Currently, the sys_stat64, sys_fstat64 and sys_lstat64 prototpyes are
only declared if BITS_PER_LONG == 32. Following commit 0753f70f07
(fs: Build sys_stat64() and friends if __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_STAT64), the
implementation of these functions is allowed on 64-bit systems for
compat support. The patch changes the condition on the prototype
declaration from BITS_PER_LONG == 32 to defined(__ARCH_WANT_STAT64) ||
defined(__ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_STAT64).
In addition, it moves the sys_fstatat64 prototype under the same #if
block
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).
The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts). The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.
Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.
Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).
Related history:
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
- http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
"prevent other people from wasting their time".
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
been fixed.
This patch (of 4):
Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.
In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).
The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).
Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kernel-side struct msghdr is (currently) using the same layout as
userland one, but it's not a one-to-one copy - even without considering
32bit compat issues, we have msg_iov, msg_name and msg_control copied
to kernel[1]. It's fairly localized, so we get away with a few functions
where that knowledge is needed (and we could shrink that set even
more). Pretty much everything deals with the kernel-side variant and
the few places that want userland one just use a bunch of force-casts
to paper over the differences.
The thing is, kernel-side definition of struct msghdr is *not* exposed
in include/uapi - libc doesn't see it, etc. So we can add struct user_msghdr,
with proper annotations and let the few places that ever deal with those
beasts use it for userland pointers. Saner typechecking aside, that will
allow to change the layout of kernel-side msghdr - e.g. replace
msg_iov/msg_iovlen there with struct iov_iter, getting rid of the need
to modify the iovec as we copy data to/from it, etc.
We could introduce kernel_msghdr instead, but that would create much more
noise - the absolute majority of the instances would need to have the
type switched to kernel_msghdr and definition of struct msghdr in
include/linux/socket.h is not going to be seen by userland anyway.
This commit just introduces user_msghdr and switches the few places that
are dealing with userland-side msghdr to it.
[1] actually, it's even trickier than that - we copy msg_control for
sendmsg, but keep the userland address on recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
done as separate commit to ease conflict resolution
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is the new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration/interface. I have
reserved the syscall number only for x86_64 so far. Other architectures
(including i386) can reserve syscall number when they enable the support
for this new syscall.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap(). It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points. Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.
memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode. Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file. If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).
Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit. It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL. Also add the
ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from hardware rng
devices into /dev/random.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Cleanups and bug fixes to /dev/random, add a new getrandom(2) system
call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL.
Also add the ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from
hardware rng devices into /dev/random"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes
random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half
random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
hw_random: fix sparse warning (NULL vs 0 for pointer)
random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter
hwrng: add per-device entropy derating
hwrng: create filler thread
random: add_hwgenerator_randomness() for feeding entropy from devices
random: use an improved fast_mix() function
random: clean up interrupt entropy accounting for archs w/o cycle counters
random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
The nmask argument to set_mempolicy() is const according to the user-space
header numaif.h, and since the kernel does indeed not modify it, it might
as well be declared const in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The nmask argument to mbind() is const according to the userspace header
numaif.h, and since the kernel does indeed not modify it, it might as well
be declared const in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
design of tracepoints and how a user could register a tracepoint
and have that tracepoint not be activated but no error was shown.
The design was for an out of tree module but broke in tree users.
The clean up was to remove the saving of the hash table of tracepoint
names such that they can be enabled before they exist (enabling
a module tracepoint before that module is loaded). This added more
complexity than needed. The clean up was to remove that code and
just enable tracepoints that exist or fail if they do not.
This removed a lot of code as well as the complexity that it brought.
As a side effect, instead of registering a tracepoint by its name,
the tracepoint needs to be registered with the tracepoint descriptor.
This removes having to duplicate the tracepoint names that are
enabled.
The second patch was added that simplified the way modules were
searched for.
This cleanup required changes that were in the 3.15 queue as well as
some changes that were added late in the 3.14-rc cycle. This final
change waited till the two were merged in upstream and then the
change was added and full tests were run. Unfortunately, the
test found some errors, but after it was already submitted to the
for-next branch and not to be rebased. Sparse errors were detected
by Fengguang Wu's bot tests, and my internal tests discovered that
the anonymous union initialization triggered a bug in older gcc compilers.
