seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig
In order to make adding configurable features into seccomp easier, it's better to have the options at one single location, considering especially that the bulk of seccomp code is arch-independent. An quick look also show that many SECCOMP descriptions are outdated; they talk about /proc rather than prctl. As a result of moving the config option and keeping it default on, architectures arm, arm64, csky, riscv, sh, and xtensa did not have SECCOMP on by default prior to this and SECCOMP will be default in this change. Architectures microblaze, mips, powerpc, s390, sh, and sparc have an outdated depend on PROC_FS and this dependency is removed in this change. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1YWz9cnp08UZgeieYRhHdqh-ch7aNwc4JRBnGyrmgfMg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [kees: added HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP help text, tweaked wording] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9ede6ef35c847e58d61e476c6a39540520066613.1600951211.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
This commit is contained in:
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arch/Kconfig
32
arch/Kconfig
@ -444,10 +444,23 @@ config ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
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select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
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select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
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bool
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bool
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config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
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config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
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bool
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bool
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help
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An arch should select this symbol to support seccomp mode 1 (the fixed
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syscall policy), and must provide an overrides for __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
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and compat syscalls if the asm-generic/seccomp.h defaults need adjustment:
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- __NR_seccomp_read_32
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- __NR_seccomp_write_32
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- __NR_seccomp_exit_32
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- __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32
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config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
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bool
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select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
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help
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help
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An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
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An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
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- all the requirements for HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
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- syscall_get_arch()
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- syscall_get_arch()
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- syscall_get_arguments()
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- syscall_get_arguments()
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- syscall_rollback()
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- syscall_rollback()
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@ -458,6 +471,23 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
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results in the system call being skipped immediately.
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results in the system call being skipped immediately.
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- seccomp syscall wired up
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- seccomp syscall wired up
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config SECCOMP
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prompt "Enable seccomp to safely execute untrusted bytecode"
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def_bool y
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depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to handle untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available
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to the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in their
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own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is enabled via
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prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) or the seccomp() syscall, it cannot be
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disabled and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe
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syscalls defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y.
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config SECCOMP_FILTER
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config SECCOMP_FILTER
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def_bool y
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def_bool y
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depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
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depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
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@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ config ARM
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select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL if !XIP_KERNEL && !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
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select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL if !XIP_KERNEL && !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
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select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
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select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
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select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
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select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
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select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
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select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT
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select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT
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select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
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select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
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select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
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select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
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@ -1617,20 +1618,6 @@ config UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY
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However, if the CPU data cache is using a write-allocate mode,
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However, if the CPU data cache is using a write-allocate mode,
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this option is unlikely to provide any performance gain.
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this option is unlikely to provide any performance gain.
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config SECCOMP
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bool
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prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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config PARAVIRT
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config PARAVIRT
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bool "Enable paravirtualization code"
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bool "Enable paravirtualization code"
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help
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help
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@ -1033,19 +1033,6 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK
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config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
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config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
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def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)
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def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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config PARAVIRT
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config PARAVIRT
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bool "Enable paravirtualization code"
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bool "Enable paravirtualization code"
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help
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help
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@ -309,16 +309,3 @@ endmenu
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source "arch/csky/Kconfig.platforms"
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source "arch/csky/Kconfig.platforms"
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source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
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source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config MICROBLAZE
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select GENERIC_SCHED_CLOCK
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select GENERIC_SCHED_CLOCK
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select HAVE_ARCH_HASH
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select HAVE_ARCH_HASH
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select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
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select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
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select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
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select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
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select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
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select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
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select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
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select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
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select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
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@ -120,23 +121,6 @@ config CMDLINE_FORCE
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Set this to have arguments from the default kernel command string
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Set this to have arguments from the default kernel command string
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override those passed by the boot loader.
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override those passed by the boot loader.
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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depends on PROC_FS
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default y
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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endmenu
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endmenu
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menu "Kernel features"
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menu "Kernel features"
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@ -3004,23 +3004,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START
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specified in the "crashkernel=YM@XM" command line boot parameter
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specified in the "crashkernel=YM@XM" command line boot parameter
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passed to the panic-ed kernel).
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passed to the panic-ed kernel).
