The cc-cross-prefix is new and developed on request from Geert Uytterhoeven.
With cc-cross-prefix it is now much easier to have a few default cross compile
prefixes and defaulting to none - if none of them were present. ARCH
maintainers are expected to pick up this feature soon.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Modify the b43 driver to avoid deadlocking suspend and resume, which happens
as a result of attempting to unregister device objects locked by the PM core
during suspend/resume cycles. Also, make it use a suspend-safe method of
unregistering device object in the resume error path.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make it possible to unregister a led classdev object in a safe way during a
suspend/resume cycle.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make it possible to unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator
device object in a safe way during a suspend/resume cycle.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make it possible to unregister a misc device object in a safe way during a
suspend/resume cycle.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace latency.c use with pm_qos_params use.
Signed-off-by: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@suse.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The following patch is a generalization of the latency.c implementation done
by Arjan last year. It provides infrastructure for more than one parameter,
and exposes a user mode interface for processes to register pm_qos
expectations of processes.
This interface provides a kernel and user mode interface for registering
performance expectations by drivers, subsystems and user space applications on
one of the parameters.
Currently we have {cpu_dma_latency, network_latency, network_throughput} as
the initial set of pm_qos parameters.
The infrastructure exposes multiple misc device nodes one per implemented
parameter. The set of parameters implement is defined by pm_qos_power_init()
and pm_qos_params.h. This is done because having the available parameters
being runtime configurable or changeable from a driver was seen as too easy to
abuse.
For each parameter a list of performance requirements is maintained along with
an aggregated target value. The aggregated target value is updated with
changes to the requirement list or elements of the list. Typically the
aggregated target value is simply the max or min of the requirement values
held in the parameter list elements.
>From kernel mode the use of this interface is simple:
pm_qos_add_requirement(param_id, name, target_value):
Will insert a named element in the list for that identified PM_QOS
parameter with the target value. Upon change to this list the new target is
recomputed and any registered notifiers are called only if the target value
is now different.
pm_qos_update_requirement(param_id, name, new_target_value):
Will search the list identified by the param_id for the named list element
and then update its target value, calling the notification tree if the
aggregated target is changed. with that name is already registered.
pm_qos_remove_requirement(param_id, name):
Will search the identified list for the named element and remove it, after
removal it will update the aggregate target and call the notification tree
if the target was changed as a result of removing the named requirement.
>From user mode:
Only processes can register a pm_qos requirement. To provide for
automatic cleanup for process the interface requires the process to register
its parameter requirements in the following way:
To register the default pm_qos target for the specific parameter, the
process must open one of /dev/[cpu_dma_latency, network_latency,
network_throughput]
As long as the device node is held open that process has a registered
requirement on the parameter. The name of the requirement is
"process_<PID>" derived from the current->pid from within the open system
call.
To change the requested target value the process needs to write a s32
value to the open device node. This translates to a
pm_qos_update_requirement call.
To remove the user mode request for a target value simply close the device
node.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build again]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@suse.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Venki Pallipadi <venkatesh.pallipadi@intel.com>
Cc: Adam Belay <abelay@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel_shutdown_prepare() can now become static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
resume_file[] and create_image() can become static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mm/vmalloc.c: In function 'unmap_kernel_range':
mm/vmalloc.c:75: warning: unused variable 'start'
Macros are so horrid.
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert AGP alpha driver from nopage to fault.
NULL is NOPAGE_SIGBUS, so we aren't changing behaviour there.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Alpha doesn't use socketcall and doesn't provide __NR_socketcall.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@citrix.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Prevents stuff like
drivers/crypto/hifn_795x.c:2443: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 4 has type 'long int'
drivers/crypto/hifn_795x.c:2443: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 4 has type 'long int'
(at least).
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas Woods <woodzy@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One EXPORT_SYMBOL should be enough for everyone.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This builds on top of the earlier vmalloc_32_user() work introduced by
b50731732f, as we now have places in the nommu
allmodconfig that hit up against these missing APIs.
As vmalloc_32_user() is already implemented, this is moved over to
vmalloc_user() and simply made a wrapper. As all current nommu platforms are
32-bit addressable, there's no special casing we have to do for ZONE_DMA and
things of that nature as per GFP_VMALLOC32.
remap_vmalloc_range() needs to check VM_USERMAP in order to figure out whether
we permit the remap or not, which means that we also have to rework the
vmalloc_user() code to grovel for the VMA and set the flag.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Acked-by: David McCullough <david_mccullough@securecomputing.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Removing config variable DUMPTOFLASH, since it is not used
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use ARRAY_SIZE macroto get maximum ports in ColdFire serial driver.