Luckily, there was a bugzilla for the gcc bug which gave a work around
to the problem. The third and fourth patch handled the sparse error
and the gcc bug respectively.
A final patch was tagged along to fix a missing documentation for
the README file.
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Merge tag 'trace-3.15-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull more tracing updates from Steven Rostedt:
"This includes the final patch to clean up and fix the issue with the
design of tracepoints and how a user could register a tracepoint and
have that tracepoint not be activated but no error was shown.
The design was for an out of tree module but broke in tree users. The
clean up was to remove the saving of the hash table of tracepoint
names such that they can be enabled before they exist (enabling a
module tracepoint before that module is loaded). This added more
complexity than needed. The clean up was to remove that code and just
enable tracepoints that exist or fail if they do not.
This removed a lot of code as well as the complexity that it brought.
As a side effect, instead of registering a tracepoint by its name, the
tracepoint needs to be registered with the tracepoint descriptor.
This removes having to duplicate the tracepoint names that are
enabled.
The second patch was added that simplified the way modules were
searched for.
This cleanup required changes that were in the 3.15 queue as well as
some changes that were added late in the 3.14-rc cycle. This final
change waited till the two were merged in upstream and then the change
was added and full tests were run. Unfortunately, the test found some
errors, but after it was already submitted to the for-next branch and
not to be rebased. Sparse errors were detected by Fengguang Wu's bot
tests, and my internal tests discovered that the anonymous union
initialization triggered a bug in older gcc compilers. Luckily, there
was a bugzilla for the gcc bug which gave a work around to the
problem. The third and fourth patch handled the sparse error and the
gcc bug respectively.
A final patch was tagged along to fix a missing documentation for the
README file"
* tag 'trace-3.15-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Add missing function triggers dump and cpudump to README
tracing: Fix anonymous unions in struct ftrace_event_call
tracepoint: Fix sparse warnings in tracepoint.c
tracepoint: Simplify tracepoint module search
tracepoint: Use struct pointer instead of name hash for reg/unreg tracepoints
This eliminates the following warning in quota/compat.c:
fs/quota/compat.c:43:17: warning: no previous prototype for `sys32_quotactl' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of explicitly changing compat system call parameters from e.g.
unsigned long to compat_ulong_t let the COMPAT_SYSCALL_WRAP macros
automatically detect (unsigned) long parameters and zero and sign
extend them automatically.
The resulting binary is completely identical.
In addition add a sys_[system call name] prototype for each system call
wrapper. This will cause compile errors if the prototype does not match
the prototype in include/linux/syscall.h.
Therefore we should now always get the correct zero and sign extension
of system call parameters. Pointers are handled like before.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Because of a recent syscall design debate; its deemed appropriate for
each syscall to have a flags argument for future extension; without
immediately requiring new syscalls.
Cc: juri.lelli@gmail.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140214161929.GL27965@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add the syscalls needed for supporting scheduling algorithms
with extended scheduling parameters (e.g., SCHED_DEADLINE).
In general, it makes possible to specify a periodic/sporadic task,
that executes for a given amount of runtime at each instance, and is
scheduled according to the urgency of their own timing constraints,
i.e.:
- a (maximum/typical) instance execution time,
- a minimum interval between consecutive instances,
- a time constraint by which each instance must be completed.
Thus, both the data structure that holds the scheduling parameters of
the tasks and the system calls dealing with it must be extended.
Unfortunately, modifying the existing struct sched_param would break
the ABI and result in potentially serious compatibility issues with
legacy binaries.
For these reasons, this patch:
- defines the new struct sched_attr, containing all the fields
that are necessary for specifying a task in the computational
model described above;
- defines and implements the new scheduling related syscalls that
manipulate it, i.e., sched_setattr() and sched_getattr().
Syscalls are introduced for x86 (32 and 64 bits) and ARM only, as a
proof of concept and for developing and testing purposes. Making them
available on other architectures is straightforward.
Since no "user" for these new parameters is introduced in this patch,
the implementation of the new system calls is just identical to their
already existing counterpart. Future patches that implement scheduling
policies able to exploit the new data structure must also take care of
modifying the sched_*attr() calls accordingly with their own purposes.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
[ Rewrote to use sched_attr. ]
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
[ Removed sched_setscheduler2() for now. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1383831828-15501-3-git-send-email-juri.lelli@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The only real feature that was added this release is from Namhyung Kim,
who introduced "set_graph_notrace" filter that lets you run the function
graph tracer and not trace particular functions and their call chain.
