kernel/secure-modules.patch

Bugzilla: N/A
Upstream-status: Fedora mustard.  Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd

From c66361cce3b23ea9c7fa8010f55e1fe31c23d5b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Add secure_modules() call

Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load
only modules signed with a trusted key.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 include/linux/module.h |  7 +++++++
 kernel/module.c        | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index f520a767c86c..fc9b54eb779e 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -509,6 +509,8 @@ int unregister_module_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
 
 extern void print_modules(void);
 
+extern bool secure_modules(void);
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */
 
 /* Given an address, look for it in the exception tables. */
@@ -619,6 +621,11 @@ static inline int unregister_module_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 static inline void print_modules(void)
 {
 }
+
+static inline bool secure_modules(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index ae79ce615cb9..e8909e2a8b96 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3839,3 +3839,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
 #endif
+
+bool secure_modules(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+	return (sig_enforce || modules_disabled);
+#else
+	return modules_disabled;
+#endif
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_modules);
-- 
2.0.4


From eb614212bd2ad9acb2a279c669624a174899e0d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 02/14] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is
 enabled

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify
kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module
signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 10 ++++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c      |  8 +++++++-
 drivers/pci/syscall.c   |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 9ff0a901ecf7..8d0d5d92b8d9 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/vgaarb.h>
 #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 #include "pci.h"
 
 static int sysfs_initialized;	/* = 0 */
@@ -704,6 +705,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -998,6 +1002,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	resource_size_t start, end;
 	int i;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
 			break;
@@ -1099,6 +1106,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 3f155e78513f..4265ea07e3b0 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index b91c4da68365..98f5637304d1 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "pci.h"
 
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || secure_modules())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
-- 
2.0.4


From 6774235b4571f527a2a101c291434f43fc8b668c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 03/14] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is
 enabled

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down by default.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 5 +++--
 drivers/char/mem.c       | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 4ddaf66ea35f..00b440307419 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
 /*
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
 
 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules()))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 	if (level > old) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules())
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 917403fe10da..cdf839f9defe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/aio.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -568,6 +569,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	const char __user *tmp = buf;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
-- 
2.0.4


From 8693d39f3b0d3f43dbc45f9a1961e695e8a21373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method

custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if any such restrictions have been enabled.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index c68e72414a67..4277938af700 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
 	struct acpi_table_header table;
 	acpi_status status;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!(*ppos)) {
 		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
 		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
-- 
2.0.4


From 7e5fa9a5109284bcd70c8ae2fc82265e2617a31c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module
 loading is restricted

We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a
given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to
be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the
kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if any of
these features are enabled.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
index 3c6ccedc82b6..960c46536c65 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
@@ -1592,6 +1592,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
 
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -1608,6 +1611,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
 				    &retval);
 
@@ -1632,6 +1638,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	union acpi_object *obj;
 	acpi_status status;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
 				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
 				     &input, &output);
-- 
2.0.4


From 7ed379a80612df99b1220869003522211d23bd96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 06/14] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is
 restricted

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when
any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index cdf839f9defe..c63cf93b00eb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (p != *ppos)
 		return -EFBIG;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -502,6 +505,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
-- 
2.0.4


From c46f20cad9d85bbf467162dddb56759e7b02e0f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 07/14] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module
 loading is restricted

This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on
loading modules. Disable it in that case.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/acpi/osl.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index bad25b070fe0..0606585e8b93 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp);
 acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
-	if (acpi_rsdp)
+	if (acpi_rsdp && !secure_modules())
 		return acpi_rsdp;
 #endif
 
-- 
2.0.4


From 8cb020222a1602bd196163d132b95bb1f69925b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 03:33:56 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module
 loading restrictions

kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes
sense to disable kexec in this situation.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 4b8f0c925884..df14daa323a9 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -947,6 +948,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
+	 * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+	 * prevent loading in that case
+	 */
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
 	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
 	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.
 	 */
-- 
2.0.4


From 2e30f7a56dcccf68c9c62dfdc791664f07737e94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 09/14] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is
 restricted

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted,
since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based
on a patch by Kees Cook.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
index c9603ac80de5..8bef43fc3f40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int err = 0;
 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
 
+	if (secure_modules())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (count % 8)
 		return -EINVAL;	/* Invalid chunk size */
 
@@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
 			err = -EBADF;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (secure_modules()) {
+			err = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			break;
-- 
2.0.4


