Linux v4.12.10

This commit is contained in:
Justin M. Forbes 2017-08-30 14:00:56 -04:00
parent 9822405eb6
commit 221a602ef6
7 changed files with 587 additions and 88 deletions

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From patchwork Fri Jun 23 09:36:37 2017
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Subject: [V4] acpi: acpica: fix acpi parse and parseext cache leaks
From: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
X-Patchwork-Id: 9806085
Message-Id: <1498210597-112293-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com>
To: lv.zheng@intel.com
Cc: robert.moore@intel.com, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com,
linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, devel@acpica.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 18:36:37 +0900
I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of
South Korea.
I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI
early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows:
[ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #10
[ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.361873] Call Trace:
[ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and
“Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same
slab cache size.
I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache were leaked
using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function.
Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows:
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
[ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
[ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
[ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
[ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
[ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.372000] Call Trace:
[ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-ParseExt: Slab cache still has objects
[ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W
4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8
[ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 0.392000] Call Trace:
[ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
[ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
[ 0.392000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
[ 0.392000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
[ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
[ 0.392000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a
[ 0.392000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0
[ 0.392000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
[ 0.392000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ut_delete_caches() function to delete local caches (acpi_gbl_namespace_
cache, state_cache, operand_cache, ps_node_cache, ps_node_ext_cache).
But the deletion codes in acpi_ut_delete_caches() function only delete
slab caches using kmem_cache_destroy() function, therefore the cache
objects should be flushed before acpi_ut_delete_caches() function.
“Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-ParseExt” cache are used in an AML parse
function, acpi_ps_parse_loop(). The function should have flush codes to
handle an error state due to invalid AML codes.
This cache leak has a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
To fix ACPI cache leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which has
flush codes in acpi_ps_parse_loop() function.
I hope that this patch improves the security of Linux kernel.
Thank you.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
---
Changes since v3: change control transfer according to reviewer's comments.
Changes since v2: merge flush code with existing code and change comments.
Changes since v1: move flush code to acpi_ps_complete_final_op() function.
drivers/acpi/acpica/psobject.c | 53 +++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/psobject.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/psobject.c
index 5bcb618..4539391 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/psobject.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/psobject.c
@@ -608,7 +608,8 @@ acpi_status
acpi_ps_complete_final_op(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
union acpi_parse_object *op, acpi_status status)
{
- acpi_status status2;
+ acpi_status return_status = AE_OK;
+ u8 ascending = TRUE;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR(ps_complete_final_op, walk_state);
@@ -622,7 +623,8 @@ acpi_ps_complete_final_op(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
op));
do {
if (op) {
- if (walk_state->ascending_callback != NULL) {
+ if (ascending &&
+ walk_state->ascending_callback != NULL) {
walk_state->op = op;
walk_state->op_info =
acpi_ps_get_opcode_info(op->common.
@@ -644,49 +646,26 @@ acpi_ps_complete_final_op(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
}
if (status == AE_CTRL_TERMINATE) {
- status = AE_OK;
-
- /* Clean up */
- do {
- if (op) {
- status2 =
- acpi_ps_complete_this_op
- (walk_state, op);
- if (ACPI_FAILURE
- (status2)) {
- return_ACPI_STATUS
- (status2);
- }
- }
-
- acpi_ps_pop_scope(&
- (walk_state->
- parser_state),
- &op,
- &walk_state->
- arg_types,
- &walk_state->
- arg_count);
-
- } while (op);
-
- return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
+ ascending = FALSE;
+ return_status = AE_CTRL_TERMINATE;
}
else if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
/* First error is most important */
- (void)
- acpi_ps_complete_this_op(walk_state,
- op);
- return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
+ ascending = FALSE;
+ return_status = status;
}
}
- status2 = acpi_ps_complete_this_op(walk_state, op);
- if (ACPI_FAILURE(status2)) {
- return_ACPI_STATUS(status2);
+ status = acpi_ps_complete_this_op(walk_state, op);
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
+ ascending = FALSE;
+ if (ACPI_SUCCESS(return_status) ||
+ return_status == AE_CTRL_TERMINATE) {
+ return_status = status;
+ }
}
}
@@ -696,5 +675,5 @@ acpi_ps_complete_final_op(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
} while (op);
- return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
+ return_ACPI_STATUS(return_status);
}