Tom Zanussi added some updates to the ftrace multibuffer tracing that
made it more consistent with the top level tracing.
One of the fixes for perf function tracing required an API change in
RCU; the addition of "rcu_is_watching()". As Paul McKenney is pushing
that change in this release too, he gave me a branch that included
all the changes to get that working, and I pulled that into my tree
in order to complete the perf function tracing fix.
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Merge tag 'trace-3.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing update from Steven Rostedt:
"This batch of changes is mostly clean ups and small bug fixes. The
only real feature that was added this release is from Namhyung Kim,
who introduced "set_graph_notrace" filter that lets you run the
function graph tracer and not trace particular functions and their
call chain.
Tom Zanussi added some updates to the ftrace multibuffer tracing that
made it more consistent with the top level tracing.
One of the fixes for perf function tracing required an API change in
RCU; the addition of "rcu_is_watching()". As Paul McKenney is pushing
that change in this release too, he gave me a branch that included all
the changes to get that working, and I pulled that into my tree in
order to complete the perf function tracing fix"
* tag 'trace-3.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Add rcu annotation for syscall trace descriptors
tracing: Do not use signed enums with unsigned long long in fgragh output
tracing: Remove unused function ftrace_off_permanent()
tracing: Do not assign filp->private_data to freed memory
tracing: Add helper function tracing_is_disabled()
tracing: Open tracer when ftrace_dump_on_oops is used
tracing: Add support for SOFT_DISABLE to syscall events
tracing: Make register/unregister_ftrace_command __init
tracing: Update event filters for multibuffer
recordmcount.pl: Add support for __fentry__
ftrace: Have control op function callback only trace when RCU is watching
rcu: Do not trace rcu_is_watching() functions
ftrace/x86: skip over the breakpoint for ftrace caller
trace/trace_stat: use rbtree postorder iteration helper instead of opencoding
ftrace: Add set_graph_notrace filter
ftrace: Narrow down the protected area of graph_lock
ftrace: Introduce struct ftrace_graph_data
ftrace: Get rid of ftrace_graph_filter_enabled
tracing: Fix potential out-of-bounds in trace_get_user()
tracing: Show more exact help information about snapshot
Use standard gcc __attribute__((alias(foo))) to define the syscall aliases
instead of custom assembler macros.
This is far cleaner, and also fixes my LTO kernel build.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The original SOFT_DISABLE patches didn't add support for soft disable
of syscall events; this adds it.
Add an array of ftrace_event_file pointers indexed by syscall number
to the trace array and remove the existing enabled bitmaps, which as a
result are now redundant. The ftrace_event_file structs in turn
contain the soft disable flags we need for per-syscall soft disable
accounting.
Adding ftrace_event_files also means we can remove the USE_CALL_FILTER
bit, thus enabling multibuffer filter support for syscall events.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6e72b566e85d8df8042f133efbc6c30e21fb017e.1382620672.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
The trace event filters are still tied to event calls rather than
event files, which means you don't get what you'd expect when using
filters in the multibuffer case:
Before:
# echo 'bytes_alloc > 8192' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
bytes_alloc > 8192
# mkdir /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test1
# echo 'bytes_alloc > 2048' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test1/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
bytes_alloc > 2048
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test1/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
bytes_alloc > 2048
Setting the filter in tracing/instances/test1/events shouldn't affect
the same event in tracing/events as it does above.
After:
# echo 'bytes_alloc > 8192' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
bytes_alloc > 8192
# mkdir /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test1
# echo 'bytes_alloc > 2048' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test1/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
bytes_alloc > 8192
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test1/events/kmem/kmalloc/filter
bytes_alloc > 2048
We'd like to just move the filter directly from ftrace_event_call to
ftrace_event_file, but there are a couple cases that don't yet have
multibuffer support and therefore have to continue using the current
event_call-based filters. For those cases, a new USE_CALL_FILTER bit
is added to the event_call flags, whose main purpose is to keep the
old behavior for those cases until they can be updated with
multibuffer support; at that point, the USE_CALL_FILTER flag (and the
new associated call_filter_check_discard() function) can go away.
