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kernel-ark/include/linux/ima.h

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integrity: IMA hooks This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly in the fs directory. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:57 +00:00
/*
* Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_IMA_H
#define _LINUX_IMA_H
integrity: shmem zero fix Based on comments from Mike Frysinger and Randy Dunlap: (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/9/262) - moved ima.h include before CONFIG_SHMEM test to fix compiler error on Blackfin: mm/shmem.c: In function 'shmem_zero_setup': mm/shmem.c:2670: error: implicit declaration of function 'ima_shm_check' - added 'struct linux_binprm' in ima.h to fix compiler warning on Blackfin: In file included from mm/shmem.c:32: include/linux/ima.h:25: warning: 'struct linux_binprm' declared inside parameter list include/linux/ima.h:25: warning: its scope is only this definition or declaration, which is probably not what you want - moved fs.h include within _LINUX_IMA_H definition Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-11 04:01:19 +00:00
#include <linux/fs.h>
struct linux_binprm;
integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check ima_path_check actually deals with files! call it ima_file_check instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-01-26 22:02:40 +00:00
extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
ima: support new kernel module syscall With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system. This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an extensible and consistent manner. To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional patches could pass the signature as the first parameter. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-16 02:10:08 +00:00
extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:58 +00:00
#else
integrity: IMA hooks This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly in the fs directory. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:57 +00:00
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check ima_path_check actually deals with files! call it ima_file_check instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-01-26 22:02:40 +00:00
static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
integrity: IMA hooks This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly in the fs directory. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:57 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
return;
}
static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
return 0;
}
ima: add inode_post_setattr call Changing an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-03-10 03:57:53 +00:00
ima: support new kernel module syscall With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system. This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an extensible and consistent manner. To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional patches could pass the signature as the first parameter. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-16 02:10:08 +00:00
static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
Remove spurious _H suffixes from ifdef comments Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2013-03-25 20:12:27 +00:00
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
ima: add inode_post_setattr call Changing an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-03-10 03:57:53 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c) Changelog: - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin) - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu) - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal. - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs - ima_protect_xattr should be static Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-03-10 23:54:15 +00:00
extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
ima: add inode_post_setattr call Changing an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-03-10 03:57:53 +00:00
#else
static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return;
}
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c) Changelog: - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin) - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu) - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal. - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs - ima_protect_xattr should be static Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-03-10 23:54:15 +00:00
static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name)
{
return 0;
}
Remove spurious _H suffixes from ifdef comments Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2013-03-25 20:12:27 +00:00
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
integrity: IMA hooks This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly in the fs directory. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-04 14:06:57 +00:00
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
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