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The function is question gets the pid from sysctl table, so this one is a
virtual pid, i.e. the pid of a task as it is seen from inside a namespace.
So the find_task_by_vpid() must be used here.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove dead config symbol from FRV code.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To be consistent with other architectures, these two DMA macros should
be defined in scatterlist.h as opposed to dma-mapping.h
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Permit the memory to be located somewhere other than address 0xC0000000 in
NOMMU mode. The configuration options are already present, it just
requires wiring up in the linker script.
Note that only a limited set of locations of runtime addresses are available
because of the way the CPU protection registers work.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.
Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.
The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on
http://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.
Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".
A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"
The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.
Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.
Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.
Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:
C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rx
A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.
Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.
A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:
A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN r
On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.
Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish w
A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.
The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a new set of configuration functions to the NetLabel/LSM API so that
LSMs can perform their own configuration of the NetLabel subsystem without
relying on assistance from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Root processes are considered more important when out of memory and killing
proceses. The check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN was augmented with a check for
uid==0 or euid==0.
There are several possible ways to look at this:
1. uid comparisons are unnecessary, trust CAP_SYS_ADMIN
alone. However CAP_SYS_RESOURCE is the one that really
means "give me extra resources" so allow for that as
well.
2. Any privileged code should be protected, but uid is not
an indication of privilege. So we should check whether
any capabilities are raised.
3. uid==0 makes processes on the host as well as in containers
more important, so we should keep the existing checks.
4. uid==0 makes processes only on the host more important,
even without any capabilities. So we should be keeping
the (uid==0||euid==0) check but only when
userns==&init_user_ns.
I'm following number 1 here.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow.
Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl,
but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By
default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.
This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are
enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements,
CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.
One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until
device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is
best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.
The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only
affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s. It also does not affect pI,
and exec() does not constrain pI'. So to really start a shell with no way
of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do
prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);
cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
cap_value_t caparray[1];
caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD;
cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);
cap_set_proc(cap);
cap_free(cap);
The following test program will get and set the bounding
set (but not pI). For instance
./bset get
(lists capabilities in bset)
./bset drop cap_net_raw
(starts shell with new bset)
(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
file capabilities to try to increase caps)
************************************************************
cap_bound.c
************************************************************
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#endif
#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
#endif
int usage(char *me)
{
printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
printf(" %s drop <capability>\n", me);
return 1;
}
#define numcaps 32
char *captable[numcaps] = {
"cap_chown",
"cap_dac_override",
"cap_dac_read_search",
"cap_fowner",
"cap_fsetid",
"cap_kill",
"cap_setgid",
"cap_setuid",
"cap_setpcap",
"cap_linux_immutable",
"cap_net_bind_service",
"cap_net_broadcast",
"cap_net_admin",
"cap_net_raw",
"cap_ipc_lock",
"cap_ipc_owner",
"cap_sys_module",
"cap_sys_rawio",
"cap_sys_chroot",
"cap_sys_ptrace",
"cap_sys_pacct",
"cap_sys_admin",
"cap_sys_boot",
"cap_sys_nice",
"cap_sys_resource",
"cap_sys_time",
"cap_sys_tty_config",
"cap_mknod",
"cap_lease",
"cap_audit_write",
"cap_audit_control",
"cap_setfcap"
};
int getbcap(void)
{
int comma=0;
unsigned long i;
int ret;
printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
printf("capability bounding set:");
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
if (ret < 0)
perror("prctl");
else if (ret==1)
printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
}
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
int capdrop(char *str)
{
unsigned long i;
int found=0;
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
found=1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return 1;
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
perror("prctl");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc<2)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0)
return getbcap();
if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
printf("unknown capability\n");
return 1;
}
return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
************************************************************
[serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a
Signed-off-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KaiGai Kohei observed that this line in the linux header is not needed.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities. If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.
FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Revert b68680e473 to make way for the next
patch: "Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel".
We want to keep the vfs_cap_data.data[] structure, using two 'data's for
64-bit caps (and later three for 96-bit caps), whereas
b68680e473 had gotten rid of the 'data' struct
made its members inline.
The 64-bit caps patch keeps the stack abuse fix at get_file_caps(), which was
the more important part of that patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Originally vfs_getxattr would pull the security xattr variable using
the inode getxattr handle and then proceed to clobber it with a subsequent call
to the LSM.
This patch reorders the two operations such that when the xattr requested is
in the security namespace it first attempts to grab the value from the LSM
directly.
If it fails to obtain the value because there is no module present or the
module does not support the operation it will fall back to using the inode
getxattr operation.
In the event that both are inaccessible it returns EOPNOTSUPP.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.
Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.
