diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 40511a8a5ae6..195707210975 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ * @cred contains the credentials to use. * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability . - * @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not + * @opts contains options for the capable check * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. * @syslog: * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing @@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ union security_list_options { const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); - int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit); + int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts); int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*syslog)(int type); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index b2c5333ed4b5..13537a49ae97 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -54,9 +54,12 @@ struct xattr; struct xfrm_sec_ctx; struct mm_struct; +/* Default (no) options for the capable function */ +#define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0 /* If capable should audit the security request */ -#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0 -#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 +#define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1) +/* If capable is being called by a setid function */ +#define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2) /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */ #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1 @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ enum lsm_event { /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit); + int cap, unsigned int opts); extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); @@ -207,10 +210,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap); -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap); +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts); int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry); int security_syslog(int type); @@ -464,14 +467,11 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, } static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); -} - -static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, opts); } static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 1e1c0236f55b..7718d7dcadc7 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, int ret; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int ret; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); @@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { int capable; @@ -372,8 +374,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) BUG(); } - capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) : - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap); + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); if (capable == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) */ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true); + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); */ bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false); + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); @@ -448,10 +449,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) return false; - if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return true; return false; @@ -500,10 +502,12 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) { int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ const struct cred *cred; + rcu_read_lock(); cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); if (cred) - ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); + ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index d7f538847b84..38a77800def6 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -443,8 +443,8 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) * behavior of privileged children. */ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) + security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 253ef6e9d445..752f73980e30 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) * @cap: capability to test if allowed - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) * * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM */ -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, - struct common_audit_data *sa) +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, + unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) { int error; @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, else error = -EPERM; - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { + if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) { if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) return error; /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, * aa_capable - test permission to use capability * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability to be tested - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated * * Look up capability in profile capability set. * * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. */ -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) sa.u.cap = cap; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa)); + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit); +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 527ea1557120..aacd1e95cb59 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; aad(sa)->peer = tracee; aad(sa)->request = 0; - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NONE); return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 60ef71268ccf..b6c395e2acd0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -172,14 +172,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, } static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit); + error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); aa_put_label(label); return error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 95fd26d09757..552ed09cb47e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, */ if (label != peer && - aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) != 0) + aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) error = fn_for_each(label, profile, audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, peer, diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 52e04136bfa8..188eaf59f82f 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, */ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { - /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, - CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) + CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return 0; return 1; } @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ || (cap_capable(current_cred(), - current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ + current_cred()->user_ns, + CAP_SETPCAP, + CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked * [2] no unlocking of locks @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; + return cap_sys_admin; } @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + CAP_OPT_NONE); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret == 0) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 953fc3ea18a9..a618e22df5c6 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -689,16 +689,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap) +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); -} - -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap) -{ - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); } int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d98e1d8d18f6..b2ee49f938f1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1578,7 +1578,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, - int cap, int audit, bool initns) + int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct av_decision avd; @@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { + if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); if (rc2) @@ -2125,9 +2125,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { - return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns); + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) @@ -2201,7 +2201,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true); + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; @@ -2988,11 +2988,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; + unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT; - if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit)) + if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) return false; - if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true)) + if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) return false; return true; } @@ -3387,7 +3387,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true); + CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 489d49a20b47..fe2ce3a65822 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred) struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; int rc; - rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); if (rc) return false;