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From patchwork Thu Aug 24 05:11:35 2017
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MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dsutils.c
From: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
X-Patchwork-Id: 9919053
Message-Id: <1503551495-33286-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com>
To: lv.zheng@intel.com
Cc: robert.moore@intel.com, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com,
linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, devel@acpica.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 14:11:35 +0900
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination is occurred due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
---
drivers/acpi/acpica/dsutils.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsutils.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsutils.c
index 0dabd9b..2c8a060 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsutils.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsutils.c
@@ -705,6 +705,8 @@ acpi_ds_create_operands(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
union acpi_parse_object *arguments[ACPI_OBJ_NUM_OPERANDS];
u32 arg_count = 0;
u32 index = walk_state->num_operands;
+ u32 prev_num_operands = walk_state->num_operands;
+ u32 new_num_operands;
u32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR(ds_create_operands, first_arg);
@@ -733,6 +735,7 @@ acpi_ds_create_operands(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
/* Create the interpreter arguments, in reverse order */
+ new_num_operands = index;
index--;
for (i = 0; i < arg_count; i++) {
arg = arguments[index];
@@ -757,7 +760,11 @@ acpi_ds_create_operands(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state,
* pop everything off of the operand stack and delete those
* objects
*/
- acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete(arg_count, walk_state);
+ walk_state->num_operands = i;
+ acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete(new_num_operands, walk_state);
+
+ /* Restore operand count */
+ walk_state->num_operands = prev_num_operands;
ACPI_EXCEPTION((AE_INFO, status, "While creating Arg %u", index));
return_ACPI_STATUS(status);

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From patchwork Wed Jul 19 07:07:23 2017
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in nseval.c
From: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
X-Patchwork-Id: 9850567
Message-Id: <1500448043-137615-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com>
To: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Robert Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, devel@acpica.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 16:07:23 +0900
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled
>[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0)
>[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing
>[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991)
>[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.529668] Call Trace:
>[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ns_evaluate() function
only removes info->return_object in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors
occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and info->return_object is
also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
---
drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c
index d22167c..f13d3cf 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/nseval.c
@@ -308,6 +308,14 @@ acpi_status acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info *info)
/* Map AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE to AE_OK, we are done with it */
status = AE_OK;
+ } else if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
+
+ /* If return_object exists, delete it */
+
+ if (info->return_object) {
+ acpi_ut_remove_reference(info->return_object);
+ info->return_object = NULL;
+ }
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_NAMES,

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@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
From eafad73ed3851707fa6e3124a255fc049ff9545d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Aug 2017 09:09:21 -0700
Subject: iio: hid-sensor-trigger: Fix the race with user space powering up
sensors
It has been reported for a while that with iio-sensor-proxy service the
rotation only works after one suspend/resume cycle. This required a wait
in the systemd unit file to avoid race. I found a Yoga 900 where I could
reproduce this.
The problem scenerio is:
- During sensor driver init, enable run time PM and also set a
auto-suspend for 3 seconds.
This result in one runtime resume. But there is a check to avoid
a powerup in this sequence, but rpm is active
- User space iio-sensor-proxy tries to power up the sensor. Since rpm is
active it will simply return. But sensors were not actually
powered up in the prior sequence, so actaully the sensors will not work
- After 3 seconds the auto suspend kicks
If we add a wait in systemd service file to fire iio-sensor-proxy after
3 seconds, then now everything will work as the runtime resume will
actually powerup the sensor as this is a user request.
To avoid this:
- Remove the check to match user requested state, this will cause a
brief powerup, but if the iio-sensor-proxy starts immediately it will
still work as the sensors are ON.
- Also move the autosuspend delay to place when user requested turn off
of sensors, like after user finished raw read or buffer disable
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
---
drivers/iio/common/hid-sensors/hid-sensor-trigger.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/common/hid-sensors/hid-sensor-trigger.c b/drivers/iio/common/hid-sensors/hid-sensor-trigger.c
index 16ade0a..0e4b379 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/common/hid-sensors/hid-sensor-trigger.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/common/hid-sensors/hid-sensor-trigger.c
@@ -111,8 +111,6 @@ static int _hid_sensor_power_state(struct hid_sensor_common *st, bool state)
s32 poll_value = 0;
if (state) {
- if (!atomic_read(&st->user_requested_state))
- return 0;
if (sensor_hub_device_open(st->hsdev))
return -EIO;
@@ -161,6 +159,9 @@ static int _hid_sensor_power_state(struct hid_sensor_common *st, bool state)
&report_val);
}
+ pr_debug("HID_SENSOR %s set power_state %d report_state %d\n",
+ st->pdev->name, state_val, report_val);
+
sensor_hub_get_feature(st->hsdev, st->power_state.report_id,
st->power_state.index,
sizeof(state_val), &state_val);
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ int hid_sensor_power_state(struct hid_sensor_common *st, bool state)
ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&st->pdev->dev);
else {
pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(&st->pdev->dev);
+ pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&st->pdev->dev);
ret = pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(&st->pdev->dev);
}
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -285,8 +287,6 @@ int hid_sensor_setup_trigger(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, const char *name,
/* Default to 3 seconds, but can be changed from sysfs */
pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(&attrb->pdev->dev,
3000);
- pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&attrb->pdev->dev);
-
return ret;
error_unreg_trigger:
iio_trigger_unregister(trig);
--
cgit v1.1

