Commit Graph

520 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Li Zefan
d823f6bfec devcgroup: fix odd behaviour when writing 'a' to devices.allow
# cat /devcg/devices.list
 a *:* rwm
 # echo a > devices.allow
 # cat /devcg/devices.list
 a *:* rwm
 a 0:0 rwm

This is odd and maybe confusing.  With this patch, writing 'a' to
devices.allow will add 'a *:* rwm' to the whitelist.

Also a few fixes and updates to the document.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-04 10:40:10 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan
1209726ce9 security: filesystem capabilities: fix CAP_SETPCAP handling
The filesystem capability support meaning for CAP_SETPCAP is less powerful
than the non-filesystem capability support.  As such, when filesystem
capabilities are configured, we should not permit CAP_SETPCAP to 'enhance'
the current process through strace manipulation of a child process.

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-04 10:40:08 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan
8cdbc2b982 capabilities: add (back) dummy support for KEEPCAPS
The dummy module is used by folk that run security conscious code(!?).  A
feature of such code (for example, dhclient) is that it tries to operate
with minimum privilege (dropping unneeded capabilities).  While the dummy
module doesn't restrict code execution based on capability state, the user
code expects the kernel to appear to support it.  This patch adds back
faked support for the PR_SET_KEEPCAPS etc., calls - making the kernel
behave as before 2.6.26.

For details see: http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10748

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-06-12 18:05:40 -07:00
Daniel Walker
dba6a4d32d keys: remove unused key_alloc_sem
This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@mvista.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-06-06 11:29:11 -07:00
Pavel Emelyanov
d1ee2971f5 devscgroup: make white list more compact in some cases
Consider you added a 'c foo:bar r' permission to some cgroup and then (a
bit later) 'c'foo:bar w' for it.  After this you'll see the

c foo:bar r
c foo:bar w

lines in a devices.list file.

Another example - consider you added 10 'c foo:bar r' permissions to some
cgroup (e.g.  by mistake).  After this you'll see 10 c foo:bar r lines in
a list file.

This is weird.  This situation also has one more annoying consequence.
Having many items in a white list makes permissions checking slower, sine
it has to walk a longer list.

The proposal is to merge permissions for items, that correspond to the
same device.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-06-06 11:29:11 -07:00
Pavel Emelyanov
cc9cb219aa devscgroup: relax task to dev_cgroup conversion
Two functions, that need to get a device_cgroup from a task (they are
devcgroup_inode_permission and devcgroup_inode_mknod) make it in a strange
way:

They get a css_set from task, then a subsys_state from css_set, then a
cgroup from the state and then a subsys_state again from the cgroup.
Besides, the devices_subsys_id is read from memory, whilst there's a
enum-ed constant for it.

Optimize this part a bit:
1. Get the subsys_stats form the task and be done - no 2 extra
   dereferences,
2. Use the device_subsys_id constant, not the value from memory
   (i.e. one less dereference).

Found while preparing 2.6.26 OpenVZ port.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-06-06 11:29:11 -07:00
Pavel Emelyanov
b66862f766 devcgroup: make a helper to convert cgroup_subsys_state to devs_cgroup
This is just picking the container_of out of cgroup_to_devcgroup into a
separate function.

This new css_to_devcgroup will be used in the 2nd patch.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-06-06 11:29:11 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
e97dcb0ead Smack: fuse mount hang fix
The d_instantiate hook for Smack can hang on the root inode of a
filesystem if the file system code has not really done all the set-up.
Fuse is known to encounter this problem.

This change detects an attempt to instantiate a root inode and addresses
it early in the processing, before any attempt is made to do something
that might hang.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-06-04 08:50:43 -07:00
Al Viro
9f3acc3140 [PATCH] split linux/file.h
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-05-01 13:08:16 -04:00
Oleg Nesterov
3b5e9e53c6 signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from
the kernel.  This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should
call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the
same check from ->task_kill() implementations.

(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session
 but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).

NOTE: Eric W.  Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think
he is very right.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 08:29:34 -07:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
d20bdda6d4 Smack: Integrate Smack with Audit
Setup the new Audit hooks for Smack. SELinux Audit rule fields are recycled
to avoid `auditd' userspace modifications. Currently only equality testing
is supported on labels acting as a subject (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER) or as an object
(AUDIT_OBJ_USER).

