644473e9c6
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
1154 lines
26 KiB
C
1154 lines
26 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* linux/fs/open.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/fdtable.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/tty.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/securebits.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/falloc.h>
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include <linux/dnotify.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs,
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struct file *filp)
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{
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int ret;
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struct iattr newattrs;
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/* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
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if (length < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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newattrs.ia_size = length;
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newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
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if (filp) {
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newattrs.ia_file = filp;
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newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
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}
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/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
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ret = should_remove_suid(dentry);
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if (ret)
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newattrs.ia_valid |= ret | ATTR_FORCE;
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mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
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ret = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
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mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
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return ret;
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}
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static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
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{
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struct path path;
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struct inode *inode;
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int error;
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error = -EINVAL;
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if (length < 0) /* sorry, but loff_t says... */
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goto out;
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error = user_path(pathname, &path);
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if (error)
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goto out;
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inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
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/* For directories it's -EISDIR, for other non-regulars - -EINVAL */
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error = -EISDIR;
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
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goto dput_and_out;
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error = -EINVAL;
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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goto dput_and_out;
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error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
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if (error)
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goto dput_and_out;
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error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
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if (error)
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goto mnt_drop_write_and_out;
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error = -EPERM;
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if (IS_APPEND(inode))
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goto mnt_drop_write_and_out;
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error = get_write_access(inode);
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if (error)
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goto mnt_drop_write_and_out;
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/*
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* Make sure that there are no leases. get_write_access() protects
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* against the truncate racing with a lease-granting setlease().
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*/
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error = break_lease(inode, O_WRONLY);
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if (error)
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goto put_write_and_out;
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error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
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if (!error)
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error = security_path_truncate(&path);
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if (!error)
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error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL);
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put_write_and_out:
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put_write_access(inode);
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mnt_drop_write_and_out:
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mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
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dput_and_out:
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path_put(&path);
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out:
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return error;
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}
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(truncate, const char __user *, path, long, length)
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{
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return do_sys_truncate(path, length);
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}
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static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
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|
{
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struct inode * inode;
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struct dentry *dentry;
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struct file * file;
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int error;
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error = -EINVAL;
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if (length < 0)
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goto out;
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error = -EBADF;
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file = fget(fd);
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if (!file)
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goto out;
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|
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/* explicitly opened as large or we are on 64-bit box */
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if (file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE)
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small = 0;
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dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
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inode = dentry->d_inode;
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error = -EINVAL;
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
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goto out_putf;
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error = -EINVAL;
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/* Cannot ftruncate over 2^31 bytes without large file support */
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if (small && length > MAX_NON_LFS)
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goto out_putf;
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error = -EPERM;
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if (IS_APPEND(inode))
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goto out_putf;
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error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
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if (!error)
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error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
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if (!error)
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error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
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out_putf:
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fput(file);
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out:
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return error;
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}
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(ftruncate, unsigned int, fd, unsigned long, length)
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{
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long ret = do_sys_ftruncate(fd, length, 1);
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/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
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asmlinkage_protect(2, ret, fd, length);
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return ret;
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}
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/* LFS versions of truncate are only needed on 32 bit machines */
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#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
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SYSCALL_DEFINE(truncate64)(const char __user * path, loff_t length)
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{
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return do_sys_truncate(path, length);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS
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asmlinkage long SyS_truncate64(long path, loff_t length)
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{
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return SYSC_truncate64((const char __user *) path, length);
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}
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SYSCALL_ALIAS(sys_truncate64, SyS_truncate64);
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#endif
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SYSCALL_DEFINE(ftruncate64)(unsigned int fd, loff_t length)
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{
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long ret = do_sys_ftruncate(fd, length, 0);
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/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
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asmlinkage_protect(2, ret, fd, length);
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return ret;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS
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asmlinkage long SyS_ftruncate64(long fd, loff_t length)
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{
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return SYSC_ftruncate64((unsigned int) fd, length);
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}
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SYSCALL_ALIAS(sys_ftruncate64, SyS_ftruncate64);
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#endif
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#endif /* BITS_PER_LONG == 32 */
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int do_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
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long ret;
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if (offset < 0 || len <= 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Return error if mode is not supported */
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if (mode & ~(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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/* Punch hole must have keep size set */
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if ((mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) &&
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!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
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return -EBADF;
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/* It's not possible punch hole on append only file */
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if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE && IS_APPEND(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
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return -EPERM;
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/*
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* Revalidate the write permissions, in case security policy has
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* changed since the files were opened.
