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Update secure boot patches to include MoK support

This commit is contained in:
Josh Boyer 2012-12-11 12:42:20 -05:00
parent 90c0d2496b
commit 389b1121b3
2 changed files with 126 additions and 110 deletions
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9
kernel.spec
View File

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
# For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
# gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
#
%global baserelease 2
%global baserelease 4
%global fedora_build %{baserelease}
# base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ Patch900: modsign-upstream-3.7.patch
Patch901: modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
# secure boot
Patch1000: secure-boot-20121105.patch
Patch1000: secure-boot-20121210.patch
Patch1001: efivarfs-3.6.patch
# Improve PCI support on UEFI
@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ ApplyPatch modsign-post-KS-jwb.patch
# secure boot
ApplyPatch efivarfs-3.6.patch
ApplyPatch secure-boot-20121105.patch
ApplyPatch secure-boot-20121210.patch
# Improved PCI support for UEFI
ApplyPatch handle-efi-roms.patch
@ -2445,7 +2445,8 @@ fi
# ||----w |
# || ||
%changelog
* Tue Dec 11 2012 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
* Tue Dec 11 2012 Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> - 3.6.10-4
- Update secure boot patches to include MoK support
- Fix IBSS scanning in mac80211 (rhbz 883414)
* Tue Dec 11 2012 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com> 3.6.10-1

227
secure-boot-20121105.patch → secure-boot-20121210.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 57c0dbcbafaa724313c672830ff0087f56a84c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From f58576110ddec23d466e78bfd3dd7e8a3a2ce30b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Secure boot: Add new capability
Subject: [PATCH 01/19] Secure boot: Add new capability
Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ index d10b7ed..4345bc8 100644
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 95fd8148be46036e20fc64c480104d2a2b454e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 1f57285279e256a905c329eaf5ab181460db3a85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 02/14] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
Subject: [PATCH 02/19] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 6869009..c03fb85 100644
index f39378d..1db1e74 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -546,6 +546,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
loff_t init_off = off;
u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ index 6869009..c03fb85 100644
if (off > dev->cfg_size)
return 0;
if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -844,6 +847,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
@@ -852,6 +855,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
resource_size_t start, end;
int i;
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ index 6869009..c03fb85 100644
for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
break;
@@ -951,6 +957,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -959,6 +965,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
loff_t off, size_t count)
{
@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ index 6869009..c03fb85 100644
}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 27911b5..ac8c9a5 100644
index af028c7..53372eb 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
int size = dp->size;
int cnt;
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ index 27911b5..ac8c9a5 100644
if (pos >= size)
return 0;
if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -211,6 +214,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
#endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
int ret = 0;
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ index 27911b5..ac8c9a5 100644
switch (cmd) {
case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -251,7 +257,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
int i, ret;
@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 2d23d2726583d79062e58abcc32c7dd027d312aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 6e8a17b89dae1074335c0b702063c0bf9791ab94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 03/14] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
Subject: [PATCH 03/19] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
environments
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
@ -190,13 +190,13 @@ index e5eedfa..1e0a660 100644
return -EFAULT;
while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From e063cb2f3a667d2540682d4bdbef91fdb23b1a84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From ea20d072eba1e2ee57edd2fd43d51b7fb034365a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
Subject: [PATCH 04/19] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
@ -222,13 +222,13 @@ index 5d42c24..247d58b 100644
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From a1cccbd084c7355dcb2be7ae2934f168ce9ba9d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 30955d49acbb357528e4fd36f41b0e7893fa5485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
Subject: [PATCH 05/19] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
@ -241,10 +241,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
index 2eb9fe8..61e055d 100644
index c0e9ff4..3c10167 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
@@ -1523,6 +1523,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
int err;
u32 retval = -1;
@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ index 2eb9fe8..61e055d 100644
err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
if (err < 0)
@@ -1539,6 +1542,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
int err;
u32 retval = -1;
@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ index 2eb9fe8..61e055d 100644
err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
&retval);
@@ -1563,6 +1569,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
union acpi_object *obj;
acpi_status status;
@ -275,13 +275,13 @@ index 2eb9fe8..61e055d 100644
1, asus->debug.method_id,
&input, &output);
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 1c9e53b626268f82509062751eda14e8572717cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From ce5f692463e82e824d4bf7c190959831d04232bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 06/14] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
