This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations. It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.
The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.
When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.
When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.
Testing:
The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.
The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.
Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.
Testing:
The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.
The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The function ia64_pci_legacy_write() returns 0 for everything
except errors. This return value gets sent back to the user from
pci_write_legacy_io(), making it look like every write fails. The trivial
patch below copies the behavior of the SGI sn machvec and does what
would be expected from something implementing a write() function.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Remove non-existing entry for fat_cvf.txt (was it ever supported?).
Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
This patch removes all references to the bouncing address
rddunlap@osdl.org and one dead web page from the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
While looking for where to send trivial patches, I found old contact
information in Documentation/SubmittingPatches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
This patch for 2.4.x updates the dead email address for 'Mydraal'
and since he no longer wishes to field questions concerning
SysRq or this document removes the statement stating otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Also use the PnP functions to start/stop the devices during the suspend so
that drivers will not have to duplicate this code.
Cc: Adam Belay <ambx1@neo.rr.com>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@suse.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@drzeus.cx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Modules: EMU10K1/EMU10K2 driver
Description:
Part way to fix ALSA bug#927
Add support for the SPI interface on the CA0108 chip.
This is used to control the registers on the DAC.
Headphone output tested.
Other outputs and Capture not tested yet.
Note: The red LED does not come on, but sound is still OK.
Signed-off-by: James Courtier-Dutton <James@superbug.co.uk>
Modules: ES1968 driver
Fix disablement of TDMA and legacy support to prevent confliction of
resources with ISA boards. Confirmed with Terratec DMX and CS4236.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Modules: ARM PXA2XX driver
The SDONE and CDONE interrupt on the PXA27x might become unusable in
some conditions. Let's use an hybrid approach (interrupt with timeout)
to have the best possible behavior in all conditions.
Also let's not care about CAR_CAIP anymore. This is useless.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Modules: ALSA sequencer
Reduce the maximum possible number of global clients to 16 to make
more numbers available for card clients, and allow dynamically allocated
card client numbers to share the same range as application client
numbers to make sure that all 32 cards can be used at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
All users of snd_seq_create_kernel_client() have to set the client name
anyway, so we can just pass the name as parameter. This relieves us
from having to muck around with a struct snd_seq_client_info in these
cases.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
The fields of struct snd_seq_client_callback either aren't used or are
always set to the same value, so we can get rid of it altogether.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Modules: ALSA sequencer
None of the fields of struct snd_seq_kernel_client was actually used, so
remove them.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Modules: YMFPCI driver
Instead of 'DS-XG', show the correct chip model (DS-1/1L/1S/1E) where possible.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Modules: HDA Codec driver,HDA generic driver
- Common labels for input pins
- Fix and clean up of Realtek codec parsers
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Modules: ENS1370/1+ driver
Move the spdif and lineio parameters around so that they are compiled
even when SUPPORT_JOYSTICK isn't set.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Modules: EMU10K1/EMU10K2 driver
Added the chip-detail entry for SB Live 5.1 Digital OEM [SB0220, (c) 2003].
Signed-off-by: Gergely Tamas <dice@mfa.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Modules: AC97 Codec,ATIIXP driver,Intel8x0 driver
This patch adds a new quirk for ac97 hardware that combines the existing
AC97_TUNE_MUTE_LED and AC97_TUNE_HP_ONLY quirks. This is needed for several
current HP laptops. Additionally, it adds the HP nx6125 to the
AC97_TUNE_MUTE_LED list.
Fixed for the latest version of ALSA by Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
