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kernel/devel-pekey-secure-boot-20130221.patch

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Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 3f91d07a25811fa58a6e48db1e17519fbc77c97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:53:35 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 01/47] KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Load all the files matching the pattern "*.x509" that are to be found in kernel
base source dir and base build dir into the module signing keyring.
The "extra_certificates" file is then redundant.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/Makefile | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
kernel/modsign_certificate.S | 3 +--
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 6c072b6..bdabd1d 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -134,17 +134,40 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE
$(call if_changed,timeconst)
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
+###############################################################################
#
-# Pull the signing certificate and any extra certificates into the kernel
+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull
+# them into the kernel.
#
+###############################################################################
+X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
+X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
+X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
+
+ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
+$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),)
+ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES))
+$(info X.509 certificate list changed)
+$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
+endif
+endif
+
+kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-quiet_cmd_touch = TOUCH $@
- cmd_touch = touch $@
+quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@
+ cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@
+targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
+ $(call if_changed,x509certs)
-extra_certificates:
- $(call cmd,touch)
+targets += $(obj)/.x509.list
+$(obj)/.x509.list:
+ @echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
-kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates
+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
###############################################################################
#
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
index 246b4c6..0a60203 100644
--- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
+++ b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
@@ -14,6 +14,5 @@
.section ".init.data","aw"
GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list)
- .incbin "signing_key.x509"
- .incbin "extra_certificates"
+ .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 2daa6c03f96a971ebc678b4ccd990f3305e2f2e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 18:39:54 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 02/47] KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
from module signing
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
can be used by code other than the module-signing code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 23 ++++++++++
init/Kconfig | 13 ++++++
kernel/Makefile | 17 ++++---
kernel/modsign_certificate.S | 18 --------
kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 104 ------------------------------------------
kernel/module-internal.h | 2 -
kernel/module_signing.c | 3 +-
kernel/system_certificates.S | 18 ++++++++
kernel/system_keyring.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/system_keyring.h
delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_certificate.S
delete mode 100644 kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
create mode 100644 kernel/system_certificates.S
create mode 100644 kernel/system_keyring.c
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dabc39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* System keyring containing trusted public keys.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
+#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
+extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 7000d96..755bb7a 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
@@ -1596,6 +1596,18 @@ config BASE_SMALL
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
default 0 if BASE_FULL
default 1 if !BASE_FULL
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
+ depends on KEYS
+ help
+ Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in
+ the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will
+ by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
+ userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
+ keys already in the keyring.
+
+ Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+
menuconfig MODULES
bool "Enable loadable module support"
help
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
@@ -1668,6 +1680,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES
+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
select KEYS
select CRYPTO
select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index bdabd1d..0ca8c0a 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -53,8 +53,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o modsign_certificate.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
@@ -133,13 +134,14 @@ targets += timeconst.h
$(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE
$(call if_changed,timeconst)
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
###############################################################################
#
-# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull
-# them into the kernel.
+# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
+# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during
+# boot.
#
###############################################################################
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
@@ -155,10 +157,11 @@ $(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
endif
endif
-kernel/modsign_certificate.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@
- cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@
+ cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; echo " - Including cert $(X509)")
+
targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
$(call if_changed,x509certs)
@@ -168,7 +171,9 @@ $(obj)/.x509.list:
@echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
+endif
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
###############################################################################
#
# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S b/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a60203..0000000
--- a/kernel/modsign_certificate.S
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-/* SYMBOL_PREFIX defined on commandline from CONFIG_SYMBOL_PREFIX */
-#ifndef SYMBOL_PREFIX
-#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) sym
-#else
-#define PASTE2(x,y) x##y
-#define PASTE(x,y) PASTE2(x,y)
-#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) PASTE(SYMBOL_PREFIX, sym)
-#endif
-
-#define GLOBAL(name) \
- .globl ASM_SYMBOL(name); \
- ASM_SYMBOL(name):
-
- .section ".init.data","aw"
-
-GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list)
- .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
-GLOBAL(modsign_certificate_list_end)
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b6e699..0000000
--- a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-/* Public keys for module signature verification
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
- * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
- */
-
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/cred.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-#include "module-internal.h"
-
-struct key *modsign_keyring;
-
-extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[];
-extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[];
-
-/*
- * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice
- * if modsign.pub changes.
- */
-static __initdata const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo";
-
-/*
- * Load the compiled-in keys
- */
-static __init int module_verify_init(void)
-{
- pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n");
-
- modsign_keyring = keyring_alloc(".module_sign",
- KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
- current_cred(),
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring))
- panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n");
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
- */
-device_initcall(module_verify_init);
-
-/*
- * Load the compiled-in keys
- */
-static __init int load_module_signing_keys(void)
-{
- key_ref_t key;
- const u8 *p, *end;
- size_t plen;
-
- pr_notice("Loading module verification certificates\n");
-
- end = modsign_certificate_list_end;
- p = modsign_certificate_list;
- while (p < end) {
- /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
- * than 256 bytes in size.
- */
- if (end - p < 4)
- goto dodgy_cert;
- if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
- p[1] != 0x82)
- goto dodgy_cert;
- plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
- plen += 4;
- if (plen > end - p)
- goto dodgy_cert;
-
- key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
- "asymmetric",
- NULL,
- p,
- plen,
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
- PTR_ERR(key));
- else
- pr_notice("MODSIGN: Loaded cert '%s'\n",
- key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
- p += plen;
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-dodgy_cert:
- pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(load_module_signing_keys);
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 24f9247..915e123 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -9,6 +9,4 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
-extern struct key *modsign_keyring;
-
extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen);
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index f2970bd..0034e36 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
/*
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1),
+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86240df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* SYMBOL_PREFIX defined on commandline from CONFIG_SYMBOL_PREFIX */
+#ifndef SYMBOL_PREFIX
+#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) sym
+#else
+#define PASTE2(x,y) x##y
+#define PASTE(x,y) PASTE2(x,y)
+#define ASM_SYMBOL(sym) PASTE(SYMBOL_PREFIX, sym)
+#endif
+
+#define GLOBAL(name) \
+ .globl ASM_SYMBOL(name); \
+ ASM_SYMBOL(name):
+
+ .section ".init.data","aw"
+
+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list)
+ .incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
+GLOBAL(system_certificate_list_end)
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3ca76f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "module-internal.h"
+
+struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+
+extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list[];
+extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list_end[];
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in keys
+ */
+static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
+{
+ pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
+
+ system_trusted_keyring =
+ keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
+ */
+device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
+
+/*
+ * Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
+ */
+static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ const u8 *p, *end;
+ size_t plen;
+
+ pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
+
+ end = system_certificate_list_end;
+ p = system_certificate_list;
+ while (p < end) {
+ /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
+ * than 256 bytes in size.
+ */
+ if (end - p < 4)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+ if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
+ p[1] != 0x82)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+ plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+ plen += 4;
+ if (plen > end - p)
+ goto dodgy_cert;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ p,
+ plen,
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(key));
+ else
+ pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+ p += plen;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+dodgy_cert:
+ pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From d23e4fbcebd332eb4cdf125f2d2bba03af548f12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 16:25:00 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 03/47] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
kernel already possessed.
Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/linux/key-type.h | 1 +
include/linux/key.h | 3 +++
kernel/system_keyring.c | 4 +++-
security/keys/key.c | 8 ++++++++
security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++++
5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index 518a53a..f942b2d 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
const void *data; /* Raw data */
size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */
size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */
+ bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */
};
typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 4dfde11..0b32a09 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -162,6 +162,8 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */
#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */
+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */
+#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
/* the description string
* - this is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED 0x0004 /* Key should be flagged as trusted */
extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index a3ca76f..dae8778 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -82,7 +83,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
plen,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
if (IS_ERR(key))
pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(key));
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 8fb7c7b..f3de9e4 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
+ key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
@@ -813,6 +815,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen;
+ prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
if (ktype->preparse) {
ret = ktype->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -826,6 +829,11 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
goto error_free_prep;
}
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
+
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 6ece7f2..f18d7ff 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1006,6 +1006,10 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
key_check(keyring);
key_check(key);
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) &&
+ !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags))
+ return -EPERM;
+
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 4dce22c0b12d9bb27838bede832cf2a0b440ac21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:32 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 04/47] KEYS: Rename public key parameter name arrays
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Rename the arrays of public key parameters (public key algorithm names, hash
algorithm names and ID type names) so that the array name ends in "_name".