The multibuffer support also made filter_current_check_discard()
redundant, so this change removes that function as well and replaces
it with filter_check_discard() (or call_filter_check_discard() as
appropriate).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f16e9ce4270c62f46b2e966119225e1c3cca7e60.1382620672.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Unclutter -Wmissing-prototypes warning types (enabled at make W=1)
linux/include/linux/syscalls.h:190:18: warning: no previous prototype for 'SyS_semctl' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \
^
linux/include/linux/syscalls.h:183:2: note: in expansion of macro '__SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
^
by adding forward declarations right before definitions.
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix inadvertent breakage in the clone syscall ABI for Microblaze that
was introduced in commit f3268edbe6 ("microblaze: switch to generic
fork/vfork/clone").
The Microblaze syscall ABI for clone takes the parent tid address in the
4th argument; the third argument slot is used for the stack size. The
incorrectly-used CLONE_BACKWARDS type assigned parent tid to the 3rd
slot.
This commit restores the original ABI so that existing userspace libc
code will work correctly.
All kernel versions from v3.8-rc1 were affected.
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
a) teach __MAP(num, m, <list of type/name pairs>) to take empty
list (with num being 0, of course)
b) fold types__... and args__... declaration and initialization into
SYSCALL_METADATA(num, ...), making their use conditional on num != 0.
That allows to use the SYSCALL_METADATA instead of its near-duplicate
in SYSCALL_DEFINE0.
c) make SYSCALL_METADATA expand to nothing in case if CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS
is not defined; that allows to make SYSCALL_DEFINE0 and SYSCALL_DEFINEx
definitions independent from CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS.
d) kill SYSCALL_DEFINE - no users left (SYSCALL_DEFINE[0-6] is, of course,
still alive and well).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
just have the bugger take unsigned long and deal with SETVAL
case (when we use an int member in the union) explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and switch i386 to HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS, killing open-coded
uses of asmlinkage_protect() in a bunch of syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and convert a bunch of SYSCALL_DEFINE ones to SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>,
killing the boilerplate crap around them.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
All those guys have the same form - "take a list of type/name pairs,
apply some macro to each of them". Abstract that part away, convert
all __SC_FOO##x(__VA_ARGS__) to __MAP(x,__SC_FOO,__VA_ARGS__).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_RT_SIGACTION,
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_RT_SIGSUSPEND,
__ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_RT_SIGSUSPEND,
__ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_SCHED_RR_GET_INTERVAL - not used anymore
CONFIG_GENERIC_{SIGALTSTACK,COMPAT_RT_SIG{ACTION,QUEUEINFO,PENDING,PROCMASK}} -
can be assumed always set.
Switch from __ARCH_WANT_SYS_RT_SIGACTION to opposite
(!CONFIG_ODD_RT_SIGACTION); the only two architectures that
need it are alpha and sparc. The reason for use of CONFIG_...
instead of __ARCH_... is that it's needed only kernel-side
and doing it that way avoids a mess with include order on many
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull signal handling cleanups from Al Viro:
"sigaltstack infrastructure + conversion for x86, alpha and um,
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE infrastructure.
Note that there are several conflicts between "unify
SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions" and UAPI patches in mainline;
resolution is trivial - just remove definitions of SS_ONSTACK and
SS_DISABLED from arch/*/uapi/asm/signal.h; they are all identical and
include/uapi/linux/signal.h contains the unified variant."
Fixed up conflicts as per Al.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal:
alpha: switch to generic sigaltstack
new helpers: __save_altstack/__compat_save_altstack, switch x86 and um to those
generic compat_sys_sigaltstack()
introduce generic sys_sigaltstack(), switch x86 and um to it
new helper: compat_user_stack_pointer()
new helper: restore_altstack()
unify SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions
new helper: current_user_stack_pointer()
missing user_stack_pointer() instances
Bury the conditionals from kernel_thread/kernel_execve series
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE: infrastructure
Conditional on CONFIG_GENERIC_SIGALTSTACK; architectures that do not
select it are completely unaffected
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
All architectures have
CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_THREAD
CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_EXECVE
None of them have __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE and there are only two callers
of kernel_execve() (which is a trivial wrapper for do_execve() now) left.