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2008-04-30 08:34:10 +10:00
David Howells
e52c1764f1 Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-30 08:23:51 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
9781db7b34 Merge branch 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
  [patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code
  [patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing
  [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings
  [PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h
  Audit: MAINTAINERS update
  Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field
  Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
  Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load
  Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back
  Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages
  Audit: end printk with newline
2008-04-29 11:41:22 -07:00
Robert P. J. Day
fdb89bce6c keys: explicitly include required slab.h header file.
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include <linux/slab.h>.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:17 -07:00
David Howells
0b77f5bfb4 keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:17 -07:00
David Howells
69664cf16a keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:17 -07:00
Arun Raghavan
6b79ccb514 keys: allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update()
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
da91d2ef9f keys: switch to proc_create()
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
David Howells
70a5bb72b5 keys: add keyctl function to get a security label
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
David Howells
4a38e122e2 keys: allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key().  request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.

The functions that change are:

	request_key_with_auxdata()
	request_key_async()
	request_key_async_with_auxdata()

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
Kevin Coffman
dceba99441 keys: check starting keyring as part of search
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.

The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring.  The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B.  The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.

Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd.  When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.

The order of calls is:

   keyctl_instantiate_key()
      lookup_user_key()				    (the default: case)
         search_process_keyrings(current)
	    search_process_keyrings(rka->context)   (recursive call)
	       keyring_search_aux()

keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.

This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for

Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
David Howells
38bbca6b6f keys: increase the payload size when instantiating a key
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key().  This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around.  The limit is raised to 1MB.  If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn
29486df325 cgroups: introduce cft->read_seq()
Introduce a read_seq() helper in cftype, which uses seq_file to print out
lists.  Use it in the devices cgroup.  Also split devices.allow into two
files, so now devices.deny and devices.allow are the ones to use to manipulate
the whitelist, while devices.list outputs the cgroup's current whitelist.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:10 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn
08ce5f16ee cgroups: implement device whitelist
Implement a cgroup to track and enforce open and mknod restrictions on device
files.  A device cgroup associates a device access whitelist with each cgroup.
 A whitelist entry has 4 fields.  'type' is a (all), c (char), or b (block).
'all' means it applies to all types and all major and minor numbers.  Major
and minor are either an integer or * for all.  Access is a composition of r
(read), w (write), and m (mknod).

The root device cgroup starts with rwm to 'all'.  A child devcg gets a copy of
the parent.  Admins can then remove devices from the whitelist or add new
entries.  A child cgroup can never receive a device access which is denied its
parent.  However when a device access is removed from a parent it will not
also be removed from the child(ren).

An entry is added using devices.allow, and removed using
devices.deny.  For instance

	echo 'c 1:3 mr' > /cgroups/1/devices.allow

allows cgroup 1 to read and mknod the device usually known as
/dev/null.  Doing

	echo a > /cgroups/1/devices.deny

will remove the default 'a *:* mrw' entry.

CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to change permissions or move another task to a new
cgroup.  A cgroup may not be granted more permissions than the cgroup's parent
has.  Any task can move itself between cgroups.  This won't be sufficient, but
we can decide the best way to adequately restrict movement later.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix may-be-used-uninitialized warning]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Looks-good-to: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Daniel Hokka Zakrisson <daniel@hozac.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:09 -07:00
David Howells
8f0cfa52a1 xattr: add missing consts to function arguments
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:06 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
cfd299dffe Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  SELinux: Fix a RCU free problem with the netport cache
  SELinux: Made netnode cache adds faster
  SELinux: include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: policydb.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: mls_types.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: mls.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: hashtab.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: context.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: ss/conditional.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: selinux/include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: objsec.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: netlabel.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
  SELinux: avc_ss.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups

Fixed up conflict in include/linux/security.h manually
2008-04-28 10:08:49 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn
1236cc3cf8 smack: use cap_task_prctl
With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related
prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl().  Have smack use
cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:27 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
30aa4faf62 smack: make smk_cipso_doi() and smk_unlbl_ambient()
The functions smk_cipso_doi and smk_unlbl_ambient are not used outside
smackfs.c and should hence be static.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:27 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn
55d00ccfb3 root_plug: use cap_task_prctl
With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related
prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl().  Have root_plug use
cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:27 -07:00
Harvey Harrison
c60264c494 smack: fix integer as NULL pointer warning in smack_lsm.c
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1257:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer

Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:27 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan
3898b1b4eb capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead.  That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.

Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege.  Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.

Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege.  In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.

The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0.  This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()).  This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.