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 14 +++++++-------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 8 ++++----
include/crypto/public_key.h | 6 +++---
kernel/module_signing.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index cb2e291..b313df1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
+const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
[PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = "DSA",
[PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "RSA",
};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name);
-const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
+const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
[PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4",
[PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = "sha1",
@@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
[PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = "sha512",
[PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = "sha224",
};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo_name);
-const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
+const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
[PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP",
[PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509",
};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
/*
* Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
if (key)
seq_printf(m, "%s.%s",
- pkey_id_type[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
+ pkey_id_type_name[key->id_type], key->algo->name);
}
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 06007f0..afbbc36 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
- pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]);
+ pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]);
pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
- pkey_algo[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
- pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
+ pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
+ pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index f5b0224..619d570 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ enum pkey_algo {
PKEY_ALGO__LAST
};
-extern const char *const pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
+extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
enum pkey_hash_algo {
PKEY_HASH_MD4,
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ enum pkey_hash_algo {
PKEY_HASH__LAST
};
-extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
+extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST];
enum pkey_id_type {
PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ enum pkey_id_type {
PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST
};
-extern const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
+extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
/*
* Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 0034e36..0b6b870 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash,
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
return -ENOPKG;
if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
- !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash])
+ !pkey_hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
return -ENOPKG;
key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From a0786aba4bae98b31c9a7018fe1f8e139c5d99cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:33 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 05/47] KEYS: Move the algorithm pointer array from x509 to
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
public_key.c
Move the public-key algorithm pointer array from x509_public_key.c to
public_key.c as it isn't X.509 specific.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 8 ++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +----------
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index b313df1..796ce08 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo_name);
+const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
+#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
+ defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
+ [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
+#endif
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
+
const char *const pkey_hash_algo_name[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
[PKEY_HASH_MD4] = "md4",
[PKEY_HASH_MD5] = "md5",
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index afbbc36..fe38628 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
-static const
-struct public_key_algorithm *x509_public_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
- [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = NULL,
-#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
- defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
- [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_public_key_algorithm,
-#endif
-};
-
/*
* Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
*/
@@ -174,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error_free_cert;
}
- cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo];
+ cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo];
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key */
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 619d570..46bde25 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ enum pkey_algo {
};
extern const char *const pkey_algo_name[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
+extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
enum pkey_hash_algo {
PKEY_HASH_MD4,
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From dd8d2d91c8ff87e224478fab299771c6bc52b2ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:33 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 06/47] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key struct
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Store public key algo ID in public_key struct for reference purposes. This
allows it to be removed from the x509_certificate struct and used to find a
default in public_key_verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 5 +++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 4 ++--
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 7fabc4c..a583930 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -343,8 +343,9 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
return -ENOPKG;
- /* There seems to be an extraneous 0 byte on the front of the data */
- ctx->cert->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+
+ /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
ctx->key = value + 1;
ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index f86dc5f..e583ad0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ struct x509_certificate {
char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
struct tm valid_from;
struct tm valid_to;
- enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; /* Public key algorithm */
enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */
enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index fe38628..fac574c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
- pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pkey_algo]);
+ pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error_free_cert;
}
- cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo];
+ cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key */
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 46bde25..05778df 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct public_key {
#define PKEY_CAN_DECRYPT 0x02
#define PKEY_CAN_SIGN 0x04
#define PKEY_CAN_VERIFY 0x08
+ enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8;
union {
MPI mpi[5];
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 19f078c7a00e385c4d9155aabe9f652561781aa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:34 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 07/47] KEYS: Split public_key_verify_signature() and make
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
available
Modify public_key_verify_signature() so that it now takes a public_key struct
rather than a key struct and supply a wrapper that takes a key struct. The
wrapper is then used by the asymmetric key subtype and the modified function is
used by X.509 self-signature checking and can be used by PKCS#7 also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h | 6 +++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 796ce08..49ac8d8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -86,21 +86,45 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
/*
* Verify a signature using a public key.
*/
-static int public_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
- const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
- const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
+ const struct public_key_algorithm *algo;
+
+ BUG_ON(!pk);
+ BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[0]);
+ BUG_ON(!pk->mpi[1]);
+ BUG_ON(!sig);
+ BUG_ON(!sig->digest);
+ BUG_ON(!sig->mpi[0]);
+
+ algo = pk->algo;
+ if (!algo) {
+ if (pk->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ algo = pkey_algo[pk->pkey_algo];
+ if (!algo)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
- if (!pk->algo->verify_signature)
+ if (!algo->verify_signature)
return -ENOTSUPP;
- if (sig->nr_mpi != pk->algo->n_sig_mpi) {
+ if (sig->nr_mpi != algo->n_sig_mpi) {
pr_debug("Signature has %u MPI not %u\n",
- sig->nr_mpi, pk->algo->n_sig_mpi);
+ sig->nr_mpi, algo->n_sig_mpi);
return -EINVAL;
}
- return pk->algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
+ return algo->verify_signature(pk, sig);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
+
+static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
+ return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
}
/*
@@ -111,6 +135,6 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
.name = "public_key",
.describe = public_key_describe,
.destroy = public_key_destroy,
- .verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature,
+ .verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature_2,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
index 5e5e356..5c37a22 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
@@ -28,3 +28,9 @@ struct public_key_algorithm {
};
extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm;
+
+/*
+ * public_key.c
+ */
+extern int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pk,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index fac574c..8cb2f70 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_mpi;
- ret = pub->algo->verify_signature(pub, sig);
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig);
pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From f9075898d9df51ed080d5640c92fa9b696ed3aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 08/47] KEYS: Store public key algo ID in public_key_signature
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
struct
Store public key algorithm ID in public_key_signature struct for reference
purposes. This allows a public_key_signature struct to be embedded in
struct x509_certificate and struct pkcs7_message more easily.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 05778df..b34fda4 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
u8 *digest;
u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
u8 nr_mpi; /* Occupancy of mpi[] */
+ enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8;
enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8;
union {
MPI mpi[2];
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 3ea1daa2cd04e122ebb6a3243ab1feca384ae42e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 09/47] X.509: struct x509_certificate needs struct tm
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
declaring
struct x509_certificate needs struct tm declaring by #inclusion of linux/time.h
prior to its definition.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index e583ad0..2d01182 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#include <linux/time.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
struct x509_certificate {
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 1144614bf4b54b3ecd1cb9b9d222ad7eefb77c35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:35 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 10/47] X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an
X.509 certificate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 10 ++++++++--
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
index bf32b3d..aae0cde 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [ 0 ] Version DEFAULT,
- serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }),
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }),
issuer Name ({ x509_note_issuer }),
validity Validity,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index a583930..08bebf1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -209,6 +209,19 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
+ * Note the certificate serial number
+ */
+int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
*/
int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -320,6 +333,8 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
}
@@ -328,6 +343,8 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 2d01182..a6ce46f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -24,9 +24,15 @@ struct x509_certificate {
enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */
enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
- size_t tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
+ unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
+ unsigned sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
const void *sig; /* Signature data */
- size_t sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
+ const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
+ unsigned raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
+ const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
+ unsigned raw_subject_size;
};
/*
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From f9af91d7bbc59b8056ea2b2d1a823a7761cfe8ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:36 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 11/47] X.509: Embed public_key_signature struct and create
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
filler function
Embed a public_key_signature struct in struct x509_certificate, eliminating
now unnecessary fields, and split x509_check_signature() to create a filler
function for it that attaches a digest of the signed data and an MPI that
represents the signature data. x509_free_certificate() is then modified to
deal with these.
Whilst we're at it, export both x509_check_signature() and the new
x509_get_sig_params().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 30 +++++------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 14 ++++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++--------------
3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 08bebf1..931f069 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->fingerprint);
kfree(cert->authority);
+ kfree(cert->sig.digest);
+ mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
kfree(cert);
}
}
@@ -152,33 +154,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
break;
case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
break;
case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
break;
case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA384;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
break;
case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA512;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
break;
case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
- ctx->cert->sig_pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA224;
+ ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
break;
}
@@ -203,8 +205,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -EINVAL;
}
- ctx->cert->sig = value;
- ctx->cert->sig_size = vlen;
+ ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index a6ce46f..6b1d877 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -21,18 +21,17 @@ struct x509_certificate {
char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
struct tm valid_from;
struct tm valid_to;
- enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */
- enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
- unsigned sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
- const void *sig; /* Signature data */
+ unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
+ const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */
const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
unsigned raw_serial_size;
unsigned raw_issuer_size;
const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
unsigned raw_subject_size;
+ struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
};
/*
@@ -40,3 +39,10 @@ struct x509_certificate {
*/
extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+/*
+ * x509_public_key.c
+ */
+extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
+ struct x509_certificate *cert);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 8cb2f70..b7c81d8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -24,72 +24,83 @@
#include "x509_parser.h"
/*
- * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
+ * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
+ * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
-static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
- const struct x509_certificate *cert)
+int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
- struct public_key_signature *sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ void *digest;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
+
+ if (cert->sig.rsa.s)
+ return 0;
+
+ cert->sig.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size);
+ if (!cert->sig.rsa.s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ cert->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
+
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
- /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
- * context data.
+ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the
+ * digest storage space.
