2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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From 269ef272b24c852a52deb5b119d4f1744108b5b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Fedora Kernel Team <kernel-team@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2019 16:20:51 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] riscv: add support for SECCOMP
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2019-06-24 14:50:29 +00:00
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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---
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arch/riscv/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++
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arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h | 10 +++++++
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arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 +++-
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arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 27 +++++++++++++++++--
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arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 10 +++++++
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tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++-
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6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
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2019-06-24 14:50:29 +00:00
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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index 391b191..b3650f1 100644
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
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+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ config RISCV
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
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select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT
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select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
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+ select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP
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select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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@@ -272,6 +273,19 @@ menu "Kernel features"
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
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+config SECCOMP
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+ bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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+ help
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+ This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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+ that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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+ execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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+ the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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+ syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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+ their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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+ enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
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+ and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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+ defined by each seccomp mode.
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+
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endmenu
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menu "Boot options"
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diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
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new file mode 100644
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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index 0000000..bf7744e
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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+
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+#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H
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+#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H
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+
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+#include <asm/unistd.h>
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+
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+#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h>
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+
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+#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */
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diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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index 905372d..a0b2a29 100644
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
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+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
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@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ struct thread_info {
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#define TIF_MEMDIE 5 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
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#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 6 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
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#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing */
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+#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* syscall secure computing */
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#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
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#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
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@@ -82,11 +83,13 @@ struct thread_info {
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#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
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#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
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#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
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+#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
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#define _TIF_WORK_MASK \
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(_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
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#define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK \
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- (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
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2019-06-24 16:01:53 +00:00
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+ (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
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+ _TIF_SECCOMP )
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#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_THREAD_INFO_H */
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diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
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index 8ca4798..c68b987 100644
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
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+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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@@ -226,8 +226,25 @@ check_syscall_nr:
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/* Check to make sure we don't jump to a bogus syscall number. */
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li t0, __NR_syscalls
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la s0, sys_ni_syscall
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- /* Syscall number held in a7 */
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- bgeu a7, t0, 1f
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+ /*
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+ * The tracer can change syscall number to valid/invalid value.
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+ * We use syscall_set_nr helper in syscall_trace_enter thus we
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+ * cannot trust the current value in a7 and have to reload from
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+ * the current task pt_regs.
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+ */
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+ REG_L a7, PT_A7(sp)
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+ /*
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+ * Syscall number held in a7.
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+ * If syscall number is above allowed value, redirect to ni_syscall.
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+ */
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+ bge a7, t0, 1f
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+ /*
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+ * Check if syscall is rejected by tracer or seccomp, i.e., a7 == -1.
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+ * If yes, we pretend it was executed.
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+ */
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+ li t1, -1
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+ beq a7, t1, ret_from_syscall_rejected
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+ /* Call syscall */
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la s0, sys_call_table
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slli t0, a7, RISCV_LGPTR
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add s0, s0, t0
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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@@ -238,6 +255,12 @@ check_syscall_nr:
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ret_from_syscall:
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/* Set user a0 to kernel a0 */
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REG_S a0, PT_A0(sp)
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+ /*
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+ * We didn't execute the actual syscall.
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+ * Seccomp already set return value for the current task pt_regs.
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+ * (If it was configured with SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE)
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+ */
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+ret_from_syscall_rejected:
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/* Trace syscalls, but only if requested by the user. */
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REG_L t0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
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andi t0, t0, _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
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diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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index 3687514..63e47c9 100644
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
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+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
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@@ -154,6 +154,16 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
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+ /*
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+ * Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast.
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+ * If this fails we might have return value in a0 from seccomp
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+ * (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
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+ */
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+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) {
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+ syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
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trace_sys_enter(regs, syscall_get_nr(current, regs));
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diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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index 7f8b5c8..69bd454 100644
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2019-06-24 14:15:53 +00:00
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--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
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+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
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@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ struct seccomp_data {
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# define __NR_seccomp 383
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# elif defined(__aarch64__)
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# define __NR_seccomp 277
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+# elif defined(__riscv)
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+# define __NR_seccomp 277
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# elif defined(__hppa__)
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# define __NR_seccomp 338
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# elif defined(__powerpc__)
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@@ -1587,6 +1589,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
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# define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
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# define SYSCALL_NUM regs[8]
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# define SYSCALL_RET regs[0]
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+#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64
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+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
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+# define SYSCALL_NUM a7
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+# define SYSCALL_RET a0
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#elif defined(__hppa__)
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# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
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# define SYSCALL_NUM gr[20]
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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@@ -1676,7 +1682,7 @@ void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
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EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {}
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#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \
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- defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__)
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+ defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv)
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{
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regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
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}
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2019-06-24 14:50:29 +00:00
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--
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2019-10-19 16:23:07 +00:00
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2.23.0
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2019-06-24 14:50:29 +00:00
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