Subject: [PATCH 06/19] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
@ -316,13 +316,13 @@ index 1e0a660..33eb947 100644
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From fbf919bf372b9a7a08bdacac8129d47ced1b1f19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From c43e7120ff4edf57a162271404844edb185fb45b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 07/14] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
Subject: [PATCH 07/19] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
switch on Secure Boot mode
This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
@ -382,13 +382,13 @@ index de728ac..7e6e83f 100644
* prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
* @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 43ed7865d867ae692e30227d66fa58cdecbd9269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 15f6071a2d551bb19f8bbc2a44de8957ca43fc73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
Subject: [PATCH 08/19] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
enabled in firmware
The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
@ -418,10 +418,10 @@ index cf5437d..7f9ed48 100644
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
(array of struct e820entry)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index b3e0227..3789356 100644
index 90201aa..bdf0eb7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -724,6 +724,36 @@ fail:
@@ -726,6 +726,36 @@ fail:
return status;
}
@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ index b3e0227..3789356 100644
/*
* Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
* need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
@@ -1018,6 +1048,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
@@ -1020,6 +1050,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
goto fail;
@ -482,10 +482,10 @@ index 2ad874c..c7338e0 100644
__u8 _pad7[0x290-0x1f1-sizeof(struct setup_header)];
__u32 edd_mbr_sig_buffer[EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX]; /* 0x290 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f4b9b80..239bf2a 100644
index 5cee802..b4f4666 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -947,6 +947,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
@@ -961,6 +961,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
io_delay_init();
@ -509,13 +509,13 @@ index ebbed2c..a24faf1 100644
* check for validity of credentials
*/
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 3acf1ceb5f6f3be9103c9da16ddc24afc6d8b02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 805ead5a371f8bab3336754993f15379d9637d5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 09/14] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
Subject: [PATCH 09/19] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
boot environment
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This
@ -541,13 +541,13 @@ index 9eaf708..f94341b 100644
#endif
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 03fb06d272ddc1062e610521c5cfdbe42f251209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 8b079695bbb544aacd00786b3e34f627d9bf149e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 10/14] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
Subject: [PATCH 10/19] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux
policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
@ -574,13 +574,13 @@ index df2de54..70e2834 100644
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 0cfaa5ecf01f8eaaa2a84d88b7258a94ac9a1bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From a3dc33319e9d4b6d912816ed1664e52050eae82e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 11/14] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
Subject: [PATCH 11/19] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
@ -606,13 +606,13 @@ index 0668d58..8b976a5 100644
/*
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 895c46276788b3711aee05a1a1d685eff69d48b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 5f68872e3aebae91a6681ed4a4e97527ff3dd238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 21:29:46 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 12/14] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove
Subject: [PATCH 12/19] Documentation: kernel-parameters.txt remove
capability.disable
Remove the documentation for capability.disable. The code supporting this
@ -647,13 +647,13 @@ index 93978d5..e3e5f8c 100644
See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 1cc529e97756554953187fe48b9b8cf0e24b9bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From ce17d3ac9c1a311633ff4fb90528f8634557a2eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
Subject: [PATCH 13/19] modsign: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
environment
If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 7e6e83f..2b0b980 100644
index 7e6e83f..6e828e2 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -623,11 +623,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ index 7e6e83f..2b0b980 100644
/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index de16959..7d4c50a 100644
index e0785b3..b964a03 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
@ -709,14 +709,14 @@ index de16959..7d4c50a 100644
static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
--
1.7.11.4
1.8.0.1
From 945f3829d0d376c5e0c790b57c4fa9e875d602d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From b8b58cc7b0b8c56170bdf75afff2ec6bc92546a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Add EFI signature data types, such as are used for
containing hashes, keys and certificates for
cryptographic verification.
Subject: [PATCH 14/19] Add EFI signature data types, such as are used for
containing hashes, keys and certificates for cryptographic verification.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 8670eb1..836c797 100644
index 5782114..6add02a 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -312,6 +312,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
@ -762,15 +762,14 @@ index 8670eb1..836c797 100644
* All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
*/
--
1.7.12.1
1.8.0.1
From 5934634101936bc4ee4636df7269e00c4979911c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From f39503e9b88375a450274ab1b5c1eb07f2f2db3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader. X.509
certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as
asymmetric type keys.