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
- sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sig)
- goto error_no_sig;
+ digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!digest)
+ goto error;
- sig->pkey_hash_algo = cert->sig_hash_algo;
- sig->digest = (u8 *)sig + sizeof(*sig) + desc_size;
- sig->digest_size = digest_size;
+ cert->sig.digest = digest;
+ cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size;
- desc = (void *)sig + sizeof(*sig);
- desc->tfm = tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+ desc = digest + digest_size;
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
+ might_sleep();
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest);
+error:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_sig_params);
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- sig->rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(cert->sig, cert->sig_size);
- if (!sig->rsa.s)
- goto error;
+/*
+ * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
+ */
+int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
+ struct x509_certificate *cert)
+{
+ int ret;
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_mpi;
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, sig);
+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig);
pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
-
-error_mpi:
- mpi_free(sig->rsa.s);
-error:
- kfree(sig);
-error_no_sig:
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
@@ -118,8 +129,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
- pkey_algo_name[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
- pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
+ pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
+ pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 2de8d6964a3f8315747ce5e19ef66a1ffaaa944c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:36 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 12/47] X.509: Check the algorithm IDs obtained from parsing an
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
X.509 certificate
Check that the algorithm IDs obtained from the ASN.1 parse by OID lookup
corresponds to algorithms that are available to us.
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index b7c81d8..eb368d4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
+
+ if (cert->pub->pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST ||
+ cert->sig.pkey_algo >= PKEY_ALGO__LAST ||
+ cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+ !pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo] ||
+ !pkey_algo[cert->sig.pkey_algo] ||
+ !pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
+ ret = -ENOPKG;
+ goto error_free_cert;
+ }
+
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 223a5deb66e66e3640c18e9ef55c2966c9f1de9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:37 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 13/47] X.509: Handle certificates that lack an
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
authorityKeyIdentifier field
Handle certificates that lack an authorityKeyIdentifier field by assuming
they're self-signed and checking their signatures against themselves.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index eb368d4..0f55e3b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
- if (!cert->fingerprint || !cert->authority) {
- pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have SubjKeyId and AuthKeyId extensions\n",
+ if (!cert->fingerprint) {
+ pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
cert->subject);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto error_free_cert;
@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
- /* Check the signature on the key */
- if (strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
+ /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
+ if (!cert->authority ||
+ strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From aa23db21b8b797d6052ae536fb025310750640cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:37 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 14/47] X.509: Export certificate parse and free functions
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 931f069..9cf0e16 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
kfree(cert);
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
/*
* Parse an X.509 certificate
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ error_no_ctx:
error_no_cert:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
/*
* Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From b97eb4015d28a2b9e6dfd2171cffbdbfa57f68e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:38 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 15/47] PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315]
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of
RFC 2315.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 13 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 127 +++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 326 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 65 +++++++
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 1 +
6 files changed, 541 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 6d2c2ea..413f3f6 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -35,4 +35,13 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
public key packet found inside the certificate.
+config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ tristate "PKCS#7 message parser"
+ depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select ASN1
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ help
+ This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
+ signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 0727204..59d8cad 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -25,3 +25,16 @@ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 message handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
+pkcs7_message-y := \
+ pkcs7-asn1.o \
+ pkcs7_parser.o
+
+$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bf91ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ contentType ContentType,
+ content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
+
+SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version INTEGER,
+ digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ({ pkcs7_note_digest_algo }),
+ contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ certificates CHOICE {
+ certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
+ certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates
+ } OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }),
+ crls CHOICE {
+ crlSet [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists,
+ crlSequence [3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence
+ } OPTIONAL,
+ signerInfos SignerInfos
+}
+
+ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ contentType ContentType,
+ content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
+}
+
+Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE {
+ daSet SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ daSequence SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+}
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+--
+-- Certificates and certificate lists
+--
+ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate
+
+ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+ certificate Certificate, -- X.509
+ extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate -- PKCS#6
+}
+
+ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating
+
+Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
+
+CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList
+
+CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly
+
+CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
+
+Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509
+
+--
+-- Signer information
+--
+SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
+ siSet SET OF SignerInfo,
+ siSequence SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo
+}
+
+SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version INTEGER,
+ issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_note_digest_algo }),
+ authenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+ aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
+ ({ pkcs7_note_set_of_authattrs }),
+ aaSequence [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+ -- Explicit because easier to compute digest on
+ -- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded
+ -- sequence in aaSequence.
+ } OPTIONAL,
+ digestEncryptionAlgorithm
+ DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_note_pkey_algo }),
+ encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
+ unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+ uaSet [1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute,
+ uaSequence [3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute
+ } OPTIONAL
+}
+
+IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
+ issuer Name ({ pkcs7_note_issuer }),
+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_note_serial })
+}
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+
+SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+
+AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ values SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_note_authenticated_attr })
+}
+
+UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ values SET OF ANY
+}
+
+DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_note_signature })
+
+---
+--- X.500 Name
+---
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ attributeValue ANY
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..231aff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+/* PKCS#7 parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#include "pkcs7-asn1.h"
+
+struct pkcs7_parse_context {
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg; /* Message being constructed */
+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate cache */
+ struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
+ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
+ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Free a PKCS#7 message
+ */
+void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ if (pkcs7) {
+ while (pkcs7->certs) {
+ cert = pkcs7->certs;
+ pkcs7->certs = cert->next;
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ }
+ while (pkcs7->crl) {
+ cert = pkcs7->crl;
+ pkcs7->crl = cert->next;
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ }
+ kfree(pkcs7->sig.digest);
+ mpi_free(pkcs7->sig.mpi[0]);
+ kfree(pkcs7);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#7 message
+ */
+struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx;
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!msg)
+ goto error_no_sig;
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_no_ctx;
+
+ ctx->msg = msg;
+ ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
+ ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+
+ /* Attempt to decode the signature */
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_decode;
+
+ while (ctx->certs) {
+ struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs;
+ ctx->certs = cert->next;
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ }
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return msg;
+
+error_decode:
+ kfree(ctx);
+error_no_ctx:
+ pkcs7_free_message(msg);
+error_no_sig:
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+ char buffer[50];
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+ (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_md4:
+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD4;
+ break;
+ case OID_md5:
+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha1:
+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha256:
+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the public key algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_rsaEncryption:
+ ctx->msg->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+ if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+ pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n",
+ tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ /* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start
+ * from the beginning. Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there
+ * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which
+ * stipulates BER).
+ */
+ value -= hdrlen;
+ vlen += hdrlen;
+
+ if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80)
+ vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */
+
+ cert = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen);
+ if (IS_ERR(cert))
+ return PTR_ERR(cert);
+
+ pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", cert->subject);
+ pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", cert->fingerprint);
+
+ *ctx->ppcerts = cert;
+ ctx->ppcerts = &cert->next;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the certificate list
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag);
+
+ *ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs;
+ ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs;
+ ctx->certs = NULL;
+ ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the data from the signature and store that and its content type OID
+ * in the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_debug("Got data\n");
+
+ ctx->msg->data = value;
+ ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
+ ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse authenticated attributes
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+ switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_messageDigest:
+ if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ ctx->msg->msgdigest = value;
+ ctx->msg->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ /* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
+ ctx->msg->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+ ctx->msg->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuing certificate serial number
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->msg->raw_serial = value;
+ ctx->msg->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuer's name
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->msg->raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->msg->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the signature data
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ MPI mpi;
+
+ BUG_ON(ctx->msg->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA);
+
+ mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
+ if (!mpi)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->msg->sig.mpi[0] = mpi;
+ ctx->msg->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5415857
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+struct pkcs7_message {
+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */
+ struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
+ struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in ->certs) */
+
+ /* Content Data (or NULL) */
+ enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
+ size_t data_len; /* Length of Data */
+ size_t data_hdrlen; /* Length of Data ASN.1 header */
+ const void *data; /* Content Data (or 0) */
+
+ /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
+ const void *msgdigest;
+ unsigned msgdigest_len;
+
+ /* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
+ unsigned authattrs_len;
+ const void *authattrs;
+
+ /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+ const void *raw_serial;
+ unsigned raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ const void *raw_issuer;
+
+ /* Message signature.
+ *
+ * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
+ * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3]. If the latter, one of
+ * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within
+ * it.
+ */
+ struct public_key_signature sig;
+};
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_parser.c
+ */
+extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data,
+ size_t datalen);
+extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_verify.c
+ */
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index 6926db7..edeff85 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ enum OID {
OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+ OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
/* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */
OID_commonName, /* 2.5.4.3 */
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 0a9dc315397d444892105a405b66e7b2efea5ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:38 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 16/47] PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data message
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the
public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 3 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 59d8cad..b6b39e7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
pkcs7_message-y := \
pkcs7-asn1.o \
- pkcs7_parser.o
+ pkcs7_parser.o \
+ pkcs7_verify.o
$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f9f26c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
+ */
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ void *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u", pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo);
+
+ if (pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+ !pkey_hash_algo_name[pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo])
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[pkcs7->sig.pkey_hash_algo],
+ 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ pkcs7->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!digest)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ desc = digest + digest_size;
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+
+ /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
+ * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
+ * digest we just calculated.
+ */
+ if (pkcs7->msgdigest) {
+ u8 tag;
+
+ if (pkcs7->msgdigest_len != pkcs7->sig.digest_size) {
+ pr_debug("Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+ pkcs7->msgdigest_len);
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(digest, pkcs7->msgdigest, pkcs7->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+ pr_debug("Message digest doesn't match\n");
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
+ * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
+ * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
+ * hash it.