The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
By putting smaller objects on their own list, we greatly reduce overall
external fragmentation and increase repeatability. This reduces total SLOB
overhead from > 50% to ~6% on a simple boot test.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We weren't merging freed blocks at the beginning of the free list. Fixing
this showed a 2.5% efficiency improvement in a userspace test harness.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After making dirty a 100M file, the normal behavior is to start the
writeback for all data after 30s delays. But sometimes the following
happens instead:
- after 30s: ~4M
- after 5s: ~4M
- after 5s: all remaining 92M
Some analyze shows that the internal io dispatch queues goes like this:
s_io s_more_io
-------------------------
1) 100M,1K 0
2) 1K 96M
3) 0 96M
1) initial state with a 100M file and a 1K file
2) 4M written, nr_to_write <= 0, so write more
3) 1K written, nr_to_write > 0, no more writes(BUG)
nr_to_write > 0 in (3) fools the upper layer to think that data have all
been written out. The big dirty file is actually still sitting in
s_more_io. We cannot simply splice s_more_io back to s_io as soon as s_io
becomes empty, and let the loop in generic_sync_sb_inodes() continue: this
may starve newly expired inodes in s_dirty. It is also not an option to
draw inodes from both s_more_io and s_dirty, an let the loop go on: this
might lead to live locks, and might also starve other superblocks in sync
time(well kupdate may still starve some superblocks, that's another bug).
We have to return when a full scan of s_io completes. So nr_to_write > 0
does not necessarily mean that "all data are written". This patch
introduces a flag writeback_control.more_io to indicate that more io should
be done. With it the big dirty file no longer has to wait for the next
kupdate invokation 5s later.
In sync_sb_inodes() we only set more_io on super_blocks we actually
visited. This avoids the interaction between two pdflush deamons.
Also in __sync_single_inode() we don't blindly keep requeuing the io if the
filesystem cannot progress. Failing to do so may lead to 100% iowait.
Tested-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: Michael Rubin <mrubin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix following warning:
WARNING: mm/built-in.o(.text+0x22069): Section mismatch in reference from the function sparse_early_usemap_alloc() to the function .init.text:__alloc_bootmem_node()
static sparse_early_usemap_alloc() were used only by sparse_init()
and with sparse_init() annotated _init it is safe to
annotate sparse_early_usemap_alloc with __init too.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After running SetPageUptodate, preceeding stores to the page contents to
actually bring it uptodate may not be ordered with the store to set the
page uptodate.
Therefore, another CPU which checks PageUptodate is true, then reads the
page contents can get stale data.
Fix this by having an smp_wmb before SetPageUptodate, and smp_rmb after
PageUptodate.
Many places that test PageUptodate, do so with the page locked, and this
would be enough to ensure memory ordering in those places if
SetPageUptodate were only called while the page is locked. Unfortunately
that is not always the case for some filesystems, but it could be an idea
for the future.
Also bring the handling of anonymous page uptodateness in line with that of
file backed page management, by marking anon pages as uptodate when they
_are_ uptodate, rather than when our implementation requires that they be
marked as such. Doing allows us to get rid of the smp_wmb's in the page
copying functions, which were especially added for anonymous pages for an
analogous memory ordering problem. Both file and anonymous pages are
handled with the same barriers.
FAQ:
Q. Why not do this in flush_dcache_page?
A. Firstly, flush_dcache_page handles only one side (the smb side) of the
ordering protocol; we'd still need smp_rmb somewhere. Secondly, hiding away
memory barriers in a completely unrelated function is nasty; at least in the
PageUptodate macros, they are located together with (half) the operations
involved in the ordering. Thirdly, the smp_wmb is only required when first
bringing the page uptodate, wheras flush_dcache_page should be called each time
it is written to through the kernel mapping. It is logically the wrong place to
put it.
Q. Why does this increase my text size / reduce my performance / etc.
A. Because it is adding the necessary instructions to eliminate the data-race.
Q. Can it be improved?
A. Yes, eg. if you were to create a rule that all SetPageUptodate operations
run under the page lock, we could avoid the smp_rmb places where PageUptodate
is queried under the page lock. Requires audit of all filesystems and at least
some would need reworking. That's great you're interested, I'm eagerly awaiting
your patches.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Orphaned page might have fs-private metadata, the page is truncated. As
the page hasn't mapping, page migration refuse to migrate the page. It
appears the page is only freed in page reclaim and if zone watermark is
low, the page is never freed, as a result migration always fail. I thought
we could free the metadata so such page can be freed in migration and make
migration more reliable.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: go direct to try_to_free_buffers()]
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Though the lower_zone_protection was changed to lowmem_reserve_ratio, the
document has been not changed. The lowmem_reserve_ratio seems quite hard
to estimate, but there is no guidance. This patch is to change document
for it.