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*/
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ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode))
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return -ESPIPE;
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/*
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* Let individual file system decide if it supports preallocation
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* for directories or not.
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*/
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
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return -ENODEV;
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/* Check for wrap through zero too */
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if (((offset + len) > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) || ((offset + len) < 0))
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return -EFBIG;
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|
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if (!file->f_op->fallocate)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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return file->f_op->fallocate(file, mode, offset, len);
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|
}
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SYSCALL_DEFINE(fallocate)(int fd, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
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{
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|
struct file *file;
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int error = -EBADF;
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file = fget(fd);
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|
if (file) {
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error = do_fallocate(file, mode, offset, len);
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fput(file);
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}
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|
return error;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS
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asmlinkage long SyS_fallocate(long fd, long mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
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{
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return SYSC_fallocate((int)fd, (int)mode, offset, len);
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}
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SYSCALL_ALIAS(sys_fallocate, SyS_fallocate);
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#endif
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|
/*
|
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* access() needs to use the real uid/gid, not the effective uid/gid.
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* We do this by temporarily clearing all FS-related capabilities and
|
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* switching the fsuid/fsgid around to the real ones.
|
|
*/
|
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
|
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{
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
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struct cred *override_cred;
|
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struct path path;
|
|
struct inode *inode;
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|
int res;
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|
|
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if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
|
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return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
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override_cred = prepare_creds();
|
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if (!override_cred)
|
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return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
override_cred->fsuid = override_cred->uid;
|
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override_cred->fsgid = override_cred->gid;
|
|
|
|
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
|
|
/* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */
|
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kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(override_cred->user_ns, 0);
|
|
if (!uid_eq(override_cred->uid, root_uid))
|
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cap_clear(override_cred->cap_effective);
|
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else
|
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override_cred->cap_effective =
|
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override_cred->cap_permitted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
|
|
|
|
res = user_path_at(dfd, filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
|
|
|
|
if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* MAY_EXEC on regular files is denied if the fs is mounted
|
|
* with the "noexec" flag.
|
|
*/
|
|
res = -EACCES;
|
|
if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
|
|
goto out_path_release;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res = inode_permission(inode, mode | MAY_ACCESS);
|
|
/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
|
|
if (res || !(mode & S_IWOTH) || special_file(inode->i_mode))
|
|
goto out_path_release;
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a rare case where using __mnt_is_readonly()
|
|
* is OK without a mnt_want/drop_write() pair. Since
|
|
* no actual write to the fs is performed here, we do
|
|
* not need to telegraph to that to anyone.
|
|
*
|
|
* By doing this, we accept that this access is
|
|
* inherently racy and know that the fs may change
|
|
* state before we even see this result.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (__mnt_is_readonly(path.mnt))
|
|
res = -EROFS;
|
|
|
|
out_path_release:
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
out:
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
|
put_cred(override_cred);
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(access, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return sys_faccessat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename)
|
|
{
|
|
struct path path;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = user_path_dir(filename, &path);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto dput_and_out;
|
|
|
|
set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &path);
|
|
|
|
dput_and_out:
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file *file;
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = -EBADF;
|
|
file = fget(fd);
|
|
if (!file)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
|
|
|
|
error = -ENOTDIR;
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
goto out_putf;
|
|
|
|
error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path);
|
|
out_putf:
|
|
fput(file);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
|
|
{
|
|
struct path path;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = user_path_dir(filename, &path);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto dput_and_out;
|
|
|
|
error = -EPERM;
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
|
|
goto dput_and_out;
|
|
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto dput_and_out;
|
|
|
|
set_fs_root(current->fs, &path);
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
dput_and_out:
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int chmod_common(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
|
|
struct iattr newattrs;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = mnt_want_write(path->mnt);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
|
