kernel-ark/arch/sparc/kernel/etrap_64.S
Khalid Aziz 74a0496748 sparc64: Add support for ADI (Application Data Integrity)
ADI is a new feature supported on SPARC M7 and newer processors to allow
hardware to catch rogue accesses to memory. ADI is supported for data
fetches only and not instruction fetches. An app can enable ADI on its
data pages, set version tags on them and use versioned addresses to
access the data pages. Upper bits of the address contain the version
tag. On M7 processors, upper four bits (bits 63-60) contain the version
tag. If a rogue app attempts to access ADI enabled data pages, its
access is blocked and processor generates an exception. Please see
Documentation/sparc/adi.txt for further details.

This patch extends mprotect to enable ADI (TSTATE.mcde), enable/disable
MCD (Memory Corruption Detection) on selected memory ranges, enable
TTE.mcd in PTEs, return ADI parameters to userspace and save/restore ADI
version tags on page swap out/in or migration. ADI is not enabled by
default for any task. A task must explicitly enable ADI on a memory
range and set version tag for ADI to be effective for the task.

Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-18 07:38:48 -07:00

285 lines
7.1 KiB
ArmAsm

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* etrap.S: Preparing for entry into the kernel on Sparc V9.
*
* Copyright (C) 1996, 1997 David S. Miller (davem@caip.rutgers.edu)
* Copyright (C) 1997, 1998, 1999 Jakub Jelinek (jj@ultra.linux.cz)
*/
#include <asm/asi.h>
#include <asm/pstate.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/spitfire.h>
#include <asm/head.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
#define TASK_REGOFF (THREAD_SIZE-TRACEREG_SZ-STACKFRAME_SZ)
#define ETRAP_PSTATE1 (PSTATE_TSO | PSTATE_PRIV)
#define ETRAP_PSTATE2 \
(PSTATE_TSO | PSTATE_PEF | PSTATE_PRIV | PSTATE_IE)
/*
* On entry, %g7 is return address - 0x4.
* %g4 and %g5 will be preserved %l4 and %l5 respectively.
*/
.text
.align 64
.globl etrap_syscall, etrap, etrap_irq, etraptl1
etrap: rdpr %pil, %g2
etrap_irq: clr %g3
etrap_syscall: TRAP_LOAD_THREAD_REG(%g6, %g1)
rdpr %tstate, %g1
or %g1, %g3, %g1
sllx %g2, 20, %g3
andcc %g1, TSTATE_PRIV, %g0
or %g1, %g3, %g1
bne,pn %xcc, 1f
sub %sp, STACKFRAME_SZ+TRACEREG_SZ-STACK_BIAS, %g2
661: wrpr %g0, 7, %cleanwin
.section .fast_win_ctrl_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
.word 0x85880000 ! allclean
.previous
sethi %hi(TASK_REGOFF), %g2
sethi %hi(TSTATE_PEF), %g3
or %g2, %lo(TASK_REGOFF), %g2
and %g1, %g3, %g3
brnz,pn %g3, 1f
add %g6, %g2, %g2
wr %g0, 0, %fprs
1: rdpr %tpc, %g3
stx %g1, [%g2 + STACKFRAME_SZ + PT_V9_TSTATE]
rdpr %tnpc, %g1
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACKFRAME_SZ + PT_V9_TPC]
rd %y, %g3
stx %g1, [%g2 + STACKFRAME_SZ + PT_V9_TNPC]
rdpr %tt, %g1
st %g3, [%g2 + STACKFRAME_SZ + PT_V9_Y]
sethi %hi(PT_REGS_MAGIC), %g3
or %g3, %g1, %g1
st %g1, [%g2 + STACKFRAME_SZ + PT_V9_MAGIC]
rdpr %cansave, %g1
brnz,pt %g1, etrap_save
nop
rdpr %cwp, %g1
add %g1, 2, %g1
wrpr %g1, %cwp
be,pt %xcc, etrap_user_spill
mov ASI_AIUP, %g3
rdpr %otherwin, %g3
brz %g3, etrap_kernel_spill
mov ASI_AIUS, %g3
etrap_user_spill:
wr %g3, 0x0, %asi
ldx [%g6 + TI_FLAGS], %g3
and %g3, _TIF_32BIT, %g3
brnz,pt %g3, etrap_user_spill_32bit
nop
ba,a,pt %xcc, etrap_user_spill_64bit
etrap_save: save %g2, -STACK_BIAS, %sp
mov %g6, %l6
bne,pn %xcc, 3f
mov PRIMARY_CONTEXT, %l4
661: rdpr %canrestore, %g3
.section .fast_win_ctrl_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
nop
.previous
rdpr %wstate, %g2
661: wrpr %g0, 0, %canrestore
.section .fast_win_ctrl_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
nop
.previous
sll %g2, 3, %g2
/* Set TI_SYS_FPDEPTH to 1 and clear TI_SYS_NOERROR. */
mov 1, %l5
sth %l5, [%l6 + TI_SYS_NOERROR]
661: wrpr %g3, 0, %otherwin
.section .fast_win_ctrl_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
.word 0x87880000 ! otherw
.previous
wrpr %g2, 0, %wstate
sethi %hi(sparc64_kern_pri_context), %g2
ldx [%g2 + %lo(sparc64_kern_pri_context)], %g3
661: stxa %g3, [%l4] ASI_DMMU
.section .sun4v_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
stxa %g3, [%l4] ASI_MMU
.previous
sethi %hi(KERNBASE), %l4
flush %l4
mov ASI_AIUS, %l7
2: mov %g4, %l4
mov %g5, %l5
add %g7, 4, %l2
/* Go to trap time globals so we can save them. */
661: wrpr %g0, ETRAP_PSTATE1, %pstate
.section .sun4v_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
SET_GL(0)
