2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
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* Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*
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* File: ima_main.c
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2009-12-04 20:48:00 +00:00
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* implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
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2010-01-26 22:02:40 +00:00
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* and ima_file_check.
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2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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2011-08-30 00:19:50 +00:00
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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2013-04-25 07:43:56 +00:00
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#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
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2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
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#include "ima.h"
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int ima_initialized;
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ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
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int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
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#else
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int ima_appraise;
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#endif
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2013-04-25 07:43:56 +00:00
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int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
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2013-06-07 10:16:37 +00:00
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static int hash_setup_done;
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2013-04-25 07:43:56 +00:00
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2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
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static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
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{
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2013-06-07 10:16:37 +00:00
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struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
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int i;
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if (hash_setup_done)
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return 1;
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if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
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if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
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ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
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else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
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ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
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goto out;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
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if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
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ima_hash_algo = i;
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break;
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}
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}
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out:
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hash_setup_done = 1;
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2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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/*
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2010-11-02 14:13:07 +00:00
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* ima_rdwr_violation_check
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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*
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2010-11-02 14:13:07 +00:00
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* Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
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2014-03-04 16:04:20 +00:00
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* - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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* results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
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* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
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2014-03-04 16:04:20 +00:00
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* could result in a file measurement error.
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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*
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*/
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2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
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static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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2014-09-12 17:35:56 +00:00
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int must_measure,
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2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
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char **pathbuf,
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const char **pathname)
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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{
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2013-06-13 22:37:49 +00:00
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
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2010-10-25 18:41:45 +00:00
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bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
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2010-10-25 18:41:59 +00:00
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
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ima: check inode integrity cache in violation check
When IMA did not support ima-appraisal, existance of the S_IMA flag
clearly indicated that the file was measured. With IMA appraisal S_IMA
flag indicates that file was measured and/or appraised. Because of
this, when measurement is not enabled by the policy, violations are
still reported.
To differentiate between measurement and appraisal policies this
patch checks the inode integrity cache flags. The IMA_MEASURED
flag indicates whether the file was actually measured, while the
IMA_MEASURE flag indicates whether the file should be measured.
Unfortunately, the IMA_MEASURED flag is reset to indicate the file
needs to be re-measured. Thus, this patch checks the IMA_MEASURE
flag.
This patch limits the false positive violation reports, but does
not fix it entirely. The IMA_MEASURE/IMA_MEASURED flags are
indications that, at some point in time, the file opened for read
was in policy, but might not be in policy now (eg. different uid).
Other changes would be needed to further limit false positive
violation reports.
Changelog:
- expanded patch description based on conversation with Roberto (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-27 08:29:28 +00:00
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if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
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2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
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if (!iint)
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iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
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ima: check inode integrity cache in violation check
When IMA did not support ima-appraisal, existance of the S_IMA flag
clearly indicated that the file was measured. With IMA appraisal S_IMA
flag indicates that file was measured and/or appraised. Because of
this, when measurement is not enabled by the policy, violations are
still reported.
To differentiate between measurement and appraisal policies this
patch checks the inode integrity cache flags. The IMA_MEASURED
flag indicates whether the file was actually measured, while the
IMA_MEASURE flag indicates whether the file should be measured.
Unfortunately, the IMA_MEASURED flag is reset to indicate the file
needs to be re-measured. Thus, this patch checks the IMA_MEASURE
flag.
This patch limits the false positive violation reports, but does
not fix it entirely. The IMA_MEASURE/IMA_MEASURED flags are
indications that, at some point in time, the file opened for read
was in policy, but might not be in policy now (eg. different uid).
Other changes would be needed to further limit false positive
violation reports.