error = security_path_chmod(path, mode);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
|
|
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
|
|
error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs);
|
|
out_unlock:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
|
mnt_drop_write(path->mnt);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fchmod, unsigned int, fd, umode_t, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file * file;
|
|
int err = -EBADF;
|
|
|
|
file = fget(fd);
|
|
if (file) {
|
|
audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry);
|
|
err = chmod_common(&file->f_path, mode);
|
|
fput(file);
|
|
}
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct path path;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
error = chmod_common(&path, mode);
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(chmod, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return sys_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int chown_common(struct path *path, uid_t user, gid_t group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
|
|
int error;
|
|
struct iattr newattrs;
|
|
kuid_t uid;
|
|
kgid_t gid;
|
|
|
|
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
|
|
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
|
|
|
|
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME;
|
|
if (user != (uid_t) -1) {
|
|
if (!uid_valid(uid))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID;
|
|
newattrs.ia_uid = uid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (group != (gid_t) -1) {
|
|
if (!gid_valid(gid))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_GID;
|
|
newattrs.ia_gid = gid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
newattrs.ia_valid |=
|
|
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
|
|
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
|
error = security_path_chown(path, user, group);
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
error = notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(chown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct path path;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = user_path(filename, &path);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out_release;
|
|
error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
|
|
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
|
|
out_release:
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fchownat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user,
|
|
gid_t, group, int, flag)
|
|
{
|
|
struct path path;
|
|
int error = -EINVAL;
|
|
int lookup_flags;
|
|
|
|
if ((flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
|
|
if (flag & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
|
|
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
|
|
error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out_release;
|
|
error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
|
|
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
|
|
out_release:
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lchown, const char __user *, filename, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct path path;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = user_lpath(filename, &path);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out_release;
|
|
error = chown_common(&path, user, group);
|
|
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
|
|
out_release:
|
|
path_put(&path);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchown, unsigned int, fd, uid_t, user, gid_t, group)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file * file;
|
|
int error = -EBADF;
|
|
struct dentry * dentry;
|
|
|
|
file = fget(fd);
|
|
if (!file)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
error = mnt_want_write_file(file);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out_fput;
|
|
dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
|
|
audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
|
|
error = chown_common(&file->f_path, user, group);
|
|
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
|
|
out_fput:
|
|
fput(file);
|
|
out:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* You have to be very careful that these write
|
|
* counts get cleaned up in error cases and
|
|
* upon __fput(). This should probably never
|
|
* be called outside of __dentry_open().
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int __get_file_write_access(struct inode *inode,
|
|
struct vfsmount *mnt)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
error = get_write_access(inode);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not take mount writer counts on
|
|
* special files since no writes to
|
|
* the mount itself will occur.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Balanced in __fput()
|
|
*/
|
|
error = mnt_want_write(mnt);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
put_write_access(inode);
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
|
|
struct file *f,
|
|
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
|
|
const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
|
|
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
|
|
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
|
|
|
|
inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
|
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
|
|
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, mnt);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto cleanup_file;
|
|
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
|
|
file_take_write(f);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
|
|
f->f_path.dentry = dentry;
|
|
f->f_path.mnt = mnt;
|
|
f->f_pos = 0;
|
|
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
|
|
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
|
|
return f;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
|
|
|
|
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto cleanup_all;
|
|
|
|
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto cleanup_all;
|
|
|
|
if (!open && f->f_op)
|
|
open = f->f_op->open;
|
|
if (open) {
|
|
error = open(inode, f);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto cleanup_all;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
|
|
i_readcount_inc(inode);
|
|
|
|
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
|
|
|
|
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
|
|
|
|
/* NB: we're sure to have correct a_ops only after f_op->open */
|
|
if (f->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
|
|
if (!f->f_mapping->a_ops ||
|
|
((!f->f_mapping->a_ops->direct_IO) &&
|
|
(!f->f_mapping->a_ops->get_xip_mem))) {
|
|
fput(f);
|
|
f = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return f;
|
|
|
|
cleanup_all:
|
|
fops_put(f->f_op);
|
|
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
|
|
put_write_access(inode);
|
|
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't consider this a real
|
|
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
|
|
* because it all happenend right
|
|
* here, so just reset the state.
|
|
*/
|
|
file_reset_write(f);
|
|
mnt_drop_write(mnt);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
file_sb_list_del(f);
|
|
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
|
|
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
|
|
cleanup_file:
|
|
put_filp(f);
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
mntput(mnt);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* lookup_instantiate_filp - instantiates the open intent filp
|
|
* @nd: pointer to nameidata
|
|
* @dentry: pointer to dentry
|
|
* @open: open callback
|
|
*
|
|
* Helper for filesystems that want to use lookup open intents and pass back
|
|
* a fully instantiated struct file to the caller.
|
|
* This function is meant to be called from within a filesystem's
|
|
* lookup method.