Signed-off-by: Yasunori Goto <y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I've written some test programs in ltp project. During writing I met an
problem which I cannot solve in user land. So I wrote a patch for linux
kernel. Please, include this patch if acceptable.
The test program tests the 4th parameter of fadvise64_64:
long sys_fadvise64_64(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice);
My test case calls fadvise64_64 with invalid advice value and checks errno is
set to EINVAL. About the advice parameter man page says:
...
Permissible values for advice include:
POSIX_FADV_NORMAL
...
POSIX_FADV_SEQUENTIAL
...
POSIX_FADV_RANDOM
...
POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE
...
POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED
...
POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED
...
ERRORS
...
EINVAL An invalid value was specified for advice.
However, I got a bug report that the system call invocations
in my test case returned 0 unexpectedly.
I've inspected the kernel code:
asmlinkage long sys_fadvise64_64(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice)
{
struct file *file = fget(fd);
struct address_space *mapping;
struct backing_dev_info *bdi;
loff_t endbyte; /* inclusive */
pgoff_t start_index;
pgoff_t end_index;
unsigned long nrpages;
int ret = 0;
if (!file)
return -EBADF;
if (S_ISFIFO(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
ret = -ESPIPE;
goto out;
}
mapping = file->f_mapping;
if (!mapping || len < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (mapping->a_ops->get_xip_page)
/* no bad return value, but ignore advice */
goto out;
...
out:
fput(file);
return ret;
}
I found the advice parameter is just ignored in the case
mapping->a_ops->get_xip_page is given. This behavior is different from
what is written on the man page. Is this o.k.?
get_xip_page is given if CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XIP is true.
Anyway I cannot find the easy way to detect get_xip_page
field is given or CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XIP is true from the
user space.
I propose the following patch which checks the advice parameter
even if get_xip_page is given.
Signed-off-by: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The show_mem() output does not include the total number of pagecache
pages. This would be helpful when analyzing the debug information in
the /var/log/messages file after OOM kills occur.
This patch includes the total pagecache pages in that output.
Signed-off-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In 46d2277c79 ("Clean up and make
try_to_free_buffers() not race with dirty pages"), try_to_free_buffers
was changed to bail out if the page was dirty.
That in turn caused truncate_complete_page to leak massive amounts of
memory, because the dirty bit was only cleared after the call to
try_to_free_buffers.
So the call to cancel_dirty_page was moved up to have the dirty bit
cleared early in 3e67c0987d ("truncate:
clear page dirtiness before running try_to_free_buffers()").
The problem with that fix is, that the page can be redirtied after
cancel_dirty_page was called, eg. like this:
truncate_complete_page()
cancel_dirty_page() // PG_dirty cleared, decr. dirty pages
do_invalidatepage()
ext3_invalidatepage()
journal_invalidatepage()
journal_unmap_buffer()
__dispose_buffer()
__journal_unfile_buffer()
__journal_temp_unlink_buffer()
mark_buffer_dirty(); // PG_dirty set, incr. dirty pages
And then we end up with dirty pages being wrongly accounted.
As a result, in ecdfc9787f ("Resurrect
'try_to_free_buffers()' VM hackery") the changes to try_to_free_buffers
were reverted, so the original reason for the massive memory leak is
gone, and we can also revert the move of the call to cancel_dirty_page
from truncate_complete_page and get the accounting right again.
I'm not sure if it matters, but opposed to the final check in
__remove_from_page_cache, this one also cares about the task io
accounting, so maybe we want to use this instead, although it's not
quite the clean fix either.
Signed-off-by: Björn Steinbrink <B.Steinbrink@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Krzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Osterried <osterried@jesse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current PageTail semantic is that a PageTail page is first a
PageCompound page. So remove the redundant PageCompound test in
set_page_refcounted().
Signed-off-by: Qi Yong <qiyong@fc-cn.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fastcall is always defined to be empty, remove it
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since I_SYNC was split out from I_LOCK, the concern in commit
4b89eed93e ("Write back inode data pages
even when the inode itself is locked") is not longer valid.
We should revert to the original behavior: in __writeback_single_inode(),
when we find an I_SYNC-ed inode and we're not doing a data-integrity sync,
skip writing entirely. Otherwise, we are double calling do_writepages()
Signed-off-by: Qi Yong <qiyong@fc-cn.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: Michael Rubin <mrubin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
try_to_unmap always fails on a page found in a VM_LOCKED vma (unless
migrating), and recycles it back to the active list. But if it's an
anonymous page, we've already allocated swap to it: just wasting swap.
Spot locked pages in page_referenced_one and treat them as referenced.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Tested-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Ethan Solomita <solo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove the prefetch logic in order to avoid touching impossible per cpu
areas.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
