- Fix -fstack-clash-protection codegen issue on 32 bit x86 (#1536555)

This commit is contained in:
Jeff Law 2018-01-24 15:13:15 -07:00
parent e90615843b
commit 6af92eba78
2 changed files with 104 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
%global gcc_major 7 %global gcc_major 7
# Note, gcc_release must be integer, if you want to add suffixes to # Note, gcc_release must be integer, if you want to add suffixes to
# %{release}, append them after %{gcc_release} on Release: line. # %{release}, append them after %{gcc_release} on Release: line.
%global gcc_release 7 %global gcc_release 8
%global nvptx_tools_gitrev c28050f60193b3b95a18866a96f03334e874e78f %global nvptx_tools_gitrev c28050f60193b3b95a18866a96f03334e874e78f
%global nvptx_newlib_gitrev aadc8eb0ec43b7cd0dd2dfb484bae63c8b05ef24 %global nvptx_newlib_gitrev aadc8eb0ec43b7cd0dd2dfb484bae63c8b05ef24
%global _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0 %global _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0
@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ Patch10: gcc7-foffload-default.patch
Patch11: gcc7-Wno-format-security.patch Patch11: gcc7-Wno-format-security.patch
Patch12: gcc7-aarch64-sanitizer-fix.patch Patch12: gcc7-aarch64-sanitizer-fix.patch
Patch13: gcc7-rh1512529-aarch64.patch Patch13: gcc7-rh1512529-aarch64.patch
Patch14: gcc7-rh1536555.patch
Patch1000: nvptx-tools-no-ptxas.patch Patch1000: nvptx-tools-no-ptxas.patch
Patch1001: nvptx-tools-build.patch Patch1001: nvptx-tools-build.patch
@ -832,6 +833,7 @@ package or when debugging this package.
%patch12 -p0 -b .aarch64-sanitizer-fix~ %patch12 -p0 -b .aarch64-sanitizer-fix~
%endif %endif
%patch13 -p0 -b .rh1512529-aarch64~ %patch13 -p0 -b .rh1512529-aarch64~
%patch14 -p0 -b .rh1537979~
cd nvptx-tools-%{nvptx_tools_gitrev} cd nvptx-tools-%{nvptx_tools_gitrev}
%patch1000 -p1 -b .nvptx-tools-no-ptxas~ %patch1000 -p1 -b .nvptx-tools-no-ptxas~
@ -3259,6 +3261,9 @@ fi
%endif %endif
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Jan 24 2018 Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> 7.2.1-8
- Fix -fstack-clash-protection codegen issue on 32 bit x86 (#1536555)
* Wed Jan 17 2018 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> 7.2.1-7 * Wed Jan 17 2018 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> 7.2.1-7
- update from the 7 branch - update from the 7 branch
- PRs fortran/78814, fortran/82367, fortran/82841, fortran/83093, - PRs fortran/78814, fortran/82367, fortran/82841, fortran/83093,

98
gcc7-rh1536555.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
diff --git a/gcc/config/i386/i386.c b/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
index 346fb4f..f0b8346 100644
--- gcc/config/i386/i386.c
+++ gcc/config/i386/i386.c
@@ -12763,6 +12763,18 @@ ix86_builtin_setjmp_frame_value (void)
return stack_realign_fp ? hard_frame_pointer_rtx : virtual_stack_vars_rtx;
}
+/* Return the probing interval for -fstack-clash-protection. */
+
+static HOST_WIDE_INT
+get_probe_interval (void)
+{
+ if (flag_stack_clash_protection)
+ return (HOST_WIDE_INT_1U
+ << PARAM_VALUE (PARAM_STACK_CLASH_PROTECTION_PROBE_INTERVAL));
+ else
+ return (HOST_WIDE_INT_1U << STACK_CHECK_PROBE_INTERVAL_EXP);
+}
+
/* When using -fsplit-stack, the allocation routines set a field in
the TCB to the bottom of the stack plus this much space, measured
in bytes. */
@@ -12948,7 +12960,14 @@ ix86_compute_frame_layout (void)
to_allocate = offset - frame->sse_reg_save_offset;
if ((!to_allocate && frame->nregs <= 1)
- || (TARGET_64BIT && to_allocate >= HOST_WIDE_INT_C (0x80000000)))
+ || (TARGET_64BIT && to_allocate >= HOST_WIDE_INT_C (0x80000000))
+ /* If stack clash probing needs a loop, then it needs a
+ scratch register. But the returned register is only guaranteed
+ to be safe to use after register saves are complete. So if
+ stack clash protections are enabled and the allocated frame is
+ larger than the probe interval, then use pushes to save
+ callee saved registers. */
+ || (flag_stack_clash_protection && to_allocate > get_probe_interval ()))
frame->save_regs_using_mov = false;
if (ix86_using_red_zone ()
@@ -13619,18 +13638,6 @@ release_scratch_register_on_entry (struct scratch_reg *sr)
}
}
-/* Return the probing interval for -fstack-clash-protection. */
-
-static HOST_WIDE_INT
-get_probe_interval (void)
-{
- if (flag_stack_clash_protection)
- return (HOST_WIDE_INT_1U
- << PARAM_VALUE (PARAM_STACK_CLASH_PROTECTION_PROBE_INTERVAL));
- else
- return (HOST_WIDE_INT_1U << STACK_CHECK_PROBE_INTERVAL_EXP);
-}
-
/* Emit code to adjust the stack pointer by SIZE bytes while probing it.
This differs from the next routine in that it tries hard to prevent
@@ -14558,12 +14565,11 @@ ix86_expand_prologue (void)
&& (flag_stack_check == STATIC_BUILTIN_STACK_CHECK
|| flag_stack_clash_protection))
{
- /* This assert wants to verify that integer registers were saved
- prior to probing. This is necessary when probing may be implemented
- as a function call (Windows). It is not necessary for stack clash
- protection probing. */
- if (!flag_stack_clash_protection)
- gcc_assert (int_registers_saved);
+ /* We expect the GP registers to be saved when probes are used
+ as the probing sequences might need a scratch register and
+ the routine to allocate one assumes the integer registers
+ have already been saved. */
+ gcc_assert (int_registers_saved);
if (flag_stack_clash_protection)
{
diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/pr83994.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/pr83994.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc0b7cb
--- /dev/null
+++ gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/pr83994.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* { dg-do compile } */
+/* { dg-options "-O2 -march=i686 -fpic -fstack-clash-protection" } */
+/* { dg-require-effective-target ia32 } */
+
+void f1 (char *);
+
+__attribute__ ((regparm (3)))
+int
+f2 (int arg1, int arg2, int arg3)
+{
+ char buf[16384];
+ f1 (buf);
+ f1 (buf);
+ return 0;
+}
+