Subject: [PATCH 15/19] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader. X.509
certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
@ -923,10 +922,10 @@ index 0000000..59b859a
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 836c797..9cc3250 100644
index 6add02a..c7c3ec4 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -536,6 +536,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
@@ -533,6 +533,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
@ -938,14 +937,14 @@ index 836c797..9cc3250 100644
* efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
* @start: starting kvirt address
--
1.7.12.1
1.8.0.1
From a06f449cee6152ce8f0a051593fceb82d26e4f16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From a4051b85c5ec179b2ec6b1fede399612462cf77d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:29:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot is
enabled
Subject: [PATCH 16/19] EFI: Add in-kernel variable to determine if Secure Boot
is enabled
There are a few cases where in-kernel functions may need to know if
Secure Boot is enabled. The added capability check cannot be used as the
@ -991,10 +990,10 @@ index 72d8899..882d794 100644
.mps = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
.acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 54b5936..411997f 100644
index c7c3ec4..2450bee 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -575,11 +575,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
@@ -570,11 +570,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
# ifdef CONFIG_X86
extern int efi_enabled;
extern bool efi_64bit;
@ -1010,12 +1009,13 @@ index 54b5936..411997f 100644
/*
--
1.7.12.1
1.8.0.1
From 2a5f33b264daffd717b509bc5ac3cdc060b5573e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From ad30518e2a4d52c680aa388c24fbd640d5f9beb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
Subject: [PATCH 17/19] MODSIGN: Add module certificate blacklist keyring
This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
@ -1031,10 +1031,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 6fdd6e3..7a9bf00 100644
index abc6e63..78f3e280 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1602,6 +1602,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
@@ -1613,6 +1613,14 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ index 24f9247..51a8380 100644
extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index ea1b1df..602aa24 100644
index d492a23..39131d3 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
@ -1130,14 +1130,13 @@ index ea1b1df..602aa24 100644
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
--
1.7.12.1
1.8.0.1
From ddd5e2e1b775fb19aeec7fb842e707fc35347bc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 6953646e8248c27c81996d538cbd9177357b80d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Subject: [PATCH 18/19] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This imports those certificates into the module signing keyring. This
@ -1153,32 +1152,35 @@ signed with those from loading.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 3 ++
init/Kconfig | 9 ++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++
init/Kconfig | 9 +++++
kernel/Makefile | 3 ++
kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 115 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index ff72468..509755e 100644
index 2450bee..d5c2cff 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -318,6 +318,9 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
@@ -318,6 +318,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f )
+
+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 )
+
typedef struct {
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 7a9bf00..9c4c529 100644
index 78f3e280..754ee66 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1610,6 +1610,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
@@ -1621,6 +1621,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_BLACKLIST
should not pass module signature verification. If a module is
signed with something in this keyring, the load will be rejected.
@ -1195,10 +1197,10 @@ index 7a9bf00..9c4c529 100644
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 0dfeca4..ff1468f 100644
index d3611c8..927a264 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o
@ -1206,7 +1208,7 @@ index 0dfeca4..ff1468f 100644
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
$(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
@ -1217,10 +1219,10 @@ index 0dfeca4..ff1468f 100644
targets += config_data.gz
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..049669d
index 0000000..8c30978
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
@ -1265,8 +1267,9 @@ index 0000000..049669d
+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+{
+ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0;
+ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
@ -1280,18 +1283,29 @@ index 0000000..049669d
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
+ if (!mok) {
+ pr_info("Couldn't get MokListRT\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Get dbx. It might not exist, so it isn't an error if we can't
+ * get it.
+ */
+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
+ if (!dbx) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get dbx list\n");
+ pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list\n");
+ }
+
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, modsign_keyring);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
+
+ if (mok) {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, modsign_keyring);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ }
+
+ if (dbx) {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
+ modsign_blacklist);
@ -1301,18 +1315,19 @@ index 0000000..049669d
+
+err:
+ kfree(db);
+ kfree(mok);
+ kfree(dbx);
+ return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--
1.7.12.1
1.8.0.1
From 924e09f1b267c407ca037171bc6f8f90b09265d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From 90b1c60f09f2ad45c59b8e6320397f2769e4bdb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
Subject: [PATCH 19/19] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
@ -1402,5 +1417,5 @@ index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
--
1.7.12.1
1.8.0.1