Changelog:
- expanded patch description based on conversation with Roberto (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-27 08:29:28 +00:00
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/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
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if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
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send_tomtou = true;
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}
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2014-03-27 08:54:11 +00:00
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} else {
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2014-09-12 17:35:56 +00:00
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if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && must_measure)
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2014-03-27 08:54:11 +00:00
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send_writers = true;
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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}
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2010-10-25 18:41:45 +00:00
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2012-06-20 13:32:55 +00:00
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if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
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return;
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2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
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*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf);
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2012-09-03 21:40:17 +00:00
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2010-10-25 18:41:45 +00:00
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if (send_tomtou)
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2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
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ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
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2010-10-25 18:41:45 +00:00
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if (send_writers)
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2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
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ima_add_violation(file, *pathname,
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2012-06-20 13:32:55 +00:00
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"invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
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2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
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}
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2011-03-09 19:13:22 +00:00
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static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
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|
|
struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
|
2010-10-25 18:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-07-26 08:30:35 +00:00
|
|
|
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
|
2010-10-25 18:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
2014-06-27 15:04:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
|
|
|
|
if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
|
|
|
|
(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
|
|
|
|
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
|
|
|
|
if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
|
|
|
|
ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
|
|
|
|
}
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
2010-10-25 18:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ima_file_free - called on __fput()
|
|
|
|
* @file: pointer to file structure being freed
|
|
|
|
*
|
2010-11-02 14:13:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* Flag files that changed, based on i_version
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-23 22:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
|
2011-03-09 19:13:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-08-31 13:38:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2010-10-25 18:42:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-09 19:13:22 +00:00
|
|
|
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
|
2010-11-02 14:14:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!iint)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-02 14:14:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-19 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
|
|
|
|
int opened)
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-23 22:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
|
2014-06-13 15:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
|
2012-09-03 21:40:17 +00:00
|
|
|
char *pathbuf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const char *pathname = NULL;
|
2014-09-03 07:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
|
2013-04-25 07:44:04 +00:00
|
|
|
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int xattr_len = 0;
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
bool violation_check;
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-12 17:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-10-25 18:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-03 22:08:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
|
|
|
|
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
|
|
|
|
* Included is the appraise submask.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-06-27 08:26:14 +00:00
|
|
|
action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
|
2014-09-12 17:35:56 +00:00
|
|
|
violation_check = ((function == FILE_CHECK || function == MMAP_CHECK) &&
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
|
|
|
|
if (!action && !violation_check)
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
|
2010-10-25 18:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-12-05 20:14:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
|
2014-09-03 07:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
|
|
|
|
function = FILE_CHECK;
|
2012-12-05 20:14:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (action) {
|
|
|
|
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
|
|
|
|
if (!iint)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (violation_check) {
|
2014-09-12 17:35:56 +00:00
|
|
|
ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
|
|
|
|
&pathbuf, &pathname);
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!action) {
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-19 09:04:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
|
2012-12-03 22:08:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
|
|
|
|
* IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
iint->flags |= action;
|
2012-06-08 10:58:49 +00:00
|
|
|
action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
|
2012-09-12 17:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
|
|
|
|
if (!action) {
|
2012-12-03 22:08:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (must_appraise)
|
2014-09-03 07:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
|
2012-09-27 12:06:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_digsig;
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-13 15:55:48 +00:00
|
|
|
template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
|
2014-08-22 06:43:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
|
|
|
|
strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
|
2013-04-25 07:44:04 +00:00
|
|
|
xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
|
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2014-05-12 13:28:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
|
|
|
|
rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
|
2012-09-27 12:06:28 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_digsig;
|
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2014-05-12 13:28:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-20 13:32:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pathname) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
|
|
|
|
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
|
2012-06-20 13:32:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
|
2013-07-23 15:15:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
|
|
|
|
xattr_value, xattr_len);
|
2012-12-03 22:08:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
|
2014-09-03 07:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname,
|
2014-06-27 15:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
|
2012-06-14 17:04:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
|
2012-09-03 21:40:17 +00:00
|
|
|
ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-09-27 12:06:28 +00:00
|
|
|
out_digsig:
|
|
|
|
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
|
|
|
|
rc = -EACCES;
|
2014-09-12 17:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(xattr_value);
|
|
|
|
out_free:
|
|
|
|
kfree(pathbuf);
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-02-13 15:15:05 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
|
|
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
|
|
|
|
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
|
|
|
|
* @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
|
|
|
|
* policy decision.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
|
|
|
|
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
|
2014-08-19 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
|
|
|
|
* @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
|
|
|
|
* from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
|
|
|
|
* already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
|
|
|
|
* So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
|
|
|
|
* what is being executed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
|
|
|
|
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-19 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
|
|
|
|
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured
|
|
|
|
* @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
|
|
|
|
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
|
2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-27 15:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
|
2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-08-19 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return process_measurement(file,
|
2013-10-10 06:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
|
2014-06-27 15:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
FILE_CHECK, opened);
|
2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-01-26 22:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
|
2010-01-20 20:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-16 02:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
|
|
|
|
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2012-09-27 12:57:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
|
|
|
|
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
|
2012-10-16 02:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-12-21 13:34:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!file) {
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
|
2013-02-25 04:42:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
|
|
|
|
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
|
2013-02-21 16:18:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
|
2012-12-21 13:34:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-02-21 16:18:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-19 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
|
2012-10-16 02:10:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-22 14:39:48 +00:00
|
|
|
int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!file) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
|
|
|
|
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
|
|
|
|
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-19 13:48:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
|
2014-07-22 14:39:48 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
static int __init init_ima(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-07 10:16:37 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ima_init();
|
2014-09-12 17:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
2014-06-27 10:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ima_initialized = 1;
|
2014-09-12 17:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ima_update_policy_flag();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|