Linux v4.14.12

This commit is contained in:
Justin M. Forbes 2018-01-05 09:30:15 -06:00
parent b4569abca3
commit 05dab9c537
3 changed files with 5 additions and 48 deletions

View File

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
%if 0%{?released_kernel}
# Do we have a -stable update to apply?
%define stable_update 11
%define stable_update 12
# Set rpm version accordingly
%if 0%{?stable_update}
%define stablerev %{stable_update}
@ -667,7 +667,6 @@ Patch628: HID-rmi-Check-that-a-device-is-a-RMI-device-before-c.patch
Patch630: v4-KVM-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-write_mmio.patch
Patch631: cgroup-for-4.15-fixes-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
Patch632: x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
# rhbz1514969
Patch633: 0001-platform-x86-dell-laptop-Filter-out-spurious-keyboar.patch
@ -2227,6 +2226,9 @@ fi
#
#
%changelog
* Fri Jan 05 2018 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.14.12-300
- Linux v4.14.12
* Thu Jan 04 2018 Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
- Add a patch to filter false positive kbd backlight change events (#1514969)

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@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
SHA512 (linux-4.14.tar.xz) = 77e43a02d766c3d73b7e25c4aafb2e931d6b16e870510c22cef0cdb05c3acb7952b8908ebad12b10ef982c6efbe286364b1544586e715cf38390e483927904d8
SHA512 (perf-man-4.14.tar.gz) = 76a9d8adc284cdffd4b3fbb060e7f9a14109267707ce1d03f4c3239cd70d8d164f697da3a0f90a363fbcac42a61d3c378afbcc2a86f112c501b9cb5ce74ef9f8
SHA512 (patch-4.14.11.xz) = 3fbaf02eb236d7490eb65e64b841fc43bd3abbbf97deef79b7457faf8005ef7f2cbaf5c4a8c3b2d22998f5197a5a98b6fef717ed60a34ff666fa7eaf8376118d
SHA512 (patch-4.14.12.xz) = b11b91503c9eb879b79cb16683204f5dbb467aac62dcfc1b025f889dc38016d990c0fd1879210226430e9f9ac6e168439b13603781188d67d213b12a334b4e5b

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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From patchwork Wed Dec 27 05:43:54 2017
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
X-Patchwork-Id: 10133447
Message-Id: <20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2017 23:43:54 -0600
AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture
does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
when that access would result in a page fault.
Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
is set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c47de4e..7d9e3b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -923,8 +923,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
- /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
fpu__init_system(c);