+ */
+ memset(digest, 0, pkcs7->sig.digest_size);
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->authattrs,
+ pkcs7->authattrs_len, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+ }
+
+ pkcs7->sig.digest = digest;
+ digest = NULL;
+
+error:
+ kfree(digest);
+error_no_desc:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kleave(" = %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a PKCS#7 message
+ */
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message */
+ ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 2425aad19d67b462fa4dba829dc946a291621d60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 17/47] PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
verify the signature
Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with
it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that
chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 2f9f26c..3f6f0e2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -118,6 +118,53 @@ error_no_desc:
}
/*
+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7
+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
+ * matching purposes. These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
+ */
+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *x509;
+
+ kenter("%u,%u", pkcs7->raw_serial_size, pkcs7->raw_issuer_size);
+
+ for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next) {
+ pr_devel("- x509 %u,%u\n",
+ x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_issuer_size);
+
+ /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
+ * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
+ * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
+ * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
+ */
+ if (x509->raw_serial_size != pkcs7->raw_serial_size ||
+ memcmp(x509->raw_serial, pkcs7->raw_serial,
+ pkcs7->raw_serial_size) != 0)
+ continue;
+ pr_devel("Found cert serial match\n");
+
+ if (x509->raw_issuer_size != pkcs7->raw_issuer_size ||
+ memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, pkcs7->raw_issuer,
+ pkcs7->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
+ pr_warn("X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != pkcs7->sig.pkey_algo) {
+ pr_warn("X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ pkcs7->signer = x509;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_warn("Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
+ pkcs7->raw_serial_size, pkcs7->raw_serial);
+ return -ENOKEY;
+}
+
+/*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message
*/
int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
@@ -129,6 +176,20 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ /* Find the key for the message signature */
+ ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pr_devel("Found X.509 cert\n");
+
+ /* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(pkcs7->signer->pub, &pkcs7->sig);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pr_devel("Verified signature\n");
+
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 41b63d8f4c0efa6d3bbc8d941d7502725fa243d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 18/47] PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chain
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7
message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify
fails, we reject the whole lot.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 3f6f0e2..b3774bd 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -165,6 +165,70 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
}
/*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *x509 = pkcs7->signer, *p;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ for (;;) {
+ pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (x509->issuer)
+ pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+ if (x509->authority)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
+
+ if (!x509->authority ||
+ (x509->subject &&
+ strcmp(x509->subject, x509->authority) == 0)) {
+ /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+ * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+ * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own
+ * authority.
+ */
+ pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
+ if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
+ memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+ x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ x509->signer = x509;
+ pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+ if (!p->signer &&
+ p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
+ strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+ x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
+ goto found_issuer;
+ pr_debug("- top\n");
+ return 0;
+
+ found_issuer:
+ pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
+ ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ x509->signer = p;
+ x509 = p;
+ might_sleep();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message
*/
int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
@@ -190,6 +254,7 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
pr_devel("Verified signature\n");
- return 0;
+ /* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+ return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 6b1d877..5e35fba 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
struct x509_certificate {
struct x509_certificate *next;
+ const struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */
struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From fa1e7dfa9408e557cd89f3a6bcb7d9044c515c75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:42 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 19/47] PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
known, trusted keys
Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7
message and a set of keys that we already know and trust.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 7 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index b6b39e7..d63cb43 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
pkcs7_message-y := \
pkcs7-asn1.o \
pkcs7_parser.o \
+ pkcs7_trust.o \
pkcs7_verify.o
$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index 5415857..ffa72dc 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data,
extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
/*
+ * pkcs7_trust.c
+ */
+extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ bool *_trusted);
+
+/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc226f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Request an asymmetric key.
+ */
+static struct key *pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key(
+ struct key *keyring,
+ const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
+ const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ char *id;
+
+ kenter(",%zu,,%zu", signer_len, auth_len);
+
+ /* Construct an identifier. */
+ id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
+ id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
+ id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
+ memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
+ id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
+
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
+ id, PTR_ERR(key));
+ kfree(id);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ /* Hide some search errors */
+ case -EACCES:
+ case -ENOTDIR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ default:
+ return ERR_CAST(key);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+ return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
+ * keys we already know and trust.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ bool *_trusted)
+{
+ struct public_key_signature *sig = &pkcs7->sig;
+ struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL;
+ struct key *key;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ for (x509 = pkcs7->signer; x509; x509 = x509->next) {
+ /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
+ * keys.
+ */
+ key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key(
+ trust_keyring,
+ x509->subject, strlen(x509->subject),
+ x509->fingerprint, strlen(x509->fingerprint));
+ if (!IS_ERR(key))
+ /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
+ * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
+ * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
+ * the signature on the descendent.
+ */
+ goto matched;
+ if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
+ * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
+ */
+ if (x509->next == x509) {
+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [unknown self-signed]");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ might_sleep();
+ last = x509;
+ sig = &last->sig;
+ }
+
+ /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
+ * trusted keys.
+ */
+ if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) {
+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [no backref]");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key(
+ trust_keyring,
+ last->issuer, strlen(last->issuer),
+ last->authority, strlen(last->authority));
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+matched:
+ ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+ trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
+ key_put(key);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ return ret;
+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ *_trusted = trusted;
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From c6001e8a866cb0fb91c270e9fb9f15d10e73af6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:39 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 20/47] Provide PE binary definitions
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Provide some PE binary structural and constant definitions as taken from the
pesign package sources.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/linux/pe.h | 448 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 448 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/linux/pe.h
diff --git a/include/linux/pe.h b/include/linux/pe.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9234aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/pe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Author(s): Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_PE_H
+#define __LINUX_PE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define MZ_MAGIC 0x5a4d /* "MZ" */
+
+struct mz_hdr {
+ uint16_t magic; /* MZ_MAGIC */
+ uint16_t lbsize; /* size of last used block */
+ uint16_t blocks; /* pages in file, 0x3 */
+ uint16_t relocs; /* relocations */
+ uint16_t hdrsize; /* header size in "paragraphs" */
+ uint16_t min_extra_pps; /* .bss */
+ uint16_t max_extra_pps; /* runtime limit for the arena size */
+ uint16_t ss; /* relative stack segment */
+ uint16_t sp; /* initial %sp register */
+ uint16_t checksum; /* word checksum */
+ uint16_t ip; /* initial %ip register */
+ uint16_t cs; /* initial %cs relative to load segment */
+ uint16_t reloc_table_offset; /* offset of the first relocation */
+ uint16_t overlay_num; /* overlay number. set to 0. */
+ uint16_t reserved0[4]; /* reserved */
+ uint16_t oem_id; /* oem identifier */
+ uint16_t oem_info; /* oem specific */
+ uint16_t reserved1[10]; /* reserved */
+ uint32_t peaddr; /* address of pe header */
+ char message[64]; /* message to print */
+};
+
+struct mz_reloc {
+ uint16_t offset;
+ uint16_t segment;
+};
+
+#define PE_MAGIC 0x00004550 /* "PE\0\0" */
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32 0x010b
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32_ROM 0x0107
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS 0x020b
+
+/* machine type */
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN 0x0000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AM33 0x01d3
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64 0x8664
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM 0x01c0
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARMV7 0x01c4
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_EBC 0x0ebc
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 0x014c
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 0x0200
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_M32R 0x9041
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPS16 0x0266
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU 0x0366
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU16 0x0466
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPC 0x01f0
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPCFP 0x01f1
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_R4000 0x0166
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3 0x01a2
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3DSP 0x01a3
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3E 0x01a4
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH4 0x01a6
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH5 0x01a8
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_THUMB 0x01c2
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_WCEMIPSV2 0x0169
+
+/* flags */
+#define IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED 0x0001
+#define IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE 0x0002
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED 0x0004
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED 0x0008
+#define IMAGE_FILE_AGGRESSIVE_WS_TRIM 0x0010
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE 0x0020
+#define IMAGE_FILE_16BIT_MACHINE 0x0040
+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO 0x0080
+#define IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE 0x0100
+#define IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED 0x0200
+#define IMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0400
+#define IMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0800
+#define IMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM 0x1000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_DLL 0x2000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY 0x4000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI 0x8000
+
+struct pe_hdr {
+ uint32_t magic; /* PE magic */
+ uint16_t machine; /* machine type */
+ uint16_t sections; /* number of sections */
+ uint32_t timestamp; /* time_t */
+ uint32_t symbol_table; /* symbol table offset */
+ uint32_t symbols; /* number of symbols */
+ uint16_t opt_hdr_size; /* size of optional header */
+ uint16_t flags; /* flags */
+};
+
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_ROM_MAGIC 0x107
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_MAGIC 0x10b
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_PLUS_MAGIC 0x20b
+
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN 0
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE 1
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI 2
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI 3
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI 7
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI 9
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION 10
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER 11
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER 12
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_ROM_IMAGE 13
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX 14
+
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE 0x0040
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY 0x0080
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT 0x0100
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_ISOLATION 0x0200
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH 0x0400
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_BIND 0x0800
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_WDM_DRIVER 0x2000
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE 0x8000
+
+/* the fact that pe32 isn't padded where pe32+ is 64-bit means union won't
+ * work right. vomit. */
+struct pe32_opt_hdr {
+ /* "standard" header */
+ uint16_t magic; /* file type */
+ uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */
+ uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */
+ uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */
+ uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */
+ uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */
+ uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */
+ uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */
+ uint32_t data_base; /* relative data addr in ram */
+ /* "windows" header */
+ uint32_t image_base; /* preferred load address */
+ uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */
+ uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */
+ uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */
+ uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */
+ uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */
+ uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */
+ uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */
+ uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */
+ uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t image_size; /* image size */
+ uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to
+ file_align */
+ uint32_t csum; /* checksum */
+ uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */
+ uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */
+ uint32_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */
+ uint32_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */
+ uint32_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */
+ uint32_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */
+ uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */
+};
+
+struct pe32plus_opt_hdr {
+ uint16_t magic; /* file type */
+ uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */
+ uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */
+ uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */
+ uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */
+ uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */
+ uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */
+ uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */
+ /* "windows" header */
+ uint64_t image_base; /* preferred load address */
+ uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */
+ uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */
+ uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */
+ uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */
+ uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */
+ uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */
+ uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */
+ uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */
+ uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t image_size; /* image size */
+ uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to
+ file_align */
+ uint32_t csum; /* checksum */
+ uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */
+ uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */
+ uint64_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */
+ uint64_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */
+ uint64_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */
+ uint64_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */
+ uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */
+};
+
+struct data_dirent {
+ uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative to load address */
+ uint32_t size;
+};
+
+struct data_directory {
+ struct data_dirent exports; /* .edata */
+ struct data_dirent imports; /* .idata */
+ struct data_dirent resources; /* .rsrc */
+ struct data_dirent exceptions; /* .pdata */
+ struct data_dirent certs; /* certs */
+ struct data_dirent base_relocations; /* .reloc */
+ struct data_dirent debug; /* .debug */
+ struct data_dirent arch; /* reservered */
+ struct data_dirent global_ptr; /* global pointer reg. Size=0 */
+ struct data_dirent tls; /* .tls */
+ struct data_dirent load_config; /* load configuration structure */
+ struct data_dirent bound_imports; /* no idea */
+ struct data_dirent import_addrs; /* import address table */
+ struct data_dirent delay_imports; /* delay-load import table */
+ struct data_dirent clr_runtime_hdr; /* .cor (object only) */
+ struct data_dirent reserved;
+};
+
+struct section_header {
+ char name[8]; /* name or "/12\0" string tbl offset */
+ uint32_t virtual_size; /* size of loaded section in ram */
+ uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative virtual address */
+ uint32_t raw_data_size; /* size of the section */
+ uint32_t data_addr; /* file pointer to first page of sec */
+ uint32_t relocs; /* file pointer to relocation entries */
+ uint32_t line_numbers; /* line numbers! */
+ uint16_t num_relocs; /* number of relocations */
+ uint16_t num_lin_numbers; /* srsly. */
+ uint32_t flags;
+};
+
+/* they actually defined 0x00000000 as well, but I think we'll skip that one. */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_0 0x00000001
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_1 0x00000002
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_2 0x00000004
+#define IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NO_PAD 0x00000008 /* don't pad - obsolete */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_3 0x00000010
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE 0x00000020 /* .text */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000040 /* .data */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000080 /* .bss */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER 0x00000100 /* reserved */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO 0x00000200 /* .drectve comments */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_4 0x00000400
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE 0x00000800 /* .o only - scn to be rm'd*/
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT 0x00001000 /* .o only - COMDAT data */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_5 0x00002000 /* spec omits this */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_6 0x00004000 /* spec omits this */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_GPREL 0x00008000 /* global pointer referenced data */
+/* spec lists 0x20000 twice, I suspect they meant 0x10000 for one of them */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE 0x00010000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_16BIT 0x00020000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LOCKED 0x00040000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_PRELOAD 0x00080000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+/* and here they just stuck a 1-byte integer in the middle of a bitfield */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES 0x00100000 /* it does what it says on the box */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES 0x00200000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES 0x00300000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES 0x00400000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES 0x00500000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES 0x00600000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES 0x00700000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES 0x00800000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES 0x00900000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES 0x00a00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES 0x00b00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES 0x00c00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES 0x00d00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES 0x00e00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_NRELOC_OVFL 0x01000000 /* extended relocations */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE 0x02000000 /* scn can be discarded */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_CACHED 0x04000000 /* cannot be cached */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED 0x08000000 /* not pageable */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED 0x10000000 /* can be shared */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE 0x20000000 /* can be executed as code */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ 0x40000000 /* readable */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE 0x80000000 /* writeable */
+
+enum x64_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ABSOLUTE = 0,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR64,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32N,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_1,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_2,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_3,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_4,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_5,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL7,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_PAIR,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SSPAN32,
+};
+
+enum arm_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32N,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH2,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH1,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECREL,
+};
+
+enum sh_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT16,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL12_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_STARTOF_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SIZEOF_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32_NB,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_GPREL4_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_PCRELPT,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFHALF,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELHALF,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_PAIR,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_NOMODE,
+};
+
+enum ppc_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR64,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR24,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR16,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR14,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL24,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL14,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32N,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL16,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFHI,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_PAIR,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECRELLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_GPREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_TOKEN,
+};
+
+enum x86_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR16,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_REL16,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32NB,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SEG12,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL7,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_REL32,
+};
+
+enum ia64_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM14,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM64,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR64,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21B,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21M,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21F,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_LTOFF22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL64I,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32NB,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL14,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_UREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60X,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60B,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60F,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60I,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60M,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMMGPREL6,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_ADDEND,
+};
+
+struct coff_reloc {
+ uint32_t virtual_address;
+ uint32_t symbol_table_index;
+ union {
+ enum x64_coff_reloc_type x64_type;
+ enum arm_coff_reloc_type arm_type;
+ enum sh_coff_reloc_type sh_type;
+ enum ppc_coff_reloc_type ppc_type;
+ enum x86_coff_reloc_type x86_type;
+ enum ia64_coff_reloc_type ia64_type;
+ uint16_t data;
+ };
+};
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for the contents of the certs data block
+ */
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA 0x0002
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_OKCS115 0x0EF0
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID 0x0EF1
+
+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_1_0 0x0100
+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0 0x0200
+
+struct win_certificate {
+ uint32_t length;
+ uint16_t revision;
+ uint16_t cert_type;
+};
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_PE_H */
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 18b3c3296b8978b638b68181853fb5a6b6c91b46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 21/47] pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
contained therein
Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later
patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 10 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 8 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h | 31 ++++++
4 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 413f3f6..2e7315c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select ASN1
select OID_REGISTRY
help
- This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
+ This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
public key packet found inside the certificate.
@@ -44,4 +44,12 @@ config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
+config PE_FILE_PARSER
+ tristate "PE binary-wrapped key parser"
+ depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ help
+ This option provides support for parsing signed PE binaries that
+ contain an X.509 certificate in an internal section.
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index d63cb43..2675146 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -40,3 +40,11 @@ $(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+#
+# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PE_FILE_PARSER) += pefile_key_parser.o
+
+pefile_key_parser-y := \
+ pefile_parser.o
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb80cf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/* Parse a signed PE binary that wraps a key.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/pe.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pefile_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PE binary.
+ */
+static int pefile_parse_binary(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ const struct mz_hdr *mz = prep->data;
+ const struct pe_hdr *pe;
+ const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32;
+ const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64;
+ const struct data_directory *ddir;
+ const struct data_dirent *dde;
+ const struct section_header *secs, *sec;
+ unsigned loop;
+ size_t cursor, datalen = prep->datalen;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+#define chkaddr(base, x, s) \
+ do { \
+ if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \
+ return -ELIBBAD; \
+ } while(0)
+
+ chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz));
+ if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC)
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ cursor = sizeof(*mz);
+
+ chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe));
+ pe = prep->data + mz->peaddr;
+ if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC)
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe);
+
+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic));
+ pe32 = prep->data + cursor;
+ pe64 = prep->data + cursor;
+
+ switch (pe32->magic) {
+ case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32:
+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32));
+ ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+ (unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)prep->data;
+ ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size;
+ cursor += sizeof(*pe32);
+ ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs;
+ break;
+
+ case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS:
+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64));
+ ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+ (unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)prep->data;
+ ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size;
+ cursor += sizeof(*pe64);
+ ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_devel("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+ pr_devel("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size);
+
+ if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen)
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+
+ if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde) ||
+ ctx->n_data_dirents < sizeof(*ddir) / sizeof(*dde))
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+
+ ddir = prep->data + cursor;
+ cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents;
+
+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset =
+ (unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)prep->data;
+ ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
+
+ if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
+ pr_devel("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, ddir->certs.size);
+ ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address;
+ ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size;
+ pr_devel("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n",
+ ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset,
+ ctx->sig_len, prep->data + ctx->sig_offset);
+
+ /* Parse the section table, checking the parameters and looking for the
+ * section containing the list of keys.