View File

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
%if 0%{?released_kernel}
# Do we have a -stable update to apply?
%define stable_update 9
%define stable_update 10
# Set rpm version accordingly
%if 0%{?stable_update}
%define stablerev %{stable_update}
@ -669,9 +669,6 @@ Patch704: input-rmi4-remove-the-need-for-artifical-IRQ.patch
# rhbz 1476467
Patch706: Fix-for-module-sig-verification.patch
# request for bug fix
Patch709: iio-race-fix.patch
# rhbz 1485086
Patch710: pci-mark-amd-stoney-gpu-ats-as-broken.patch
@ -681,6 +678,18 @@ Patch711: rt2800-fix-TX_PIN_CFG-setting-for-non-MT7620-chips.patch
# CVE-2017-7558 rhbz 1480266 1484810
Patch712: net-sctp-Avoid-out-of-bounds-reads-from-address-storage.patch
# CVE-2017-13693 rhbz 1485346 1485356
Patch713: acpi-acpica-fix-acpi-operand-cache-leak-in-dsutils.c.patch
# CVE-2017-13694 rhbz 1485348
Patch714: V4-acpi-acpica-fix-acpi-parse-and-parseext-cache-leaks.patch
# CVE-2017-13695 rhbz 1485349
Patch715: acpi-acpica-fix-acpi-operand-cache-leak-in-nseval.c.patch
# rhbz 1484587
Patch716: md-raid-reset-bio-allocated-from-mempool.patch
# END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
%endif
@ -2255,6 +2264,13 @@ fi
#
#
%changelog
* Wed Aug 30 2017 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@redhat.com> - 4.12.10-200
- Linux v4.12.10
- Fix for CVE-2017-13693 (rhbz 1485346 1485356)
- Fix for CVE-2017-13694 (rhbz 1485348)
- Fix for CVE-2017-13695 (rhbz 1485349)
- Fix for raid 1/10 (rhbz 1484587)
* Fri Aug 25 2017 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.12.9-200
- Linux v4.12.9
- For for AMD Stoney GPU (rhbz 1485086)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
From: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Date: 2017-08-25 2:41:16
Subject: [PATCH] md/raid1/10: reset bio allocated from mempool
From: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Data allocated from mempool doesn't always get initialized, this happens when
the data is reused instead of fresh allocation. In the raid1/10 case, we must
reinitialize the bios.
Reported-by: Jonathan G. Underwood <jonathan.underwood@gmail.com>
Fixes: f0250618361d(md: raid10: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages)
Fixes: 98d30c5812c3(md: raid1: don't use bio's vec table to manage resync pages)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (4.12+)
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
---
drivers/md/raid1.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/md/raid10.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/raid1.c b/drivers/md/raid1.c
index f50958ded9f0..79474f47eeef 100644
--- a/drivers/md/raid1.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid1.c
@@ -2564,6 +2564,23 @@ static int init_resync(struct r1conf *conf)
return 0;
}
+static struct r1bio *raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(struct r1conf *conf)
+{
+ struct r1bio *r1bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+ struct resync_pages *rps;
+ struct bio *bio;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = conf->poolinfo->raid_disks; i--; ) {
+ bio = r1bio->bios[i];
+ rps = bio->bi_private;
+ bio_reset(bio);
+ bio->bi_private = rps;
+ }
+ r1bio->master_bio = NULL;
+ return r1bio;
+}
+
/*
* perform a "sync" on one "block"
*