With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:

  prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);

This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:26 -07:00
Eric Paris
b556f8ad58 Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces.  No userspace
changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy
work.  We have the following string audit interfaces to use:

void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);

void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n);
void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf);

void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n);
void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string);

This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that
people have with the string output from the kernel audit system.  But we
still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:19:22 -04:00
Eric Paris
2532386f48 Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages
Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was
available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of
netlink messages.  This patch adds that information to netlink messages
so we can audit who sent netlink messages.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:18:03 -04:00
Paul Moore
c9b7b97937 SELinux: Fix a RCU free problem with the netport cache
The netport cache doesn't free resources in a manner which is safe or orderly.
This patch fixes this by adding in a missing call to rcu_dereference() in
sel_netport_insert() as well as some general cleanup throughout the file.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:36:27 +10:00
Paul Moore
a639e7ca8e SELinux: Made netnode cache adds faster
When adding new entries to the network node cache we would walk the entire
hash bucket to make sure we didn't cross a threshold (done to bound the
cache size).  This isn't a very quick or elegant solution for something
which is supposed to be quick-ish so add a counter to each hash bucket to
track the size of the bucket and eliminate the need to walk the entire
bucket list on each add.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:36:23 +10:00
Eric Paris
489a5fd719 SELinux: policydb.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes policydb.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
location of * in pointer declarations

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:07 +10:00
Eric Paris
8bf1f3a6c0 SELinux: mls_types.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes mls_types.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

spaces used instead of tabs

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:06 +10:00
Eric Paris
d497fc87c0 SELinux: mls.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes mls.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

spaces used instead of tabs

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:05 +10:00
Eric Paris
faff786ce2 SELinux: hashtab.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes hashtab.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

spaces used instead of tabs

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:04 +10:00
Eric Paris
81fa42df78 SELinux: context.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes context.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

include spaces around , in function calls

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:03 +10:00
Eric Paris
ccb3cbeb4f SELinux: ss/conditional.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes ss/conditional.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

location of * in pointer declarations

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:02 +10:00
Eric Paris
b19d8eae99 SELinux: selinux/include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes selinux/include/security.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:01 +10:00
Eric Paris
a936b79bdf SELinux: objsec.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes objsec.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:29:00 +10:00
Eric Paris
cc03766aaf SELinux: netlabel.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes netlabel.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

spaces used instead of tabs

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:28:59 +10:00
Eric Paris
e392febedb SELinux: avc_ss.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
This patch changes avc_ss.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues.  Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)

whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-28 09:28:58 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
94bc891b00 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  [PATCH] get rid of __exit_files(), __exit_fs() and __put_fs_struct()
  [PATCH] proc_readfd_common() race fix
  [PATCH] double-free of inode on alloc_file() failure exit in create_write_pipe()
  [PATCH] teach seq_file to discard entries
  [PATCH] umount_tree() will unhash everything itself
  [PATCH] get rid of more nameidata passing in namespace.c
  [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path
  [PATCH] lock exclusively in collect_mounts() and drop_collected_mounts()
  [PATCH] move a bunch of declarations to fs/internal.h
2008-04-22 18:28:34 -07:00
Paul E. McKenney
6184425091 SELinux fixups needed for preemptable RCU from -rt
The attached patch needs to move from -rt to mainline given preemptable RCU.
This patch fixes SELinux code that implicitly assumes that disabling
preemption prevents an RCU grace period from completing, an assumption that
is valid for Classic RCU, but not necessarily for preemptable RCU.  Explicit
rcu_read_lock() calls are thus added.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-22 15:37:23 +10:00
Al Viro
b5266eb4c8 [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path
Namely, ones from namespace.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-21 23:13:23 -04:00
Eric Paris
0f5e64200f SELinux: no BUG_ON(!ss_initialized) in selinux_clone_mnt_opts
The Fedora installer actually makes multiple NFS mounts before it loads
selinux policy.  The code in selinux_clone_mnt_opts() assumed that the
init process would always be loading policy before NFS was up and
running.  It might be possible to hit this in a diskless environment as
well, I'm not sure.  There is no need to BUG_ON() in this situation
since we can safely continue given the circumstances.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-22 10:00:09 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
19b5b517a8 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  SELinux: one little, two little, three little whitespaces, the avc.c saga.
  SELinux: cleanup on isle selinuxfs.c
  changing whitespace for fun and profit: policydb.c
  SELinux: whitespace and formating fixes for hooks.c
  SELinux: clean up printks
  SELinux: sidtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: services.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: mls.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: hashtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: ebitmap.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: conditional.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: avtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: xfrm.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: nlmsgtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: netnode.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: netlink.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: netlabel.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
  SELinux: netif.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
2008-04-21 16:01:40 -07:00