Fix 2 CVEs

CVE-2011-4131: nfs4_getfacl decoding kernel oops (rhbz 753236)
CVE-2011-4132: jbd/jbd2: invalid value of first log block leads to oops (rhbz 753346)
This commit is contained in:
Josh Boyer 2011-11-14 10:03:45 -05:00
parent 4220aaf744
commit 68b031c163
3 changed files with 227 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
From 8762202dd0d6e46854f786bdb6fb3780a1625efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2011 19:04:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] jbd/jbd2: validate sb->s_first in journal_get_superblock()
I hit a J_ASSERT(blocknr != 0) failure in cleanup_journal_tail() when
mounting a fsfuzzed ext3 image. It turns out that the corrupted ext3
image has s_first = 0 in journal superblock, and the 0 is passed to
journal->j_head in journal_reset(), then to blocknr in
cleanup_journal_tail(), in the end the J_ASSERT failed.
So validate s_first after reading journal superblock from disk in
journal_get_superblock() to ensure s_first is valid.
The following script could reproduce it:
fstype=ext3
blocksize=1024
img=$fstype.img
offset=0
found=0
magic="c0 3b 39 98"
dd if=/dev/zero of=$img bs=1M count=8
mkfs -t $fstype -b $blocksize -F $img
filesize=`stat -c %s $img`
while [ $offset -lt $filesize ]
do
if od -j $offset -N 4 -t x1 $img | grep -i "$magic";then
echo "Found journal: $offset"
found=1
break
fi
offset=`echo "$offset+$blocksize" | bc`
done
if [ $found -ne 1 ];then
echo "Magic \"$magic\" not found"
exit 1
fi
dd if=/dev/zero of=$img seek=$(($offset+23)) conv=notrunc bs=1 count=1
mkdir -p ./mnt
mount -o loop $img ./mnt
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
---
fs/jbd/journal.c | 8 ++++++++
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jbd/journal.c b/fs/jbd/journal.c
index 9fe061f..fea8dd6 100644
--- a/fs/jbd/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd/journal.c
@@ -1135,6 +1135,14 @@ static int journal_get_superblock(journal_t *journal)
goto out;
}
+ if (be32_to_cpu(sb->s_first) == 0 ||
+ be32_to_cpu(sb->s_first) >= journal->j_maxlen) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "JBD: Invalid start block of journal: %u\n",
+ be32_to_cpu(sb->s_first));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
return 0;
out:
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
index f24df13..d6e93d0 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
@@ -1251,6 +1251,14 @@ static int journal_get_superblock(journal_t *journal)
goto out;
}
+ if (be32_to_cpu(sb->s_first) == 0 ||
+ be32_to_cpu(sb->s_first) >= journal->j_maxlen) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "JBD2: Invalid start block of journal: %u\n",
+ be32_to_cpu(sb->s_first));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
return 0;
out:
--
1.7.7.1

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@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
# gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
#
%global baserelease 1
%global baserelease 2
%global fedora_build %{baserelease}
# base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@ -719,8 +719,14 @@ Patch3000: rcutree-avoid-false-quiescent-states.patch
# fs fixes
#rhbz 753346
Patch3500: jbd-jbd2-validate-sb-s_first-in-journal_get_superblo.patch
# NFSv4
#rhbz 753236
Patch4000: nfsv4-include-bitmap-in-nfsv4_get_acl_data.patch
# patches headed upstream
Patch12010: add-appleir-usb-driver.patch
@ -1270,6 +1276,8 @@ ApplyPatch linux-2.6-i386-nx-emulation.patch
#
# ext4
#rhbz 753346
ApplyPatch jbd-jbd2-validate-sb-s_first-in-journal_get_superblo.patch
# xfs
ApplyPatch xfs-Fix-possible-memory-corruption-in-xfs_readlink.patch
@ -1280,6 +1288,7 @@ ApplyPatch xfs-Fix-possible-memory-corruption-in-xfs_readlink.patch
# eCryptfs
# NFSv4
ApplyPatch nfsv4-include-bitmap-in-nfsv4_get_acl_data.patch
# USB
@ -2124,6 +2133,10 @@ fi
# and build.
%changelog
* Mon Nov 14 2011 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> 3.1.1-2
- CVE-2011-4131: nfs4_getfacl decoding kernel oops (rhbz 753236)
- CVE-2011-4132: jbd/jbd2: invalid value of first log block leads to oops (rhbz 753346)
* Fri Nov 11 2011 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
- Use the same naming scheme as rawhide for -stable RC kernels
(e.g. 3.1.1-0.rc1.1 instead of 3.1.1-1.rc1)

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@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
From: Andy Adamson <andros@xxxxxxxxxx>
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Cc:stable@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index deb88d9..97014dd 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -3671,6 +3671,22 @@ static void nfs4_zap_acl_attr(struct inode *inode)
nfs4_set_cached_acl(inode, NULL);
}
+/*
+ * The bitmap xdr length, bitmasks, and the attr xdr length are stored in
+ * the acl cache to handle variable length bitmasks. Just copy the acl data.
+ */
+static void nfs4_copy_acl(char *buf, char *acl_data, size_t acl_len)
+{
+ __be32 *q, *p = (__be32 *)acl_data;
+ int32_t len;
+
+ len = be32_to_cpup(p); /* number of bitmasks */
+ len += 2; /* add words for bitmap and attr xdr len */
+ q = p + len;
+ len = len << 2; /* convert to bytes for acl_len math */
+ memcpy(buf, (char *)q, acl_len - len);
+}
+
static inline ssize_t nfs4_read_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
@@ -3688,7 +3704,7 @@ static inline ssize_t nfs4_read_cached_acl(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_
ret = -ERANGE; /* see getxattr(2) man page */
if (acl->len > buflen)
goto out;
- memcpy(buf, acl->data, acl->len);
+ nfs4_copy_acl(buf, acl->data, acl->len);
out_len:
ret = acl->len;
out:
@@ -3763,7 +3779,7 @@ static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t bu
if (res.acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
if (localpage)
- memcpy(buf, resp_buf, res.acl_len);
+ nfs4_copy_acl(buf, resp_buf, res.acl_len);
}
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
index f9fd96d..9c07380 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2513,7 +2513,7 @@ static void nfs4_xdr_enc_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
- replen = hdr.replen + op_decode_hdr_maxsz + nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz + 1;
+ replen = hdr.replen + op_decode_hdr_maxsz + 1;
encode_getattr_two(xdr, FATTR4_WORD0_ACL, 0, &hdr);
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, replen << 2,
@@ -4955,7 +4955,7 @@ decode_restorefh(struct xdr_stream *xdr)
static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
- __be32 *savep;
+ __be32 *savep, *bm_p;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
@@ -4964,6 +4964,7 @@ static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
+ bm_p = xdr->p;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
@@ -4972,12 +4973,20 @@ static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
- size_t hdrlen;
+ size_t hdrlen, len;
u32 recvd;
+ /*The bitmap (xdr len + bitmasks) and the attr xdr len words
+ * are stored with the acl data to handle the problem of
+ * variable length bitmasks.*/
+ xdr->p = bm_p;
+ len = be32_to_cpup(bm_p);
+ len += 2; /* add bitmap and attr xdr len words */
+
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
+ attrlen += len << 2; /* attrlen is in bytes */
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
--
1.7.6.4