@@ -2649,7 +2666,7 @@ static sector_t raid1_sync_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr,
bitmap_cond_end_sync(mddev->bitmap, sector_nr,
mddev_is_clustered(mddev) && (sector_nr + 2 * RESYNC_SECTORS > conf->cluster_sync_high));
- r1_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r1buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+ r1_bio = raid1_alloc_init_r1buf(conf);
raise_barrier(conf, sector_nr);
diff --git a/drivers/md/raid10.c b/drivers/md/raid10.c
index f55d4cc085f6..d51ac02e98ef 100644
--- a/drivers/md/raid10.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c
@@ -2798,6 +2798,35 @@ static int init_resync(struct r10conf *conf)
return 0;
}
+static struct r10bio *raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(struct r10conf *conf)
+{
+ struct r10bio *r10bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+ struct rsync_pages *rp;
+ struct bio *bio;
+ int nalloc;
+ int i;
+
+ if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &conf->mddev->recovery) ||
+ test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &conf->mddev->recovery))
+ nalloc = conf->copies; /* resync */
+ else
+ nalloc = 2; /* recovery */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) {
+ bio = r10bio->devs[i].bio;
+ rp = bio->bi_private;
+ bio_reset(bio);
+ bio->bi_private = rp;
+ bio = r10bio->devs[i].repl_bio;
+ if (bio) {
+ rp = bio->bi_private;
+ bio_reset(bio);
+ bio->bi_private = rp;
+ }
+ }
+ return r10bio;
+}
+
/*
* perform a "sync" on one "block"
*
@@ -3027,7 +3056,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr,
atomic_inc(&mreplace->nr_pending);
rcu_read_unlock();
- r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+ r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
r10_bio->state = 0;
raise_barrier(conf, rb2 != NULL);
atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0);
@@ -3236,7 +3265,7 @@ static sector_t raid10_sync_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr,
}
if (sync_blocks < max_sync)
max_sync = sync_blocks;
- r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+ r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
r10_bio->state = 0;
r10_bio->mddev = mddev;
@@ -4360,7 +4389,7 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr,
read_more:
/* Now schedule reads for blocks from sector_nr to last */
- r10_bio = mempool_alloc(conf->r10buf_pool, GFP_NOIO);
+ r10_bio = raid10_alloc_init_r10buf(conf);
r10_bio->state = 0;
raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0);
atomic_set(&r10_bio->remaining, 0);
--
2.11.0
--
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View File

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
SHA512 (perf-man-4.12.tar.gz) = 4d3bbda1f520dba0007c351af46f45085fe4842074eb2e01aee736fd369df595f8f72ed6c1192715f1120bf3353279777f9dca1178fe93bffe5be2de700d409c
SHA512 (linux-4.12.tar.xz) = 8e81b41b253e63233e92948941f44c6482acb52aa3a3fd172f03a38a86f2c35b2ad4fd407acd1bc3964673eba344fe104d3a03e3ff4bf9cd1f22bd44263bd728
SHA512 (patch-4.12.9.xz) = 8f4f9e270e8d00008b505be53aa0132aefbde21ae797e9daede19d6c81b26f255773b8e91396b75bbc78153d641a2479afbc22a7dc0d95b9c24534327fb95e38
SHA512 (patch-4.12.10.xz) = 9463d9335c551376c7cdf45f4aa8f599d7783dbd4de62f87853e1c676f0a7e1a99b25909eac994676786e850137c90897a11c61d59e25674982132b888cfb1f1