kernel-ark/security/apparmor/net.c
Thomas Gleixner b886d83c5b treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:37:17 +02:00

255 lines
5.5 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor network mediation
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
*/
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/secid.h"
#include "net_names.h"
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
{ }
};
static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
"unknown",
"send",
"receive",
"unknown",
"create",
"shutdown",
"connect",
"unknown",
"setattr",
"getattr",
"setcred",
"getcred",
"chmod",
"chown",
"chgrp",
"lock",
"mmap",
"mprot",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"accept",
"bind",
"listen",
"unknown",
"setopt",
"getopt",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
};
/* audit callback for net specific fields */
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
}
}
if (aad(sa)->peer) {
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
/* Generic af perm */
int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
u32 request, u16 family, int type)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
unsigned int state;
__be16 buffer[2];
AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
return 0;
state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
if (!state)
return 0;
buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
4);
aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
}
int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
int type, int protocol)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
type));
}
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
int error = 0;
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sk);
if (!unconfined(label)) {
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
}
return error;
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error;
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock)
{
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
{
struct aa_label *label;
if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
return 0;
}
label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
secmark->secid = label->secid;
return 0;
}
static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
struct common_audit_data *sa, struct sock *sk)
{
int i, ret;
struct aa_perms perms = { };
if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
else
perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
}
}
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
}
int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
u32 secid, struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
&sa, sk));
}
#endif