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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depends on PROC_FS
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default y
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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config MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT
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config MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT
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bool "Support for O32 binaries using 64-bit FP" if !CPU_MIPSR6
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bool "Support for O32 binaries using 64-bit FP" if !CPU_MIPSR6
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depends on 32BIT || MIPS32_O32
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depends on 32BIT || MIPS32_O32
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@ -378,19 +378,3 @@ endmenu
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source "drivers/parisc/Kconfig"
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source "drivers/parisc/Kconfig"
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config SECCOMP
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def_bool y
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prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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@ -934,23 +934,6 @@ config ARCH_WANTS_FREEZER_CONTROL
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source "kernel/power/Kconfig"
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source "kernel/power/Kconfig"
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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depends on PROC_FS
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default y
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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config PPC_MEM_KEYS
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config PPC_MEM_KEYS
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prompt "PowerPC Memory Protection Keys"
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prompt "PowerPC Memory Protection Keys"
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def_bool y
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def_bool y
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@ -333,19 +333,6 @@ menu "Kernel features"
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source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
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source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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config RISCV_SBI_V01
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config RISCV_SBI_V01
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bool "SBI v0.1 support"
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bool "SBI v0.1 support"
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default y
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default y
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@ -791,23 +791,6 @@ config CRASH_DUMP
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endmenu
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endmenu
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config SECCOMP
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def_bool y
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prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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depends on PROC_FS
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y.
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config CCW
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config CCW
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def_bool y
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def_bool y
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@ -600,22 +600,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START
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where the fail safe kernel needs to run at a different address
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where the fail safe kernel needs to run at a different address
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than the panic-ed kernel.
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than the panic-ed kernel.
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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depends on PROC_FS
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via prctl, it cannot be disabled and the task is only
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allowed to execute a few safe syscalls defined by each seccomp
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mode.
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If unsure, say N.
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config SMP
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config SMP
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bool "Symmetric multi-processing support"
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bool "Symmetric multi-processing support"
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depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP
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depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP
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@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ config SPARC
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select HAVE_OPROFILE
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select HAVE_OPROFILE
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select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !SMP || SPARC64
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select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !SMP || SPARC64
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select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
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select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
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select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP if SPARC64
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select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
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select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
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select HAVE_PCI
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select HAVE_PCI
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select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
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select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
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@ -226,23 +227,6 @@ config EARLYFB
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help
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help
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Say Y here to enable a faster early framebuffer boot console.
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Say Y here to enable a faster early framebuffer boot console.
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config SECCOMP
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bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
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depends on SPARC64 && PROC_FS
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default y
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help
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This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
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that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
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execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
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the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
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syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
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their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
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enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
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and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
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defined by each seccomp mode.
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If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
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config HOTPLUG_CPU
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config HOTPLUG_CPU
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bool "Support for hot-pluggable CPUs"
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bool "Support for hot-pluggable CPUs"
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depends on SPARC64 && SMP
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depends on SPARC64 && SMP
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@ -173,22 +173,6 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS
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default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES
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default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES
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default 2
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default 2
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config SECCOMP
|
|
||||||
def_bool y
|
|
||||||
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
|
|
||||||
help
|
|
||||||
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
|
|
||||||
that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
|
|
||||||
execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
|
|
||||||
the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
|
|
||||||
syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
|
|
||||||
their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
|
|
||||||
enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
|
|
||||||
and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
|
|
||||||
defined by each seccomp mode.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
config UML_TIME_TRAVEL_SUPPORT
|
config UML_TIME_TRAVEL_SUPPORT
|
||||||
bool
|
bool
|
||||||
prompt "Support time-travel mode (e.g. for test execution)"
|
prompt "Support time-travel mode (e.g. for test execution)"
|
||||||
|
@ -1968,22 +1968,6 @@ config EFI_MIXED
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
If unsure, say N.
|
If unsure, say N.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
config SECCOMP
|
|
||||||
def_bool y
|
|
||||||
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
|
|
||||||
help
|
|
||||||
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
|
|
||||||
that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
|
|
||||||
execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
|
|
||||||
the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
|
|
||||||
syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
|
|
||||||
their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
|
|
||||||
enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
|
|
||||||
and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
|
|
||||||
defined by each seccomp mode.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
|
source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
config KEXEC
|
config KEXEC
|
||||||
|
@ -217,20 +217,6 @@ config HOTPLUG_CPU
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Say N if you want to disable CPU hotplug.
|
Say N if you want to disable CPU hotplug.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
config SECCOMP
|
|
||||||
bool
|
|
||||||
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
|
|
||||||
help
|
|
||||||
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
|
|
||||||
that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
|
|
||||||
execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
|
|
||||||
the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
|
|
||||||
syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
|
|
||||||
their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
|
|
||||||
enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
|
|
||||||
and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
|
|
||||||
defined by each seccomp mode.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
config FAST_SYSCALL_XTENSA
|
config FAST_SYSCALL_XTENSA
|
||||||
bool "Enable fast atomic syscalls"
|
bool "Enable fast atomic syscalls"
|
||||||
default n
|
default n
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user