From f3437ca79d1ddd12ebdff439c4c3931ba0081a1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 10/14] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures
 when in Secure Boot mode

UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
that enforces this automatically when enabled.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt       |  2 ++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                      | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c      | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c               |  6 ++++++
 include/linux/module.h                |  6 ++++++
 kernel/module.c                       |  7 +++++++
 7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 199f453cb4de..ec38acf00b40 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
 				(below)
+1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
 1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 6b71f0417293..67e25e3c8583 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1559,6 +1559,16 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
+        def_bool n
+	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+	---help---
+	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
+	  firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain
+	  use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed.
+	  Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement
+	  when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index f277184e2ac1..88edd48f03e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/efi.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
 
 #undef memcpy			/* Use memcpy from misc.c */
 
@@ -803,6 +804,37 @@ out:
 	return status;
 }
 
+static int get_secure_boot(void)
+{
+	u8 sb, setup;
+	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+
+	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize,
+				&setup);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (setup == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+
 /*
  * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol
  */
@@ -1374,6 +1406,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
 	else
 		setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
 
+	sanitize_boot_params(boot_params);
+
+	boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot();
+
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
 	status = setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index 225b0988043a..90dbfb73e11f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ struct boot_params {
 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
-	__u8  _pad5[3];					/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  _pad5[2];					/* 0x1ed */
 	/*
 	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
 	 *
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 41ead8d3bc0b..5a5cf7395724 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1142,6 +1142,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	io_delay_init();
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
+	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+		enforce_signed_modules();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration.
 	 */
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index fc9b54eb779e..7377bc851461 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -188,6 +188,12 @@ const struct exception_table_entry *search_exception_tables(unsigned long add);
 
 struct notifier_block;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+extern void enforce_signed_modules(void);
+#else
+static inline void enforce_signed_modules(void) {};
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
 
 extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index e8909e2a8b96..7d5b301efa01 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3840,6 +3840,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+void enforce_signed_modules(void)
+{
+	sig_enforce = true;
+}
+#endif
+
 bool secure_modules(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-- 
2.0.4


From ad56618c3851b102d59bab12d946bcce41caa48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/14] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode

A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
images it loads.  When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set.  Given that the
user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
secure boot mode if that variable is set.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 88edd48f03e9..3b18ef2b534c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -806,8 +806,9 @@ out:
 
 static int get_secure_boot(void)
 {
-	u8 sb, setup;
+	u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
 	unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
+	u32 attr;
 	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
@@ -831,6 +832,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void)
 	if (setup == 1)
 		return 0;
 
+	/* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode.  If so, and the variable
+	 * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
+	 */
+	var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+	status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
+				L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
+				&moksbstate);
+
+	/* If it fails, we don't care why.  Default to secure */
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
+		if (moksbstate == 1)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
-- 
2.0.4


From d3bcd51e1e47252afa3b2bb4da781b358da7d3d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 12/14] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being
UEFI based.  Reflect this in the config deps.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 67e25e3c8583..a46be2f21b95 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1560,7 +1560,8 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
 config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
-        def_bool n
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI
 	prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
 	---help---
 	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the
-- 
2.0.4


From 3d30f2c07daac85befa76ac44b4dc4db3d64a018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 13/14] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
for use with efi_enabled.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++
 include/linux/efi.h     | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 5a5cf7395724..fb282ff6a802 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1144,7 +1144,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE
 	if (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+		set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
 		enforce_signed_modules();
+		pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
 	}
 #endif
 
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index efc681fd5895..3f683a13d7aa 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -923,6 +923,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
 #define EFI_64BIT		5	/* Is the firmware 64-bit? */
 #define EFI_PARAVIRT		6	/* Access is via a paravirt interface */
 #define EFI_ARCH_1		7	/* First arch-specific bit */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		8	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
 /*
-- 
2.0.4


From f19107379dbcfced86458de8ad9cf8a6443567e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 08:53:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 14/14] hibernate: Disable in a signed modules environment

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate.  This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in
a secure modules environment.

Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
---
 kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index a9dfa79b6bab..14c7356ff53a 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/genhd.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 
 #include "power.h"
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
 
 bool hibernation_available(void)
 {
-	return (nohibernate == 0);
+	return ((nohibernate == 0) && !secure_modules());
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.0.4