And move it to struct inet_connection_sock. DCCP will use it in the
upcoming changesets.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
And inet6_rsk_offset in inet_request_sock, for the same reasons as
inet_sock's pinfo6 member.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
More work is needed tho to introduce inet6_request_sock from
tcp6_request_sock, in the same layout considerations as ipv6_pinfo in
inet_sock, next changeset will do that.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Another spin of Herbert Xu's "safer ip reassembly" patch
for 2.6.16.
(The original patch is here:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=112281936522415&w=2
and my only contribution is to have tested it.)
This patch (optionally) does additional checks before accepting IP
fragments, which can greatly reduce the possibility of reassembling
fragments which originated from different IP datagrams.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Arthur Kepner <akepner@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This makes ebt_log and ebt_ulog use the new nf_log api. This enables
the bridging packet filter to log packets e.g. via nfnetlink_log.
Signed-off-by: Bart De Schuymer <bdschuym@pandora.be>
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Part of a performance problem with ip_tables is that memory allocation
is not NUMA aware, but 'only' SMP aware (ie each CPU normally touch
separate cache lines)
Even with small iptables rules, the cost of this misplacement can be
high on common workloads. Instead of using one vmalloc() area
(located in the node of the iptables process), we now allocate an area
for each possible CPU, using vmalloc_node() so that memory should be
allocated in the CPU's node if possible.
Port to arp_tables and ip6_tables by Harald Welte.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replace existing BIC version 1.1 with new version 2.0.
The main change is to replace the window growth function
with a cubic function as described in:
http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/rhee/export/bitcp/cubic-paper.pdf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The latest BICTCP patch at:
http://www.csc.ncsu.edu:8080/faculty/rhee/export/bitcp/index_files/Page546.htm
disables the low_utilization feature of BICTCP because it doesn't work
in some cases. This patch removes it.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations. It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.
The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.
When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.
When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.
Testing:
The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.
The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.
Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.
Testing:
The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.
The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- cluster/sys.c: make needlessly global code static
- dlm/: "extern" declarations for variables belong into header files
(and in this case, they are already in dlmdomain.h)
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Link the code into the kernel build system. OCFS2 is marked as
experimental.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
dlmfs: A minimal dlm userspace interface implemented via a virtual
file system.
Most of the OCFS2 tools make use of this to take cluster locks when
doing operations on the file system.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
A distributed lock manager built with the cluster file system use case
in mind. The OCFS2 dlm exposes a VMS style API, though things have
been simplified internally. The only lock levels implemented currently
are NLMODE, PRMODE and EXMODE.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
Node messaging via tcp. Used by the dlm and the file system for point
to point communication between nodes.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
Disk based heartbeat. Configured and started from userspace, the
kernel component handles I/O submission and event generation via
callback mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
A simple node information service, filled and updated from
userspace. The rest of the stack queries this service for simple node
information.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
Very simple printk wrapper which adds the ability to enable various
sets of debug messages at run-time.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Hackel <kurt.hackel@oracle.com>
readpage(), prepare_write(), and commit_write() callers are updated to
understand the special return code AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE in the style of
writepage() and WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE. AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE tells the caller that
the callee has unlocked the page and that the operation should be tried again
with a new page. OCFS2 uses this to detect and work around a lock inversion in
its aop methods. There should be no change in behaviour for methods that don't
return AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE.
WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE is also prepended with AOP_ for consistency and they are
made enums so that kerneldoc can be used to document their semantics.
Signed-off-by: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Configfs, a file system for userspace-driven kernel object configuration.
The OCFS2 stack makes extensive use of this for propagation of cluster
configuration information into kernel.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
The function ia64_pci_legacy_write() returns 0 for everything
except errors. This return value gets sent back to the user from
pci_write_legacy_io(), making it look like every write fails. The trivial
patch below copies the behavior of the SGI sn machvec and does what
would be expected from something implementing a write() function.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Remove non-existing entry for fat_cvf.txt (was it ever supported?).
Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
This patch removes all references to the bouncing address
rddunlap@osdl.org and one dead web page from the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
While looking for where to send trivial patches, I found old contact
information in Documentation/SubmittingPatches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
This patch for 2.4.x updates the dead email address for 'Mydraal'
and since he no longer wishes to field questions concerning
SysRq or this document removes the statement stating otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Also use the PnP functions to start/stop the devices during the suspend so
that drivers will not have to duplicate this code.
Cc: Adam Belay <ambx1@neo.rr.com>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@suse.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@drzeus.cx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
