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- Fixed warnings in pam patch (bug #203166).

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This commit is contained in:
Tim Waugh 2006-08-24 16:05:51 +00:00
parent 1d72cf0b92
commit ee719b5558
2 changed files with 18 additions and 15 deletions
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32
coreutils-pam.patch
View File

@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
@node Process control
@chapter Process control
--- coreutils-5.97/src/su.c.pam 2006-08-23 10:45:26.000000000 +0100
+++ coreutils-5.97/src/su.c 2006-08-23 10:45:33.000000000 +0100
--- coreutils-5.97/src/su.c 2006-08-23 10:45:33.000000000 +0100
+++ coreutils-5.97/src/su.c 2006-08-24 17:04:48.000000000 +0100
@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@
restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to
be fascist.
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
/* The name this program was run with. */
char *program_name;
@@ -248,7 +274,22 @@
@@ -248,7 +274,26 @@
}
#endif
@ -124,6 +124,10 @@
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
+ return 0; \
+}
+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) { \
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
+return; \
+}
+#endif
+
/* Ask the user for a password.
@ -131,7 +135,7 @@
Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
or if PW has an empty password. */
@@ -256,6 +297,44 @@
@@ -256,6 +301,44 @@
static bool
correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
{
@ -176,7 +180,7 @@
char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
#if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
/* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */
@@ -280,6 +359,7 @@
@@ -280,6 +363,7 @@
encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
@ -184,7 +188,7 @@
}
/* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
@@ -293,12 +373,18 @@
@@ -293,12 +377,18 @@
/* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
Unset all other environment variables. */
char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
@ -203,7 +207,7 @@
xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
@@ -331,8 +417,13 @@
@@ -331,8 +421,13 @@
{
#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
errno = 0;
@ -218,7 +222,7 @@
endgrent ();
#endif
if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
@@ -341,6 +432,31 @@
@@ -341,6 +436,31 @@
error (EXIT_FAIL, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
}
@ -250,7 +254,7 @@
/* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
@@ -348,17 +464,49 @@
@@ -348,17 +468,49 @@
static void
run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
@ -301,7 +305,7 @@
shell_basename = base_name (shell);
arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
arg0[0] = '-';
@@ -383,6 +531,66 @@
@@ -383,6 +535,66 @@
error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
exit (exit_status);
}
@ -354,9 +358,9 @@
+ /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
+ PAM_BAIL_P;
+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
+ retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+ PAM_BAIL_P;
+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
+ if (caught) {
+ sleep(2);
+ kill(child, SIGKILL);
@ -368,9 +372,7 @@
}
/* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
@@ -550,9 +758,9 @@
shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
modify_environment (pw, shell);
@@ -552,7 +764,7 @@
+#ifndef USE_PAM
change_identity (pw);

1
coreutils.spec
View File

@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ fi
%changelog
* Thu Aug 24 2006 Tim Waugh <twaugh@redhat.com>
- Fixed warnings in pam patch (bug #203166).
- Fixed warnings in i18n patch (bug #203166).
- Fixed warnings in sysinfo patch (bug #203166).
- Fixed warnings in selinux patch (bug #203166).