kernel-ark/security/keys
David Howells b4a1b4f504 KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.

There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke().  If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.

This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.

Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.

I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.

This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller).  Here's a cleaned up version:

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>
	#include <pthread.h>
	void *thr0(void *arg)
	{
		key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
		keyctl_revoke(key);
		return 0;
	}
	void *thr1(void *arg)
	{
		key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
		char buffer[16];
		keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
		return 0;
	}
	int main()
	{
		key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
		pthread_t th[5];
		pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
		pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
		pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
		pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
		pthread_join(th[0], 0);
		pthread_join(th[1], 0);
		pthread_join(th[2], 0);
		pthread_join(th[3], 0);
		return 0;
	}

Build as:

	cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread

Run as:

	while keyctl-race; do :; done

as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel.  The crash can be
summarised as:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
	IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
	 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
	 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-12-19 12:34:43 +11:00
..
encrypted-keys KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key 2015-11-25 14:19:47 +11:00
big_key.c KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data 2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
compat.c switch keyctl_instantiate_key_common() to iov_iter 2015-04-11 22:27:12 -04:00
gc.c KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring 2015-10-15 17:21:37 +01:00
internal.h switch keyctl_instantiate_key_common() to iov_iter 2015-04-11 22:27:12 -04:00
Kconfig KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y 2015-01-22 22:34:32 +00:00
key.c KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data 2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
keyctl.c KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke 2015-12-19 12:34:43 +11:00
keyring.c KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data 2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
Makefile KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches 2013-09-24 10:35:19 +01:00
permission.c KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h 2014-03-14 17:44:49 +00:00
persistent.c KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h 2014-03-14 17:44:49 +00:00
proc.c KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y 2015-01-22 22:34:32 +00:00
process_keys.c KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data 2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
request_key_auth.c KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data 2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
request_key.c Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2015-11-05 15:32:38 -08:00
sysctl.c security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table 2014-04-15 13:39:58 +10:00
trusted.c KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key 2015-11-25 14:19:47 +11:00
trusted.h keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.h 2015-10-19 01:01:21 +02:00
user_defined.c KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key 2015-11-25 14:19:47 +11:00