Kill the conditionals and make both callers use do_execve().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
to verify the source of the module (ChromeOS) and/or use standard IMA on it
or other security hooks.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
"Nothing all that exciting; a new module-from-fd syscall for those who
want to verify the source of the module (ChromeOS) and/or use standard
IMA on it or other security hooks."
* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
MODSIGN: Fix kbuild output when using default extra_certificates
MODSIGN: Avoid using .incbin in C source
modules: don't hand 0 to vmalloc.
module: Remove a extra null character at the top of module->strtab.
ASN.1: Use the ASN1_LONG_TAG and ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH constants
ASN.1: Define indefinite length marker constant
moduleparam: use __UNIQUE_ID()
__UNIQUE_ID()
MODSIGN: Add modules_sign make target
powerpc: add finit_module syscall.
ima: support new kernel module syscall
add finit_module syscall to asm-generic
ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM
security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
module: add flags arg to sys_finit_module()
module: add syscall to load module from fd
But the kernel decided to call it "origin" instead. Fix most of the
sites.
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Thanks to Michael Kerrisk for keeping us honest. These flags are actually
useful for eliminating the only case where kmod has to mangle a module's
internals: for overriding module versioning.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
As part of the effort to create a stronger boundary between root and
kernel, Chrome OS wants to be able to enforce that kernel modules are
being loaded only from our read-only crypto-hash verified (dm_verity)
root filesystem. Since the init_module syscall hands the kernel a module
as a memory blob, no reasoning about the origin of the blob can be made.
Earlier proposals for appending signatures to kernel modules would not be
useful in Chrome OS, since it would involve adding an additional set of
keys to our kernel and builds for no good reason: we already trust the
contents of our root filesystem. We don't need to verify those kernel
modules a second time. Having to do signature checking on module loading
would slow us down and be redundant. All we need to know is where a
module is coming from so we can say yes/no to loading it.
If a file descriptor is used as the source of a kernel module, many more
things can be reasoned about. In Chrome OS's case, we could enforce that
the module lives on the filesystem we expect it to live on. In the case
of IMA (or other LSMs), it would be possible, for example, to examine
extended attributes that may contain signatures over the contents of
the module.
This introduces a new syscall (on x86), similar to init_module, that has
only two arguments. The first argument is used as a file descriptor to
the module and the second argument is a pointer to the NULL terminated
string of module arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (merge fixes)
* allow kernel_execve() leave the actual return to userland to
caller (selected by CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE). Callers
updated accordingly.
* architecture that does select GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE in its
Kconfig should have its ret_from_kernel_thread() do this:
call schedule_tail
call the callback left for it by copy_thread(); if it ever
returns, that's because it has just done successful kernel_execve()
jump to return from syscall
IOW, its only difference from ret_from_fork() is that it does call the
callback.
* such an architecture should also get rid of ret_from_kernel_execve()
and __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE
This is the last part of infrastructure patches in that area - from
that point on work on different architectures can live independently.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
While doing the checkpoint-restore in the user space one need to determine
whether various kernel objects (like mm_struct-s of file_struct-s) are
shared between tasks and restore this state.
The 2nd step can be solved by using appropriate CLONE_ flags and the
unshare syscall, while there's currently no ways for solving the 1st one.
One of the ways for checking whether two tasks share e.g. mm_struct is to
provide some mm_struct ID of a task to its proc file, but showing such
info considered to be not that good for security reasons.
Thus after some debates we end up in conclusion that using that named
'comparison' syscall might be the best candidate. So here is it --
__NR_kcmp.
It takes up to 5 arguments - the pids of the two tasks (which
characteristics should be compared), the comparison type and (in case of
comparison of files) two file descriptors.
Lookups for pids are done in the caller's PID namespace only.
At moment only x86 is supported and tested.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up selftests, warnings]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: include errno.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If a header file is making use of BUG, BUG_ON, BUILD_BUG_ON, or any
other BUG variant in a static inline (i.e. not in a #define) then
that header really should be including <linux/bug.h> and not just
expecting it to be implicitly present.
We can make this change risk-free, since if the files using these
headers didn't have exposure to linux/bug.h already, they would have
been causing compile failures/warnings.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
