-the-permission-check-in-sock_diag_put_filterinfo-to-packet_diag_dump.patch
Patch25084: 3-5-net-Add-variants-of-capable-for-use-on-on-sockets.patch
Patch25085: 4-5-net-Add-variants-of-capable-for-use-on-netlink-messages.patch
Patch25086: 5-5-net-Use-netlink_ns_capable-to-verify-the-permisions-of-netlink-messages.patch
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
%endif
@ -1511,6 +1519,15 @@ ApplyPatch 0003-samsung-laptop-Add-broken-acpi-video-quirk-for-NC210.patch
#rhbz 1067181
ApplyPatch 0004-acpi-blacklist-Add-dmi_enable_osi_linux-quirk-for-As.patch
#CVE-2014-0181 rhbz 1094270 1094265
ApplyPatch net-Fix-ns_capable-check-in-sock_diag_put_filterinfo.patch
ApplyPatch 1-5-netlink-Rename-netlink_capable-netlink_allowed.patch
ApplyPatch 2-5-net-Move-the-permission-check-in-sock_diag_put_filterinfo-to-packet_diag_dump.patch
ApplyPatch 3-5-net-Add-variants-of-capable-for-use-on-on-sockets.patch
ApplyPatch 4-5-net-Add-variants-of-capable-for-use-on-netlink-messages.patch
ApplyPatch 5-5-net-Use-netlink_ns_capable-to-verify-the-permisions-of-netlink-messages.patch
# END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
%endif
@ -2322,7 +2339,10 @@ fi
# ||----w |
# || ||
%changelog
* Tue May 06 2014 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> 3.14.3-200
* Tue May 06 2014 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> 3.14.3-200
- CVE-2014-0181 insufficient netlink permission checks (rhbz 1094270 1094265)
* Tue May 06 2014 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
- Linux v3.14.3
* Tue May 06 2014 Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>

72
net-Fix-ns_capable-check-in-sock_diag_put_filterinfo.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
Bugzilla: 1094270
Upstream-status: 3.15 and queued for stable
From 3b72ed3ca18b9f55fc90f55a52c32b22b3a2837e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2014 21:41:34 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] net: Fix ns_capable check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo
The caller needs capabilities on the namespace being queried, not on
their own namespace. This is a security bug, although it likely has
only a minor impact.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
---
include/linux/sock_diag.h | 2 +-
net/core/sock_diag.c | 4 ++--
net/packet/diag.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sock_diag.h b/include/linux/sock_diag.h
index 54f91d35e5fd..302ab805b0bb 100644
--- a/include/linux/sock_diag.h
+++ b/include/linux/sock_diag.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int sock_diag_check_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie);
void sock_diag_save_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie);
int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attr);
-int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct sock *sk,
+int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype);
#endif
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c
index a0e9cf6379de..6a7fae228634 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_diag_put_meminfo);
-int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct sock *sk,
+int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
{
struct nlattr *attr;
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct sock *sk,
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
- if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
nla_reserve(skb, attrtype, 0);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/packet/diag.c b/net/packet/diag.c
index 533ce4ff108a..435ff99ba8c7 100644
--- a/net/packet/diag.c
+++ b/net/packet/diag.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
goto out_nlmsg_trim;
if ((req->pdiag_show & PACKET_SHOW_FILTER) &&
- sock_diag_put_filterinfo(user_ns, sk, skb, PACKET_DIAG_FILTER))
+ sock_diag_put_filterinfo(sk, skb, PACKET_DIAG_FILTER))
goto out_nlmsg_trim;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
--
1.9.0