+ */
+ ctx->n_sections = pe->sections;
+ if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec))
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ ctx->secs = secs = prep->data + cursor;
+ cursor += sizeof(*sec) * ctx->n_sections;
+
+ for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ sec = &secs[loop];
+ chkaddr(cursor, sec->data_addr, sec->raw_data_size);
+ if (memcmp(sec->name, ".keylist", 8) == 0) {
+ ctx->keylist_offset = sec->data_addr;
+ ctx->keylist_len = sec->raw_data_size;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->keylist_offset == 0) {
+ pr_devel("No .keylist section in PE binary\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("keylist = %x @%x [%*ph]\n",
+ ctx->keylist_len, ctx->keylist_offset,
+ ctx->keylist_len, prep->data + ctx->keylist_offset);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PE binary.
+ */
+static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct pefile_context ctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+ ret = pefile_parse_binary(prep, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
+}
+
+static struct asymmetric_key_parser pefile_key_parser = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .name = "pefile",
+ .parse = pefile_key_preparse,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init pefile_key_init(void)
+{
+ return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&pefile_key_parser);
+}
+
+static void __exit pefile_key_exit(void)
+{
+ unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&pefile_key_parser);
+}
+
+module_init(pefile_key_init);
+module_exit(pefile_key_exit);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82bcaf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* PE Binary parser bits
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+struct pefile_context {
+ unsigned header_size;
+ unsigned image_checksum_offset;
+ unsigned cert_dirent_offset;
+ unsigned n_data_dirents;
+ unsigned n_sections;
+ unsigned certs_size;
+ unsigned sig_offset;
+ unsigned sig_len;
+ unsigned keylist_offset;
+ unsigned keylist_len;
+ const struct section_header *secs;
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+
+ /* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
+ const void *digest; /* Digest */
+ unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */
+ enum pkey_hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */
+};
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 7edf76fb2cc2c4b1c4fd762a8a36e2ebf98da632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 22/47] pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7
signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got
something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 60 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
index fb80cf0..f2d4df0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/pe.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
@@ -145,6 +146,61 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
}
/*
+ * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the
+ * remnant looks something like PKCS#7.
+ */
+static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct win_certificate wrapper;
+ const u8 *pkcs7;
+
+ if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
+ pr_devel("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&wrapper, prep->data + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper));
+ pr_devel("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
+ wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
+ if (wrapper.length != ctx->sig_len) {
+ pr_devel("Signature wrapper len wrong\n");
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ }
+ if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
+ pr_devel("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+ if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+ pr_devel("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
+ ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
+ if (ctx->sig_len == 0) {
+ pr_devel("Signature data missing\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ /* What's left should a PKCS#7 cert */
+ pkcs7 = prep->data + ctx->sig_offset;
+ if (pkcs7[0] == (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+ if (pkcs7[1] == 0x82 &&
+ pkcs7[2] == (((ctx->sig_len - 4) >> 8) & 0xff) &&
+ pkcs7[3] == ((ctx->sig_len - 4) & 0xff))
+ return 0;
+ if (pkcs7[1] == 0x80)
+ return 0;
+ if (pkcs7[1] > 0x82)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+}
+
+/*
* Parse a PE binary.
*/
static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
@@ -159,6 +215,10 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(prep, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
return -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
}
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 0e1fce61c58270009a99b807f7023ce797257a1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:40 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 23/47] pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
certificate blob
Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
index f2d4df0..056500f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
*/
static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
int ret;
@@ -219,7 +220,22 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(prep->data + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+ ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7;
+
+ if (!ctx.pkcs7->data || !ctx.pkcs7->data_len) {
+ pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
+
+error:
+ pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
+ return ret;
}
static struct asymmetric_key_parser pefile_key_parser = {
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 0c26064ba333e05c3e79a2aa400096cb39ac0e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:41 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 24/47] pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing"
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
data blob
The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing"
data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed
content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically
SHA256).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 9 ++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 | 28 +++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 6 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h | 5 ++
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 6 +-
6 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 2675146..ddc64bb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -47,4 +47,11 @@ clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h
obj-$(CONFIG_PE_FILE_PARSER) += pefile_key_parser.o
pefile_key_parser-y := \
- pefile_parser.o
+ pefile_parser.o \
+ mscode_parser.o \
+ mscode-asn1.o
+
+$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+$(obj)/mscode-asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.c $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+
+clean-files += mscode-asn1.c mscode-asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d09ba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser
+---
+--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+---
+--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+---
+
+MSCode ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type SEQUENCE {
+ contentType ContentType,
+ parameters ANY
+ },
+ content SEQUENCE {
+ digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ digest OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest })
+ }
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bd68e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include "pefile_parser.h"
+#include "mscode-asn1.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ */
+int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n",
+ ctx->pkcs7->data_len + ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen,
+ (unsigned)(ctx->pkcs7->data_len + ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen),
+ ctx->pkcs7->data - ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen);
+
+ return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx,
+ ctx->pkcs7->data - ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen,
+ ctx->pkcs7->data_len + ctx->pkcs7->data_hdrlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the content type OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ enum OID oid;
+
+ oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (oid == OID__NR) {
+ char buffer[50];
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ printk("MSCODE: Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) {
+ printk("MSCODE: Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+ char buffer[50];
+ enum OID oid;
+
+ oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ switch (oid) {
+ case OID_md4:
+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD4;
+ break;
+ case OID_md5:
+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_MD5;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha1:
+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha256:
+ ctx->digest_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
+ break;
+
+ case OID__NR:
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ printk("MSCODE: Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ default:
+ printk("MSCODE: Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->digest = value;
+ ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
index 056500f..f1c8cc1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -231,6 +231,12 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
}
+ ret = mscode_parse(&ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ pr_devel("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n", ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+
ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
error:
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h
index 82bcaf6..c3462b7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.h
@@ -29,3 +29,8 @@ struct pefile_context {
unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */
enum pkey_hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */
};
+
+/*
+ * mscode_parser.c
+ */
+extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx);
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index edeff85..332dcf5 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -52,8 +52,12 @@ enum OID {
OID_md4, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.4 */
OID_md5, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.5 */
- OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
+ /* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
+ OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+ OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
+
+ OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 50ea1d6116226f677cc58d4ec6659d5e74fb261c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:41 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 25/47] pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
data
Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table
before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the
PKCS#7 signed content.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 198 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
index f1c8cc1..dfdb85e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -201,6 +201,193 @@ static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
}
/*
+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation.
+ */
+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ const struct section_header *shdra = a;
+ const struct section_header *shdrb = b;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address)
+ return -1;
+
+ rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image
+ * checksum and the certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx,
+ struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image
+ * checksum and the data dirent for the signature.
+ */
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, prep->data, ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, prep->data + tmp,
+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, prep->data + tmp,
+ ctx->header_size - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!canon)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an
+ * insertion sort.
+ */
+ canon[0] = 0;
+ for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) {
+ if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]],
+ &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) {
+ memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i],
+ (loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0]));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ canon[i] = loop;
+ }
+
+ hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size;
+ for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ i = canon[loop];
+ if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0)
+ continue;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ prep->data + ctx->secs[i].data_addr,
+ ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(canon);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size;
+ }
+ kfree(canon);
+
+ if (prep->datalen > hashed_bytes) {
+ tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ prep->data + hashed_bytes,
+ prep->datalen - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the
+ * certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ void *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo);
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
+ pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+ digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error_no_desc;
+ }
+ pr_devel("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(prep, ctx, desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ digest = (void *)desc + desc_size;
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ pr_devel("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest);
+
+ /* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the
+ * PKCS#7 certificate.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
+ pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
+ }
+
+error:
+ kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Parse a PE binary.
*/
static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
@@ -237,6 +424,17 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n", ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+ /* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate
+ * contents.
+ */
+ ret = pefile_digest_pe(prep, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
error:
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From e439ce7f7e9d8524b64513f7545b1b1ecd5e6ceb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:58:35 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 26/47] PEFILE: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 2e7315c..2777916 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ config PE_FILE_PARSER
tristate "PE binary-wrapped key parser"
depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
help
This option provides support for parsing signed PE binaries that
contain an X.509 certificate in an internal section.
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
index dfdb85e..edad948 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/asn1.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "public_key.h"
@@ -435,6 +436,10 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &prep->trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
error:
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 5df41da156b8ff7ac5560b4035d2f9cd9165859a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2013 15:33:42 +0000
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 27/47] PEFILE: Load the contained key if we consider the
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
container to be validly signed
Load the key contained in the PE binary if the signature on the container can
be verified by following the chain of X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
to a key that we already trust. Typically, the trusted key will be acquired
from a source outside of the kernel, such as the UEFI database.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c | 11 ++++++++++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 3 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
index edad948..c3efe39 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pefile_parser.c
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
+ const void *saved_data;
+ size_t saved_datalen;
int ret;
kenter("");
@@ -440,7 +442,14 @@ static int pefile_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = -ENOANO; // Not yet complete
+ /* We can now try to load the key */
+ saved_data = prep->data;
+ saved_datalen = prep->datalen;
+ prep->data += ctx.keylist_offset;
+ prep->datalen = ctx.keylist_len;
+ ret = x509_key_preparse(prep);
+ prep->data = saved_data;
+ prep->datalen = saved_datalen;
error:
pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 5e35fba..65452c4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+struct key_preparsed_payload;
+
struct x509_certificate {
struct x509_certificate *next;
const struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */
@@ -47,3 +49,4 @@ extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen
extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 0f55e3b..c3e5a6d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
*/
-static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert;
struct tm now;
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ error_free_cert:
x509_free_certificate(cert);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_key_preparse);
static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 11175c4e58d42555e58ee33ac84cc7a4f8995f92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 19:23:49 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 28/47] MODSIGN: Fix including certificate twice when the
signing_key.x509 already exists
This issue was found in devel-pekey branch on linux-modsign.git tree. The
x509_certificate_list includes certificate twice when the signing_key.x509
already exists.