|
|
* Beware of calling it for non-regular files! Those ->open methods might block
|
|
* (e.g. in fifo_open), leaving you with parent locked (and in case of fifo,
|
|
* leading to a deadlock, as nobody can open that fifo anymore, because
|
|
* another process to open fifo will block on locked parent when doing lookup).
|
|
* Note that in case of error, nd->intent.open.file is destroyed, but the
|
|
* path information remains valid.
|
|
* If the open callback is set to NULL, then the standard f_op->open()
|
|
* filesystem callback is substituted.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct file *lookup_instantiate_filp(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *))
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(nd->intent.open.file))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
nd->intent.open.file = __dentry_open(dget(dentry), mntget(nd->path.mnt),
|
|
nd->intent.open.file,
|
|
open, cred);
|
|
out:
|
|
return nd->intent.open.file;
|
|
out_err:
|
|
release_open_intent(nd);
|
|
nd->intent.open.file = ERR_CAST(dentry);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lookup_instantiate_filp);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* nameidata_to_filp - convert a nameidata to an open filp.
|
|
* @nd: pointer to nameidata
|
|
* @flags: open flags
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that this function destroys the original nameidata
|
|
*/
|
|
struct file *nameidata_to_filp(struct nameidata *nd)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
|
struct file *filp;
|
|
|
|
/* Pick up the filp from the open intent */
|
|
filp = nd->intent.open.file;
|
|
nd->intent.open.file = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Has the filesystem initialised the file for us? */
|
|
if (filp->f_path.dentry == NULL) {
|
|
path_get(&nd->path);
|
|
filp = __dentry_open(nd->path.dentry, nd->path.mnt, filp,
|
|
NULL, cred);
|
|
}
|
|
return filp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* dentry_open() will have done dput(dentry) and mntput(mnt) if it returns an
|
|
* error.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct file *dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags,
|
|
const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
struct file *f;
|
|
|
|
validate_creds(cred);
|
|
|
|
/* We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. */
|
|
BUG_ON(!mnt);
|
|
|
|
error = -ENFILE;
|
|
f = get_empty_filp();
|
|
if (f == NULL) {
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
mntput(mnt);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f->f_flags = flags;
|
|
return __dentry_open(dentry, mnt, f, NULL, cred);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(dentry_open);
|
|
|
|
static void __put_unused_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
|
|
__clear_open_fd(fd, fdt);
|
|
if (fd < files->next_fd)
|
|
files->next_fd = fd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void put_unused_fd(unsigned int fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct files_struct *files = current->files;
|
|
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
__put_unused_fd(files, fd);
|
|
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_unused_fd);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Install a file pointer in the fd array.
|
|
*
|
|
* The VFS is full of places where we drop the files lock between
|
|
* setting the open_fds bitmap and installing the file in the file
|
|
* array. At any such point, we are vulnerable to a dup2() race
|
|
* installing a file in the array before us. We need to detect this and
|
|
* fput() the struct file we are about to overwrite in this case.
|
|
*
|
|
* It should never happen - if we allow dup2() do it, _really_ bad things
|
|
* will follow.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void fd_install(unsigned int fd, struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
struct files_struct *files = current->files;
|
|
struct fdtable *fdt;
|
|
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
|
|
BUG_ON(fdt->fd[fd] != NULL);
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(fdt->fd[fd], file);
|
|
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fd_install);
|
|
|
|
static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *op)
|
|
{
|
|
int lookup_flags = 0;
|
|
int acc_mode;
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & O_CREAT))
|
|
mode = 0;
|
|
op->mode = mode;
|
|
|
|
/* Must never be set by userspace */
|
|
flags &= ~FMODE_NONOTIFY;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
|
|
* check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
|
|
* always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
|
|
* for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (flags & __O_SYNC)
|
|
flags |= O_DSYNC;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have O_PATH in the open flag. Then we
|
|
* cannot have anything other than the below set of flags
|
|
*/
|
|
if (flags & O_PATH) {
|
|
flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH;
|
|
acc_mode = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
op->open_flag = flags;
|
|
|
|
/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
|
|
if (flags & O_TRUNC)
|
|
acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
/* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
|
|
access from general write access. */
|
|
if (flags & O_APPEND)
|
|
acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
|
|
|
|
op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
|
|
|
|
op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & O_CREAT) {
|
|
op->intent |= LOOKUP_CREATE;
|
|
if (flags & O_EXCL)
|
|
op->intent |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
|
|
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
|
|
if (!(flags & O_NOFOLLOW))
|
|
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
|
|
return lookup_flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* filp_open - open file and return file pointer
|
|
*
|
|
* @filename: path to open
|
|
* @flags: open flags as per the open(2) second argument
|
|
* @mode: mode for the new file if O_CREAT is set, else ignored
|
|
*
|
|
* This is the helper to open a file from kernelspace if you really
|
|
* have to. But in generally you should not do this, so please move
|
|
* along, nothing to see here..