.previous
stx %g1, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G1]
stx %g2, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G2]
sllx %l7, 24, %l7
stx %g3, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G3]
rdpr %cwp, %l0
stx %g4, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G4]
stx %g5, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G5]
stx %g6, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G6]
stx %g7, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_G7]
or %l7, %l0, %l7
661: sethi %hi(TSTATE_TSO | TSTATE_PEF), %l0
/* If userspace is using ADI, it could potentially pass
* a pointer with version tag embedded in it. To maintain
* the ADI security, we must enable PSTATE.mcde. Userspace
* would have already set TTE.mcd in an earlier call to
* kernel and set the version tag for the address being
* dereferenced. Setting PSTATE.mcde would ensure any
* access to userspace data through a system call honors
* ADI and does not allow a rogue app to bypass ADI by
* using system calls. Setting PSTATE.mcde only affects
* accesses to virtual addresses that have TTE.mcd set.
* Set PMCDPER to ensure any exceptions caused by ADI
* version tag mismatch are exposed before system call
* returns to userspace. Setting PMCDPER affects only
* writes to virtual addresses that have TTE.mcd set and
* have a version tag set as well.
*/
.section .sun_m7_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
sethi %hi(TSTATE_TSO | TSTATE_PEF | TSTATE_MCDE), %l0
.previous
661: nop
.section .sun_m7_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
.word 0xaf902001 /* wrpr %g0, 1, %pmcdper */
.previous
or %l7, %l0, %l7
wrpr %l2, %tnpc
wrpr %l7, (TSTATE_PRIV | TSTATE_IE), %tstate
stx %i0, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I0]
stx %i1, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I1]
stx %i2, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I2]
stx %i3, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I3]
stx %i4, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I4]
stx %i5, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I5]
stx %i6, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I6]
mov %l6, %g6
stx %i7, [%sp + PTREGS_OFF + PT_V9_I7]
LOAD_PER_CPU_BASE(%g5, %g6, %g4, %g3, %l1)
ldx [%g6 + TI_TASK], %g4
done
3: mov ASI_P, %l7
ldub [%l6 + TI_FPDEPTH], %l5
add %l6, TI_FPSAVED + 1, %l4
srl %l5, 1, %l3
add %l5, 2, %l5
/* Set TI_SYS_FPDEPTH to %l5 and clear TI_SYS_NOERROR. */
sth %l5, [%l6 + TI_SYS_NOERROR]
ba,pt %xcc, 2b
stb %g0, [%l4 + %l3]
nop
etraptl1: /* Save tstate/tpc/tnpc of TL 1-->4 and the tl register itself.
* We place this right after pt_regs on the trap stack.
* The layout is:
* 0x00 TL1's TSTATE
* 0x08 TL1's TPC
* 0x10 TL1's TNPC
* 0x18 TL1's TT
* ...
* 0x58 TL4's TT
* 0x60 TL
*/
TRAP_LOAD_THREAD_REG(%g6, %g1)
sub %sp, ((4 * 8) * 4) + 8, %g2
rdpr %tl, %g1
wrpr %g0, 1, %tl
rdpr %tstate, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x00]
rdpr %tpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x08]
rdpr %tnpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x10]
rdpr %tt, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x18]
wrpr %g0, 2, %tl
rdpr %tstate, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x20]
rdpr %tpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x28]
rdpr %tnpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x30]
rdpr %tt, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x38]
sethi %hi(is_sun4v), %g3
lduw [%g3 + %lo(is_sun4v)], %g3
brnz,pn %g3, finish_tl1_capture
nop
wrpr %g0, 3, %tl
rdpr %tstate, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x40]
rdpr %tpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x48]
rdpr %tnpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x50]
rdpr %tt, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x58]
wrpr %g0, 4, %tl
rdpr %tstate, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x60]
rdpr %tpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x68]
rdpr %tnpc, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x70]
rdpr %tt, %g3
stx %g3, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x78]
stx %g1, [%g2 + STACK_BIAS + 0x80]
finish_tl1_capture:
wrpr %g0, 1, %tl
661: nop
.section .sun4v_1insn_patch, "ax"
.word 661b
SET_GL(1)
.previous
rdpr %tstate, %g1
sub %g2, STACKFRAME_SZ + TRACEREG_SZ - STACK_BIAS, %g2
ba,pt %xcc, 1b
andcc %g1, TSTATE_PRIV, %g0
#undef TASK_REGOFF
#undef ETRAP_PSTATE1