kernel-ark/security
Eric Paris 788084aba2 Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.

The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
..
integrity/ima integrity: add ima_counts_put (updated) 2009-06-29 08:59:10 +10:00
keys
selinux Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
smack
tomoyo
capability.c Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c 2009-08-17 15:08:35 +10:00
commoncap.c Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
device_cgroup.c
inode.c
Kconfig Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
lsm_audit.c
Makefile Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
min_addr.c Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +10:00
root_plug.c
security.c