We can reproduce this issue by making kernel twice, the build log of
second time looks like this:
...
CHK kernel/config_data.h
CERTS kernel/x509_certificate_list
- Including cert /ramdisk/working/joey/linux-modsign/signing_key.x509
- Including cert signing_key.x509
...
Actually the build path was the same with the srctree path when building
kernel. It causes the size of bzImage increased by packaging certificates
twice.
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/Makefile | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 0ca8c0a..ecbe73f 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -142,7 +142,10 @@ $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE
#
###############################################################################
ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
+X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509)
+ifneq ($(shell pwd), $(srctree))
+X509_CERTIFICATES-y += $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
+endif
X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
X509_CERTIFICATES := $(sort $(X509_CERTIFICATES-y))
--
1.8.1.2
From b95e8797fb4ca498d0421547248a099907c0159b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:56 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 29/47] Secure boot: Add new capability
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability
and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial
capability set if required.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index ba478fa..7109e65 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
+/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */
+
+#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From a9ceab83bf85047aaf856a3e8440379af0b7854c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:05 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 30/47] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Add the name of the new Secure Boot capability. This allows SELinux
policies to properly map CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL to the appropriate
capability class.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 14d04e6..ed99a2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
{ "capability2",
- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
- NULL } },
+ { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm",
+ "block_suspend", "compromise_kernel", NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 0d9aa147ad57e39dec877671986f9515f5bb4cfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:02 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 31/47] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
switch on Secure Boot mode
This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset
in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from. This works on
any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++++++
kernel/cred.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 4c5b3f9..fff3306 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
@@ -2650,6 +2650,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
+ secureboot_enable=
+ [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This
+ locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the
+ CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things
+ like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can
+ be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes.
+
security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
security module asking for security registration will be
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
+void __init secureboot_enable()
+{
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+ cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+}
+
+/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
+static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str)
+{
+ int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+ if (sb_enable)
+ secureboot_enable();
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt);
+
/**
* prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
* @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 7c57aed9b55c5b53bd2c090b7219b14d31d43d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:03 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 32/47] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
enabled in firmware
The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
down. We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the
EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 7 +++++++
include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++
include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 199f453..ff651d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index f8fa411..96bd86b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -849,6 +849,36 @@ fail:
return status;
}
+static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
+{
+ u8 sb, setup;
+ unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+ efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+ L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sb == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+
+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+ L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
+ &setup);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (setup == 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we
* need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create
@@ -1143,6 +1173,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table,
if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
goto fail;
+ boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table);
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 8b24289..d74b441 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1042,6 +1042,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
io_delay_init();
+ if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility);
+#endif
+ secureboot_enable();
+ }
+
/*
* Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 04421e8..9e69542 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern void __init cred_init(void);
+extern void secureboot_enable(void);
+
/*
* check for validity of credentials
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 9bf2f1f..1bf382b 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES 3 /* Can we use runtime services? */
#define EFI_MEMMAP 4 /* Can we use EFI memory map? */
#define EFI_64BIT 5 /* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 6 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
# ifdef CONFIG_X86
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 011dfe9f317861b3eda05d2f646b324f13dd5b71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:30:54 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 33/47] Add EFI signature data types
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Add the data types that are used for containing hashes, keys and certificates
for cryptographic verification.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 1bf382b..8902faf 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b )
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28 )
+
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
+
typedef struct {
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
@@ -523,6 +529,20 @@ typedef struct {
#define EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR (~0UL)
+typedef struct {
+ efi_guid_t signature_owner;
+ u8 signature_data[];
+} efi_signature_data_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ efi_guid_t signature_type;
+ u32 signature_list_size;
+ u32 signature_header_size;
+ u32 signature_size;
+ u8 signature_header[];
+ /* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
+} efi_signature_list_t;
+
/*
* All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
*/
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 43db0a42addcc13979d94f76d8509cae7e3a347c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Dave Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:36:28 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 34/47] Add an EFI signature blob parser and key loader.
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
X.509 certificates are loaded into the specified keyring as asymmetric type
keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 8 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 4 ++
4 files changed, 122 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 2777916..429bbb7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -53,4 +53,12 @@ config PE_FILE_PARSER
This option provides support for parsing signed PE binaries that
contain an X.509 certificate in an internal section.
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+ bool "EFI signature list parser"
+ depends on EFI
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ help
+ This option provides support for parsing EFI signature lists for
+ X.509 certificates and turning them into keys.
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index ddc64bb..360b308 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER) += efi_parser.o
#
# X.509 Certificate handling
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..424896a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/efi_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* EFI signature/key/certificate list parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "EFI: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
+
+/**
+ * parse_efi_signature_list - Parse an EFI signature list for certificates
+ * @data: The data blob to parse
+ * @size: The size of the data blob
+ * @keyring: The keyring to add extracted keys to
+ */
+int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size, struct key *keyring)
+{
+ unsigned offs = 0;
+ size_t lsize, esize, hsize, elsize;
+
+ pr_devel("-->%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, size);
+
+ while (size > 0) {
+ efi_signature_list_t list;
+ const efi_signature_data_t *elem;
+ key_ref_t key;
+
+ if (size < sizeof(list))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ memcpy(&list, data, sizeof(list));
+ pr_devel("LIST[%04x] guid=%pUl ls=%x hs=%x ss=%x\n",
+ offs,
+ list.signature_type.b, list.signature_list_size,
+ list.signature_header_size, list.signature_size);
+
+ lsize = list.signature_list_size;
+ hsize = list.signature_header_size;
+ esize = list.signature_size;
+ elsize = lsize - sizeof(list) - hsize;
+
+ if (lsize > size) {
+ pr_devel("<--%s() = -EBADMSG [overrun @%x]\n",
+ __func__, offs);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (lsize < sizeof(list) ||
+ lsize - sizeof(list) < hsize ||
+ esize < sizeof(*elem) ||
+ elsize < esize ||
+ elsize % esize != 0) {
+ pr_devel("- bad size combo @%x\n", offs);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (efi_guidcmp(list.signature_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) != 0) {
+ data += lsize;
+ size -= lsize;
+ offs += lsize;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ data += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+ size -= sizeof(list) + hsize;
+ offs += sizeof(list) + hsize;
+
+ for (; elsize > 0; elsize -= esize) {
+ elem = data;
+
+ pr_devel("ELEM[%04x]\n", offs);
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(
+ make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ &elem->signature_data,
+ esize - sizeof(*elem),
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(key));
+ else
+ pr_notice("Loaded cert '%s' linked to '%s'\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description,
+ keyring->description);
+
+ data += esize;
+ size -= esize;
+ offs += esize;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 8902faf..ff3c599 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ extern int efi_set_rtc_mmss(unsigned long nowtime);
extern void efi_reserve_boot_services(void);
extern struct efi_memory_map memmap;
+struct key;
+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(const void *data, size_t size,
+ struct key *keyring);
+
/**
* efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
* @start: starting kvirt address
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From d1fd85ceab15c3b04ae4f3cbda3c0f0bba93e6a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:36:24 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 35/47] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
This adds an additional keyring that is used to store certificates that
are blacklisted. This keyring is searched first when loading signed modules
and if the module's certificate is found, it will refuse to load. This is
useful in cases where third party certificates are used for module signing.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 ++++
init/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c | 12 ++++++++++++
kernel/system_keyring.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 8dabc39..e466de1 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+extern struct key *system_blacklist_keyring;
+#endif
+
#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 755bb7a..d456b7a 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
@@ -1608,6 +1608,15 @@ config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys"
+ depends on KEYS
+ help
+ Provide a system keyring to which blacklisted keys can be added. Keys
+ in the keyring are considered entirely untrusted. Keys in this keyring
+ are used by the module signature checking to reject loading of modules
+ signed with a blacklisted key.
+
menuconfig MODULES
bool "Enable loadable module support"
help
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 0b6b870..0a29b40 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_blacklist_keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+ /* module is signed with a cert in the blacklist. reject */
+ pr_err("Module key '%s' is in blacklist\n", id);
+ key_ref_put(key);
+ kfree(id);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+ }
+#endif
+
key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, id);
if (IS_ERR(key))
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index dae8778..2913c70 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+struct key *system_blacklist_keyring;
+#endif
extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list[];
extern __initdata const u8 system_certificate_list_end[];
@@ -41,6 +44,20 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ system_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".system_blacklist_keyring",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
+ current_cred(),
+ (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(system_blacklist_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
+
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_blacklist_keyring->flags);
+#endif
+
return 0;
}
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 143029b177dc16cbf27f4c0fd8e0472e2eeffcd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:42:16 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 36/47] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This imports those certificates into the system trusted keyring. This
allows for a third party signing certificate to be used in conjunction
with signed modules. By importing the public certificate into the 'db'
variable, a user can allow a module signed with that certificate to
load. The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored
in the 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well.