|
|
*/
|
|
struct file *filp_open(const char *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct open_flags op;
|
|
int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
|
|
return do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, &op, lookup);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(filp_open);
|
|
|
|
struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
|
|
const char *filename, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct open_flags op;
|
|
int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
|
|
if (flags & O_CREAT)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
|
|
if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
|
|
return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op, lookup);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_open_root);
|
|
|
|
long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct open_flags op;
|
|
int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
|
|
char *tmp = getname(filename);
|
|
int fd = PTR_ERR(tmp);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
|
|
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
|
|
if (fd >= 0) {
|
|
struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, &op, lookup);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(f)) {
|
|
put_unused_fd(fd);
|
|
fd = PTR_ERR(f);
|
|
} else {
|
|
fsnotify_open(f);
|
|
fd_install(fd, f);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
putname(tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
return fd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open, const char __user *, filename, int, flags, umode_t, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
if (force_o_largefile())
|
|
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
|
|
|
|
ret = do_sys_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, flags, mode);
|
|
/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
|
|
asmlinkage_protect(3, ret, filename, flags, mode);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(openat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, flags,
|
|
umode_t, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
if (force_o_largefile())
|
|
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
|
|
|
|
ret = do_sys_open(dfd, filename, flags, mode);
|
|
/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
|
|
asmlinkage_protect(4, ret, dfd, filename, flags, mode);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef __alpha__
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For backward compatibility? Maybe this should be moved
|
|
* into arch/i386 instead?
|
|
*/
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(creat, const char __user *, pathname, umode_t, mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return sys_open(pathname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* "id" is the POSIX thread ID. We use the
|
|
* files pointer for this..
|
|
*/
|
|
int filp_close(struct file *filp, fl_owner_t id)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!file_count(filp)) {
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "VFS: Close: file count is 0\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->flush)
|
|
retval = filp->f_op->flush(filp, id);
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
|
|
dnotify_flush(filp, id);
|
|
locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
|
|
}
|
|
fput(filp);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(filp_close);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Careful here! We test whether the file pointer is NULL before
|
|
* releasing the fd. This ensures that one clone task can't release
|
|
* an fd while another clone is opening it.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(close, unsigned int, fd)
|
|
{
|
|
struct file * filp;
|
|
struct files_struct *files = current->files;
|
|
struct fdtable *fdt;
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
|
|
if (fd >= fdt->max_fds)
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
filp = fdt->fd[fd];
|
|
if (!filp)
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(fdt->fd[fd], NULL);
|
|
__clear_close_on_exec(fd, fdt);
|
|
__put_unused_fd(files, fd);
|
|
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
retval = filp_close(filp, files);
|
|
|
|
/* can't restart close syscall because file table entry was cleared */
|
|
if (unlikely(retval == -ERESTARTSYS ||
|
|
retval == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
|
|
retval == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
|
|
retval == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
|
|
retval = -EINTR;
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
|
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
|
|
return -EBADF;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sys_close);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This routine simulates a hangup on the tty, to arrange that users
|
|
* are given clean terminals at login time.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(vhangup)
|
|
{
|
|
if (capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) {
|
|
tty_vhangup_self();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called when an inode is about to be open.
|
|
* We use this to disallow opening large files on 32bit systems if
|
|
* the caller didn't specify O_LARGEFILE. On 64bit systems we force
|
|
* on this flag in sys_open.
|
|
*/
|
|
int generic_file_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE) && i_size_read(inode) > MAX_NON_LFS)
|
|
return -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_file_open);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is used by subsystems that don't want seekable
|
|
* file descriptors. The function is not supposed to ever fail, the only
|
|
* reason it returns an 'int' and not 'void' is so that it can be plugged
|
|
* directly into file_operations structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int nonseekable_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
|
|
{
|
|
filp->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_LSEEK | FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nonseekable_open);
|