In the opposite case, Secure Boot maintains a list of disallowed
certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into
the newly introduced system blacklist keyring and forbid any module
signed with those from loading.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++
init/Kconfig | 9 +++++
kernel/Makefile | 3 ++
kernel/modsign_uefi.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 109 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 kernel/modsign_uefi.c
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index ff3c599..8400949 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -394,6 +394,12 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_capsule_caps_t(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
EFI_GUID( 0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72 )
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f )
+
+#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID( 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 )
+
typedef struct {
efi_guid_t guid;
u64 table;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index d456b7a..aa7b461 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
@@ -1715,6 +1715,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
+config MODULE_SIG_UEFI
+ bool "Allow modules signed with certs stored in UEFI"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG && SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING && EFI
+ select EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER
+ help
+ This will import certificates stored in UEFI and allow modules
+ signed with those to be loaded. It will also disallow loading
+ of modules stored in the UEFI dbx variable.
+
choice
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index ecbe73f..396a4f8 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI) += modsign_uefi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
@@ -115,6 +116,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
$(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.h
+$(obj)/modsign_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
+
# config_data.h contains the same information as ikconfig.h but gzipped.
# Info from config_data can be extracted from /proc/config*
targets += config_data.gz
diff --git a/kernel/modsign_uefi.c b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df831ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/modsign_uefi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "module-internal.h"
+
+static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, unsigned long *size)
+{
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned long lsize = 4;
+ unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+ void *db = NULL;
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+ if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ db = kmalloc(lsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!db) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't allocate memory for uefi cert list\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ kfree(db);
+ db = NULL;
+ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ }
+out:
+ *size = lsize;
+ return db;
+}
+
+/*
+ * * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
+ * */
+static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+{
+ efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+ efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
+ unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Check if SB is enabled and just return if not */
+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
+ * an error if we can't get them.
+ */
+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
+ if (!db) {
+ pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(db, dbsize, system_trusted_keyring);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ kfree(db);
+ }
+
+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
+ if (!mok) {
+ pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(mok, moksize, system_trusted_keyring);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ kfree(mok);
+ }
+
+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
+ if (!dbx) {
+ pr_info("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
+ } else {
+ rc = parse_efi_signature_list(dbx, dbxsize,
+ system_blacklist_keyring);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
+ kfree(dbx);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+late_initcall(load_uefi_certs);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From b0099b5ab477170b20c9b76f36e8d8b18bfe60b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:57 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 37/47] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to cause
arbitrary kernel behaviour. Default to paranoid - in future we can
potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++-
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 9c6e9bb..b966089 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -622,6 +622,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj,
loff_t init_off = off;
u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (off > dev->cfg_size)
return 0;
if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -928,6 +931,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
resource_size_t start, end;
int i;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
break;
@@ -1035,6 +1041,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
loff_t off, size_t count)
{
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 9b8505c..35580bc 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof
int size = dp->size;
int cnt;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (pos >= size)
return 0;
if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
#endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
int ret = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
switch (cmd) {
case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -259,7 +265,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
int i, ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index e1c1ec5..97e785f 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
u32 dword;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
return -EPERM;
dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From e8e265b9308d3c8ac126f7c6928b8013c9868b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:58 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 38/47] x86: Lock down IO port access in secure boot
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
environments
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down by default.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
drivers/char/mem.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 8c96897..a2578c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
return -EINVAL;
- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
return -EPERM;
/*
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ long sys_iopl(unsigned int level, struct pt_regs *regs)
return -EINVAL;
/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
if (level > old) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
return -EPERM;
}
regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index c6fa3bc..fc28099 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
unsigned long i = *ppos;
const char __user * tmp = buf;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From a672c5ea6688238ccfabf47ca1ab9eebf19fb44a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:40:59 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 39/47] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
It must be impossible for even root to get code executed in kernel context
under a secure boot environment. custom_method effectively allows arbitrary
access to system memory, so it needs to have a capability check here.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 6adfc70..1417a22 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
struct acpi_table_header table;
acpi_status status;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!(*ppos)) {
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 6d7adeb62f8396d0d5bebc2c99e5da2e20dd74e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:00 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 40/47] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel. Add a capability check to prevent that.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
index f80ae4d..059195f 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
@@ -1521,6 +1521,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
int err;
u32 retval = -1;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
if (err < 0)
@@ -1537,6 +1540,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
int err;
u32 retval = -1;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
&retval);
@@ -1561,6 +1567,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
union acpi_object *obj;
acpi_status status;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
1, asus->debug.method_id,
&input, &output);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 00b1cd446168136ddc9572cb4e16bde69f54339c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:01 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 41/47] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index fc28099..b5df7a8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
unsigned long copied;
void *ptr;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
int err = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
(unsigned long)high_memory - p);
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From afdf2e86bf1f6db3a87ce36b5b6d3ca7790001e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2012 10:41:04 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 42/47] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
boot environment
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel. This
could potentially be used to circumvent the secure boot trust model.
This is setup through the setup_arch function, which is called before the
security_init function sets up the security_ops, so we cannot use a
capable call here. We ignore the setting if we are booted in Secure Boot
mode.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index 908b02d..3b03454 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
- if (acpi_rsdp)
+ if (acpi_rsdp && !efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return acpi_rsdp;
#endif
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 8e52668f8a2b7e431fa83627643a6e032ff467db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:13 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 43/47] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
kexec could be used as a vector for a malicious user to use a signed kernel
to circumvent the secure boot trust model. In the long run we'll want to
support signed kexec payloads, but for the moment we should just disable
loading entirely in that situation.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
---
kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 5e4bd78..dd464e0 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
int result;
/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
return -EPERM;
/*
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From c0fc3cf2a10a11de3bedec8da48de086a3223220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2012 10:12:48 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 44/47] MODSIGN: Always enforce module signing in a Secure Boot
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
environment
If a machine is booted into a Secure Boot environment, we need to
protect the trust model. This requires that all modules be signed
with a key that is in the kernel's _modsign keyring. The checks for
this are already done via the 'sig_enforce' module parameter. Make
this visible within the kernel and force it to be true.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
kernel/cred.c | 8 ++++++++
kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index c3f4e3e..c5554e0 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -565,11 +565,19 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+extern bool sig_enforce;
+#endif
+
void __init secureboot_enable()
{
pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ /* Enable module signature enforcing */
+ sig_enforce = true;
+#endif
}
/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index eab0827..93a16dc 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
-static bool sig_enforce = true;
+bool sig_enforce = true;
#else
-static bool sig_enforce = false;
+bool sig_enforce = false;
static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From dc252e295a06d2644fdc623324a3cf842cae2404 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 14:02:09 -0400
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 45/47] hibernate: Disable in a Secure Boot environment
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the secure boot trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
a Secure Boot environment.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
kernel/power/main.c | 7 ++++++-
kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index b26f5f1..7f63cb4 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/genhd.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include "power.h"
@@ -632,6 +633,10 @@ int hibernate(void)
{
int error;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
lock_system_sleep();
/* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
@@ -723,7 +728,7 @@ static int software_resume(void)
/*
* If the user said "noresume".. bail out early.
*/
- if (noresume)
+ if (noresume || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
return 0;
/*
@@ -889,6 +894,11 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
int i;
char *start = buf;
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
+ buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled");
+ return buf-start;
+ }
+
for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) {
if (!hibernation_modes[i])
continue;
@@ -923,6 +933,9 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
char *p;
int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
p = memchr(buf, '\n', n);
len = p ? p - buf : n;
diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
index d77663b..78f8ed5 100644
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
--- a/kernel/power/main.c
+++ b/kernel/power/main.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include "power.h"
@@ -301,7 +302,11 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
- s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
+ s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk");
+ } else {
+ s += sprintf(s, "\n");
+ }
#else
if (s != buf)
/* convert the last space to a newline */
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 4ed81e7..b11a0f4 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
struct snapshot_data *data;
int error;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
lock_system_sleep();
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From fda03ea8d295b9b7bf6fa384012471317b976c94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 46/47] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
secure boot mode if that variable is set.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 96bd86b..6e1331c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -851,8 +851,9 @@ fail:
static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
{
- u8 sb, setup;
+ u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+ u32 attr;
efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
efi_status_t status;
@@ -876,6 +877,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table)
if (setup == 1)
return 0;
+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable
+ * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
+ */
+ var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+ L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
+ &moksbstate);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
+ if (moksbstate == 1)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
--
1.8.1.2
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
From 66acdd343982f593403fc5de7b0d96071d111181 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
Linux v3.8-3195-g024e4ec
2013-02-21 20:19:58 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 47/47] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
Add pekey support from David Howells and rework secure-boot patchset on top
2013-02-20 00:00:57 +00:00
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed unless CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is
set since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
index 4929502..adaab3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
int err = 0;
ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (count % 8)
return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
err = -EBADF;
break;
}
+ if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
--
1.8.1.2
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